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Summary of Thesis 
Dynamic mobility and migration patterns, including forced migration, have always formed 
part of the complex social, cultural and economic relationships between Africa and Europe. 
Like other Africans, Nigerian migrants live in countless locations around the world and are 
connected to their homeland through contingent transnational networks. This thesis 
explores the onward migration of Nigerian migrants towards, within and beyond Europe 
and analyses the motivations, patterns and outcomes of their multiple movements. 
Six cities in Germany, the UK and Spain are the main research locations for the 
fieldwork that took place over 17 months. The three countries are important destinations 
for Nigerian migrants in Europe and also the principal destinations of intra-European 
onward migrants. The cities included in this study are the capital cities Berlin, London and 
Madrid, as well as Cologne, Manchester and Málaga. The multi-sited fieldwork comprised 
ethnographic research techniques involving in-depth interviews (to gather information 
about the motivations and experiences of onward migrants) and participant observation (to 
understand the contexts in which mobility practices were embedded), which were 
complemented with analysis of the 2011 Census data and other secondary statistical data 
(to explore general migration patterns and socio-demographic data). 
Onward migration is conceptualised as a function of aspirations and capabilities, 
thus highlighting how evolving structures of opportunities and constraints can influence 
social and geographical trajectories. The findings suggest that migrant decision-making and 
trajectories are open-ended and unfold across the life course and the migration project. 
Furthermore, onward migrants engage in sustained multi-sited transnationalism which 
influences their complex mobility patterns and identity formation. Rather than focusing on 
migrants’ integration at a destination or their contribution to development in their origin 
country, as is common in migration studies, this study uses the wellbeing approach to 
holistically explore how migrants and their families experience onward migration in 
different places and countries. Their perceptions of wellbeing are multi-dimensional and 
relational, shaped both by previous, present and anticipated future states of wellbeing. 
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Chapter 1   
 
Introduction  
1.1  A chance encounter 
My interest in onward migration dates back to a chance encounter with Harrison in North 
London during the autumn of 2009. I was working as an associate researcher on the 
Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) survey. Around Seven Sisters underground 
station in North London I was looking for a Ghanaian restaurant, where I had arranged to 
meet a potential survey respondent. Seeing that I was having difficulty locating the place, I 
entered an internet café on West Green Road to ask for directions. Harrison was busy 
chatting to the owner, but he recognised the name of the restaurant I was asking for and 
offered to show me the way. We stepped outside onto the road, and he indicated in which 
direction I should head. He instructed me to ‘Walk straight down road and then go rechts at 
the Ampel… ehh… traffic lights’. I was a little confused at first why Harrison was using 
German words, but did not say anything. When Harrison continued to speak and 
interspersed more German words into our conversation, I became curious. Being bilingual 
in German and English, I could understand Harrison’s instructions without any difficulty. 
But rather self-consciously at this point I was trying to assess whether I had inadvertently 
said anything in German myself or was wearing something that marked me out as German. 
I was all too aware how difficult it was to make a complete switch between languages, and 
knew the feeling of not remembering certain words. Still slightly confused, I decided to just 
politely ask Harrison if he spoke German. 
Harrison initially was puzzled, because he must not have noticed his slippage into 
German. Then he responded with a smile that he was from Ghana but had lived in Hamburg 
for over 10 years before coming to London. I told him how happy I was to meet a fellow 
Hamburger, seeing that this was the city I was born in. I also mentioned that I had travelled 
to Ghana and really liked the country. We both laughed about our chance encounter and 
continued chatting for a while. Harrison now told me in German about the neighbourhood 
he used to live in and where he used to work in Hamburg. He also mentioned his two 
children who had stayed living in Hamburg with their mother. Harrison told me that he 
worked for a big company in Germany. A few years after he and his wife had separated, 
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Harrison asked if the company could offer him employment in one of their branches in the 
UK. When his company indicated that they would be willing to hire him in East London, 
Harrison decided to relocate. At the beginning, he was doing a job that was below his skill-
level and previous pay grade in Germany. Harrison also did not like the shift pattern, which 
changed from week to week. He said that it was challenging to share accommodation with 
several other people. But Harrison also explained how he had become used to the lifestyle. 
At the time he was considering to move to Milton Keynes, because a lot of his German-
Ghanaian friends were calling to say that there was more affordable housing there and he 
could easily find a job. Harrison still went back to Hamburg frequently to visit his children. 
Seeing that I had to head off to my appointment, I asked Harrison if we could exchange 
telephone numbers and said that I would like to stay in touch with him. Harrison agreed 
and we joked that we might even bump into each other in Hamburg.  
1.2  Onward migration: defining the term 
Onward migration is a migration trajectory that spans multiple places, remains open-ended 
and continuously evolves over time. The encounter with Harrison sparked my interest to 
explore the topic for my doctoral research. On a theoretical level, onward migration poses 
several challenges to scholarship within Migration Studies. International migration used to 
be mainly conceptualised as a linear move from a country of origin to a particular 
destination – country A to country B. Drawing attention to the possible reversibility of these 
flows, other studies have considered moves that occur in the opposite direction, when 
migrants eventually decide to return to their country of origin (for a review see King 2000; 
also Cassarino 2004). Thus international migration has been spatially fixed between two 
geographical nodes in order to analyse and interpret it (Cresswell 2006). Recent research 
into transit migration and stepwise migration has emphasised more complex migration 
trajectories and contributed insights about the ‘journeys’ and possible ‘in-between’ stages 
of the migration process (Andersson 2013; Paul 2011; Suter 2012; Vogt 2013). 
Nevertheless, the overarching framing, that international migration occurs between two 
main geographic nodes, has remained largely unchallenged (Collyer and de Haas 2012). 
When people decide to move again after settling at an initial destination, their 
migration trajectories encompass further geographic nodes, located in country C and 
country D. Indeed, the migration trajectories of onward migrants can unfold over a whole 
series of different localities, involving both internal and international migration. This 
constitutes an important conceptual broadening of migration trajectories as dynamic and 
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potentially open-ended processes. Furthermore, onward migration is not linear, because it 
can involve complex multi-directional moves and visits – to new places or previous places 
of settlement – and therefore problematises notions of 'origin', 'destination', 'home' and 
'return'. Onward migrants associate different life stages with particular places. Similar to 
other key life events – such as the completion of education, a new job, marriage or the birth 
of children – migration can mark an important life transition. Moving to another place can 
be the start of another chapter in life – a step back to recapture, a continuation of the life 
story or a rupture that signals new beginnings. Throughout the life course migrants’ 
biographies become enmeshed with their winding migration paths and the places they 
settle (Fangen 2012). 
Migration can transform the ways in which individuals see the world, their place 
within it and how they are perceived. Discourses and practices relating to contemporary 
identities and ideas of nationhood are thus affected and challenged by mobility (Brah 1996). 
Migrants who move between ‘here’ and ‘there’ gain novel perspectives on their 'home' and 
'host' society. This led to the acknowledgement that migrants can form ‘hyphenated’ 
national identities as a way of expressing their varying degrees of identification with two 
nations, two political systems and two ways of being (Çaglar 1997). Nonetheless, these 
hyphenated identifications are commonly expected to fall on a pre-defined binary spectrum. 
Migrants who continue to move and consecutively settle in different countries, step outside 
of this supposed duality of being and belonging. The question then becomes how onward 
migrants perceive and perform their identities. It is possible that this complexity, which is 
difficult to explain, might result in onward migrants presenting stable and simplistic self-
definitions. Others might favour ambivalent ‘hybrid’ and plural identities – religious, 
political and social (Ifekwunigwe 2002; St. Louis 2009; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). 
The ‘transnational turn’ in the social sciences has drawn attention to the various  ties 
and exchanges that connect migrants with family members, kin and institutions across 
national borders (Basch et al. 1994). Yet transnationalism has been criticised for its 
deterritorialised conceptualisation of space, which does not acknowledge how everyday 
practices and transnational flows situate people and places in contingent ways (Mitchell 
2007). Onward migrants in particular draw our attention to an explicitly multi-sited and 
multi-directional form of transnationalism, as they maintain ties and are involved in 
activities across their origin country, former places of residence and other places they visit.  
Thus, onward migration may represent a migration strategy through which migrants use 
the ‘situatedness’ of particular places for differentiated access to particular resources and 
opportunity structures.  
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Migrants hope that the places they reach and decide to settle will enable them to 
realise their imagined future. Thus migration aspirations represent powerful claims to 
where migrants envisage themselves – both in terms of place and wellbeing. For (aspirant) 
migrants, (im)mobility is therefore closely linked to the realisation of social mobility and 
other life endeavours (Pelican 2013). The continued movement of migrants can be driven 
by particular aspirations, dreams, hopes and desires that were formed in the origin 
countries, but remained unfulfilled. While for others, the decision to move multiple times 
may also be the result of new aspirations that were formed due to the experience of 
migration and new surroundings. The act of migration often enables individuals to gain new 
perspectives and accumulate further resources, including social, economic and cultural 
capital. Migrants might attain new mobility rights, learn new skills and accumulate 
economic resources, which in turn increase the likelihood of further moves (Massey 1990; 
Myrdal 1957). Onward migrants learn to envision their lives in other places and how this 
might influence their wellbeing. Importantly, they also develop the emotional capacity to 
make a new home for themselves and feel settled in a new place. Ultimately, further moves 
might allow individuals to reach places and states of wellbeing which did not form part of 
their initial horizon of possibilities, while others forever are ‘seeking greener pastures’. 
1.3 Diverse global onward mobilities 
The scale of global onward migration is difficult to quantify, however, several studies 
suggest that these trajectories constitute a sizable part of migration patterns in several 
destinations (Bratsberg et al. 2007; Hugo 2008). In Sweden, Nekby (2006) found that on 
leaving the country 72 per cent of migrants intended to return to their country of birth, 
meaning that 28 per cent relocated to another destination. For the USA, Artuç and Özden 
(2016) estimate that 9 per cent of recent immigrants in the USA arrived via a country other 
than their country of birth. Interestingly, the authors’ findings indicate that amongst 
immigrants in the USA who had previously resided in a high-income country the rate of 
onward migration was even higher, namely 30 per cent (Artuç and Özden 2016). On the 
whole, Canada, the USA and New Zealand are better at retaining migrants for extended 
periods of time, whereas in Europe higher shares of migrants leave again within five years 
– either to their origin country or another destination (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). Thus 
current European migration dynamics include multi-directional onward mobilities, which 
occur towards, within and beyond the region. 
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Despite the evidence of these more complex migration processes, onward migration 
remains under-studied relative to other trajectories, such as one-step migration or return 
migration. Whilst some earlier research has focused on repeat internal migrations 
(Newbold and Bell 2001; da Vanzo 1983), much less is known about international onward 
migration. The relative dearth of research on international onward migration is not because 
this migration trajectory is a new phenomenon – it is likely that onward and circular 
mobilities always formed part of migration patterns (Bratsberg et al. 2007; Voigt-Graf 
2004). For some migrants continuous migration even represents a way of life (Sinatti 2011; 
Walker 2011). Yet, current immigration statistics do not readily lend themselves to the 
study of onward migration and even qualitative studies have tended to portray 
international migration as a simple linear trajectory. Growing awareness about 
international onward migration and the availability of large-scale migration surveys, 1 
however, have contributed to an increase of research on this topic over the recent decade 
(Biao 2006; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Nekby 2006; Ossman 2013; Toma and Castagnone 
2015). 
As regards the drivers of multiple migration, some scholars interpret more complex 
trajectories as a planned ‘stepwise’ strategy that enables migrants to navigate and 
overcome barriers to reach their desired destination (Biao 2006; Konadu-Agyemang 1999; 
Paul 2011; De Voretz and Zhang 2004). People from low-income countries are confronted 
with a mobility paradox. Although the media and other means of communication provide 
information about out what it means to live well in other parts of the world, many face 
considerable restrictions to move to these places (Kleist and Thorsen 2017). Increasing 
inequality and the implementation of more selective immigration policies in high-income 
countries since the 1990s, make it necessary for aspirant migrants to find alternative routes 
to reach particular places, which in turn may have contributed to a rise in transit and 
stepwise migration (Collyer and de Haas 2012; de Haas et al. 2016). Meanwhile other 
scholars believe that onward mobilities are a result of migrants’ ongoing evaluations of their 
migration project, during which they weigh up the evolving opportunities and constraints 
in different places (Kelly 2013; Ossman 2013; Schapendonk 2012). Throughout their 
migration project individuals may find new ways, or re-consider how to, create ‘better lives’ 
for themselves and their families. When analysing migrant decision-making, however, the 
boundaries between 'planned strategies', 'ongoing adjustments' and 'fortuitous 
coincidences' often become blurred. This is because migrants may retrospectively 
                                                        
 
1 The most relevant migration surveys in this respect are the Mexican Migration Project and the 
Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) dataset. 
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'rationalise' coincidences, discount failed itineraries or forget details when they recall their 
migration histories. Researchers have sought to address this issue by employing various 
methods, including life histories, detailed surveys or ethnographic methods (Carling 2012; 
Collyer and de Haas 2012; Fangen 2012; Findlay et al. 2015). 
Much uncertainty still exists about the socio-demographic profile of onward 
migrants. The limited amount of studies conducted with this migrant group thus far, 
indicate that onward migrants are more likely than one-step migrants to have attained 
higher education credentials (Artuç and Özden 2016; Kelly 2013; Takenaka 2007). In 
addition, onward migrants experience higher unemployment and lower income prior to 
their relocation, compared to migrants who opted to stay at their first destination (Kelly 
2013; Mas Giralt 2016; Nekby 2006). Overall, these sources characterise onward migrants 
as having relatively high levels of formal education, but nonetheless they often struggle to 
find work commensurate with their skills. Onward migrants also reported that their 
decision to relocate was influenced by the discrimination and racism they experienced in 
their previous country of residence (Ahrens et al. 2016; van Liempt 2011). It remains 
unclear to what extent gender, age and other social categories may shape onward mobility 
patterns.  
As regards the onward migrants residing in high-income countries, African migrants 
appear to have a particularly high propensity to engage in onward mobility (Ahrens et al. 
2016; Artuç and Özden 2017; Nekby 2006; Takenaka 2007; van Heelsum and Hessels 2006). 
Recent qualitative studies also suggest that the intra-continental migration routes of African 
migrants are characterised by increasing fluidity and complexity (Collyer 2007; 
Haandrikman and Hassanen 2014; Schapendonk 2010; van Liempt 2011; van 
Nieuwenhuyze 2009). In particular, the irregular moves of transit migrants, who traverse 
several African countries and the Mediterranean, have received media and policy attention 
in Europe (Andersson 2013; Collyer and de Haas 2012; İçduygu 2005; Schapendonk 2010; 
Suter 2012). Yet, much less is known about the continued mobilities of African migrants 
who arrive via other migration channels – as family members, business people or students.  
1.4 Research focus and aims 
This study is concerned with the onward migration of Nigerian migrants towards, within 
and beyond Europe. Before outlining the research questions which inform the thesis, let me 
elaborate on the relevance of this study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the issue of 
onward migration is of important theoretical value, because it problematises the simplistic 
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mapping of migrant trajectories restricted to two nodes – one located in the origin country, 
region or place and another node at the destination. Further developing the theoretical 
conceptualisation of onward migration, thus in turn can help to conceive of international 
migration as a potentially stepwise, multi-directional and open-ended process. The 
acknowledgment of more complex and multiple migration patterns, of course, also has 
implications for how we approach and analyse related topics, such as citizenship, 
transnational families, livelihoods, wellbeing and belonging. 
 With this study I also wish to contribute to a broader understanding of the diversity 
and complexity of African mobilities and their protagonists’ lifeworlds in Europe. I decided 
to focus on Nigerian migrants because they are a highly mobile population and relative to 
the size of their migrant communities in Europe, Nigerians remain an extremely under-
studied migrant group (Carling 2006). Even though several studies have analysed the 
onward mobilities of African migrants in Europe, on the whole they have focused on migrant 
groups who arrived as asylum seekers or irregular migrants (Haandrikman and Hassanen 
2014; van Liempt 2011; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Moret et al. 2005; Schapendonk 2012; 
Stewart and Shaffer 2015). Seeing that Nigerian migrants came to Europe via various 
migration channels and continue to be mobile for numerous reasons, I therefore further our 
understanding about the diverse profile and motivations of onward migrants.  
As there are already several studies about onward migrants in Europe, there is a risk 
that this study could be perceived as yet another study about onward migration. However, 
there are several features of my research which make it innovative. Firstly, through the 
multi-sited fieldwork design that includes several cities across Germany, the UK and Spain, 
I highlight a diverse range of (onward) mobility patterns. While Nigerians have long-
standing connections with the UK through colonial ties, trade and cultural exchange, 
Germany and Spain represent more recent destinations for Nigerian migrants. On the 
whole, studies about intra-European onward mobilities have focused on the UK as a 
destination (della Puppa 2016; Kelly 2013; Mas Giralt 2016; van Liempt 2011). The 
fieldwork in Germany and Spain therefore generates novel insights about the onward 
mobility patterns of Nigerians in the Schengen Area. Furthermore, this multi-sited research 
enhances our understanding of the structuring forces within particular contexts, thereby 
shedding light on the ways in which ‘diaspora space’ is multiply situated and differently 
inhabited (Brah 1996: 209). At the same time, studying the multiple (im)mobilities of 
Nigerian migrants illustrates actors' particular 'strategies of space formation and space 
appropriation' (Amelina and Faist 2012). 
Secondly, this research tries to fill a methodological gap. There is a need for more 
contextualised studies about onward migration; current research on onward migration 
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overwhelmingly relies either on statistical data or ethnographic methods. The 
methodological approach taken in this study is a mixed-methods approach based on in-
depth interviews and other ethnographic methods, set alongside the analysis of statistical 
secondary data. Extensive ethnographic fieldwork allowed me to better understand the 
situated and embodied experiences of (im)mobility across different research settings. By 
staying in touch with informants after the completion of fieldwork, I was also able to 
observe how migration and settlement intentions evolved over time. Through the analysis 
of 2011 Census data I explored the socio-demographic characteristics of onward migrants, 
while at the same time being acutely aware of the limitations of this data in terms of the 
lived experiences and mobility patterns it does not capture. Taken together, these mixed 
strategies give the findings of my research enhanced value. They can advance our 
understanding of onward migration, by unpacking and challenging some of the well-
established assumptions concerning migration, belonging, home and return. Overall, this 
thesis aims to provide an holistic analysis of Nigerian onward mobilities by way of a multi-
sited ethnographic study that also takes into account varied statistical data. 
1.5 Research questions 
This thesis aims to address the questions listed below. The questions will be expanded 
throughout the following seven chapters and in particular in the three main results 
chapters. The questions refer to onward migration, comprising both regular and irregular 
migrations, as well as multi-directional temporary and circular movements and other forms 
of non-migratory mobility. 
 
What are the drivers that influence Nigerian intra-European onward migration? 
 
• How is onward migration linked to immigration and settlement opportunities and 
strategies in different destination countries? 
• How are intra-European (im)mobilities linked to different types of legal status? 
• What role do networks play in the process of onward migration? 
• How do aspirations and capabilities influence migrants’ trajectories? 
• How does migrant decision-making evolve during the life course and the migration 
project? 
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What are the patterns of intra-European onward migration?  
• Which spatial dynamics characterise the intra-European onward mobilities of 
Nigerians? 
• What role do age, gender and generation play in mobility patterns? 
• How does the process of onward migration impact on migrants’ situated and 
transnational practices? 
• And how does this in turn influence onward migrants’ transnational identities?  
 
What are the outcomes of intra-European onward migration? 
• What did migrants hope to achieve by onward migrating? 
• How do migrants evaluate their migration project? 
• How is onward migration connected to the wellbeing of migrants and their 
families? 
• Which policies and measures have an impact on the experience of onward 
migrants? 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the available data on onward migration. It also 
outlines some of the main literature that has informed this thesis. It particularly focuses on 
research that provides insights about the socio-demographic profile of onward migrants, as 
well as the patterns and the outcomes of onward migration. The second part of the chapter 
contains the theoretical and conceptual framework that forms the basis for the critical 
analytical approach in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology. It illustrates the multi-sited and mixed-method 
approach of the study. Furthermore the chapter describes the various research methods 
that were used to elicit data: in-depth interviews, participant observation, visual methods 
and analysis of secondary statistical data. The relational positionalities of a researcher 
conducting multi-sited fieldwork and the ways in which ethical concerns were addressed 
are tackled in the latter part of the chapter.  
Chapter 4 sets out the historical background regarding the multi-faceted migration 
dynamics between Nigeria and Europe. It draws on a variety of sources, such as academic 
texts, international migration and census data, key informant interviews and literary 
accounts of migration. The portrayal of Nigeria’s main post-colonial migration phases is 
critically discussed in light of the overlooked patterns of onward migration. The migration 
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and settlement patterns of Nigerians in Europe are embedded within various networks and 
broader processes of social transformation. In addition, this chapter provides more detailed 
information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the Nigerian migrant 
community in Europe. 
Chapter 5 analyses the various policies that structure migration dynamics between 
Africa and Europe. By taking a multi-scalar approach it also provides a detailed account of 
how the more recent policy developments affect migrant projects at different stages. In 
addition, it outlines the general dynamics of intra-European mobilities based on the 2011 
Census round and uncovers the overlooked mobility patterns onward migrants. 
Chapter 6 is the first of set of three main empirical chapters. It focuses on the drivers 
of Nigerian onward migration. The aspirations and capabilities of Nigerian migrants are 
analysed to explain how emigration and intra-European (im)mobilities are shaped. It 
highlights how migration decision-making is influenced by particular life stage concerns 
and shifts in contextual conditions. 
Chapter 7 illustrates the manifestation of several onward mobility patterns. It 
focuses the multi-sited transnational practices and translocal geographies of onward 
migrants and those migrants who stayed put in a destination. Particular gendered and 
generational differences in the practice of onward migration are highlighted. The question 
of transnational identity is approached in terms of how understandings of belonging are 
challenged and re-negotiated throughout the migration project.  
Chapter 8 evaluates the outcomes of onward migration in terms of human wellbeing. 
Typically, migration outcomes are either assessed with regard to the integration or to the 
development efforts that migrants make using state-centred measures. This chapter 
provides an actor-orientated view and highlights the multi-dimensional ways in which 
migrants construct and experience wellbeing across time-space, as well as the barriers that 
frustrate their ambitions. 
The final chapter is the conclusion. It draws together the main themes that this study 
has addressed. The main findings are summarised. Then follows a brief discussion about 
the drawbacks of this study and some avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
 
 
Geographies and Theories of  
Multiple and Onward Migrations  
 
This chapter opens with a review of the extant literature on migration trajectories that span 
multiple places and destinations. The recent flurry of different terms used to describe these 
multiple migrations is indicative of the growing research interests concerning this topic. 
Even though the labels, at times, are used interchangeably, I demonstrate that the socio-
demographic profile of different types of multiple migrants, as well as their motivations and 
trajectories are remarkably diverse. In the next section, I consider how established theories 
of migration might help inform a deeper understanding of onward migration, especially in 
relation to the intra-EU onward migration of Nigerians. Although, there is no single theory 
or model which can explain the complexities of the onward migration process, I argue that 
a theoretical framework that draws on several approaches and key concepts allows us to 
unpack the drivers, patterns and outcomes of onward migration. To this end, I discuss an 
adaptation of Carling’s (2002) aspiration/ability model; an explicitly multi-sited 
conceptualisation of transnationalism and the human wellbeing approach.   
2.1 Multiple migrations in the migration literature 
Within migration studies, there is a growing body of literature that looks at migration 
trajectories that span several destination countries. Nevertheless, this research field 
remains rather disparate and difficult to circumscribe. This is partly due to the countless 
terms used to label this type of migration, such as: transit migration, fragmented migration, 
secondary migration, stepwise migration, indirect migration, twice migration, re-
emigration, triangular migration, sequential migration, onward migration, third country 
migration and serial migration (Bhachu 1985; Biao 2007; Collyer and de Haas 2012; 
DeVoretz et al. 2003; Hugo 2008; Konadu-Agyemang 1999; Ossman 2015). These terms all 
refer to migration trajectories that involve stays in at least two or more destination 
countries, including irregular and legal migration.  
Several scholars have studied the multiple historical displacements and mobilities 
of diasporas. Cohen (2008) defined the classical 'victim' diasporas – Jews, Africans, 
Armenians, Irish, and the Palestinians – as being scattered to different parts of the world 
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following a tragic event or a series of events that forced them into exile. But the definition 
and categorisation of diasporas has expanded to also include other types of diasporas. In 
her definitive study of onward migration, Bhachu (1985) documents the twice migration of 
East African Asians to the UK. They first left South Asia as indentured workers to build the 
Kenya-Uganda rail lines and their descendants were expelled in 1972 as part of the 
Africanisation policies that were implemented in the newly independent nation states. At 
the time of their expulsion Commonwealth subjects already faced more immigration 
restrictions to enter the UK. For some families this twice migration therefore took place 
across several generations.  
Aside from forced migrants, the multiple moves of highly-skilled migrants also have 
prominently featured in the academic literature. In line with neoclassical economic theories, 
these studies often emphasise the rational choices migrants make concerning higher 
salaries, which are regarded as the principal motivations for indirect migration (Artuç and 
Özden 2016; Aydemir and Robinson 2008; DeVoretz and Zhang 2004; King and Newbold 
2007). DeVoretz and Zhang (2004) introduced a model for triangular migration in order to 
describe migration trajectories which are first directed at what they call an ‘entrepôt’ 
country where migrants can acquire further subsidised resources (i.e. a passport, university 
degree, language skills etc.), to then move to a third country (such as the USA). DeVoretz 
and Zhang (2004) analysed census data for international migrants born in Hong Kong. They 
compared the characteristics of those migrants who stayed abroad in Canada with those 
who returned from various destination countries back to Hong Kong. ‘Triangular migrants’ 
returning from the USA were more likely to hold an overseas degree, be married and have 
a high salary.  
More recently stepwise migration has been studied as a migration strategy amongst 
individuals who do not have all the necessary resources to reach their desired destination 
(even though some may well have completed university-level education). Drawing on 
insights from internal rural-urban migration, Konadu-Agyemang (1999) suggested that 
migrants who face visa barriers and do not have all the required resources for a direct 
migration are likely to opt for what he conceptualised as international stepwise migration. 
In his research with Ghanaian migrants in Canada, Konadu-Agyemang (1999) found that 33 
per cent of his survey respondents had stayed in one other country before reaching Toronto, 
while another 34 per cent had lived in two or more countries. Amongst the respondents, 
more men engaged in stepwise migration than women. In her multi-sited research Paul 
(2011) found that ‘capital-constrained’ Filipino women often followed established stepwise 
migration patterns. Through recruitment agencies the Filipino women sought employment 
as migrant domestic workers in Singapore, Italy, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. 
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The high fees charged by the recruitment agencies covered the contractual procedures, visa 
costs and flights, and the women re-paid this sum once they started working. Through this 
work experience and savings, the women then hoped to secure a special visa as a live-in 
caregiver in Canada or the USA and later also bring their families.  
Meanwhile transit migrants are individuals who usually have fewer financial 
resources and they view travelling ‘by road’ as their only feasible option. Transit migrants 
heading in the direction of Europe or North America have received considerable attention 
from the media, policy-makers and academics (Barros et al. 2002; Collyer 2007; Collyer and 
de Haas 2012; İçduygu 2005; Vogt 2013). Transit migration involves 'mixed flows' of both 
refugees and purported ‘economic’ migrants who travel overland to reach their desired final 
destination. In Central America, increasing levels of violence related to gangs and the 
narcotics trade have compelled even young children to head North to reach Mexico and 
eventually enter the USA (Vogt 2013). Transit migrants often stop at places along the way 
to rest, work and gather information for the next leg of their journey (Collyer 2007; Kastner 
2010; Schapendonk 2012). Some transit migrants struggle to realise their migration plans 
and become ‘stranded’ for extended periods of time, settle permanently in the transit 
country or decide to return to their origin country. During the so-called ‘migrant and 
refugee crisis’ Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis  followed transit routes through Libya or Turkey 
to reach North-Western Europe (Crawley et al. 2016; King and Collyer 2016). In order to 
evade border controls, transit migrants often pay smugglers along the route and many lose 
their lives on the perilous journeys.  
There are similarities between transit migration and stepwise migration, seeing 
that both involve migrants who cannot easily secure visas and need to acquire further 
resources along the way to reach their destination. Nevertheless, there are two important 
differences regarding the means of travel and the legal status of the migrants. First, transit 
migrants generally are undocumented or irregular migrants, whereas stepwise migrants in 
the majority of the cases have (been able to borrow money to cover the cost of) the required 
visas to enter their destination countries (even though some subsequently ‘overstay’). 
Second, transit migration usually involves dangerous journeys by land and sea across 
geographically neighbouring countries, whereas stepwise migrants typically have enough 
resources to pay for visas and air travel.  
 Once migrants have reached high-income countries new labels are attached to their 
ongoing trajectories. For instance, asylum-seekers are accused of having engaged in 
secondary movement when they travel via other European countries before claiming 
asylum. Collyer (2005) conducted research with Algerians who traversed France in order 
to reach the UK where some subsequently sought asylum. Secondary movement is regarded 
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as suspicious by policy-makers and often is labelled ‘asylum shopping’, seeing that the 
Dublin II regulation requires asylum-seekers to apply for asylum in the ‘first safe country’ 
they reach (Collyer 2005; Legomsky 2003). When refugees exercise a degree of choice as to 
where to seek asylum, their asylum claim generally is viewed as less legitimate and may be 
rejected simply on the grounds that they have travelled via another ‘safe’ country. This 
occurs despite the fact that it is not always clear whether refugees in practice can realise all 
their rights in the first country of asylum. 
The foregoing descriptions of multiple migrations mostly conceptualise the 
migration process as a strategic itinerary that migrants conceived in their origin country 
(with the exception of ‘twice migration’). Now we turn to multiple migrants whose 
trajectories unfolded more organically over an extended period of time. Serial migrants 
described by Ossman (2015) do not move for financial gains but rather see ongoing mobility 
as a lifestyle choice. The trajectories of serial migrants are unplanned and malleable to suit 
various life endeavours. Most serial migrants in Ossman’s study do not face financial 
constraints or mobility barriers, which is indicative of their privileged social class position. 
Overall, they are mainly interested in acquiring new cultural resources, i.e. learning 
languages, experiencing new cultures, etc. Other scholars have mapped the mobility 
patterns of Brazilian and Polish migrants who are ‘settled in mobility’ or ‘living in mobility’ 
(Morokvasic 2004; Schrooten et al. 2016). In order to improve their lives at home, and not 
have to emigrate permanently, they remain mobile and continuously seek out new 
destinations. For the Polish migrants this type of ongoing mobility became possible through 
Poland’s accession to the European Union, which allowed them to work in any of the 
member states. Although the Brazilian informants in the study by Schrooten and colleagues 
(2016) experience greater barriers to their movement and frequent changes in legal status, 
they also desire to stay mobile as long as they can. 
Onward migrants often move because the situation in their country of residence 
changes or they see better opportunities to lead self-sufficient and fulfilled lives elsewhere 
(della Puppa 2016; Kelly 2013; Mas Giralt 2016; McGarrigle and Ascensão 2016; van Liempt 
2011; Toma and Castagnone 2015). This was the case when an estimated 10,000 Somali 
onward migrants relocated to Leicester from various EU member states (Lindley and Van 
Hear 2007). In her research, van Liempt (2011) conducted interviews with Dutch-Somali 
onward migrants in London and Leicester. She found that her informants left the 
Netherlands because of increasing levels of Islamophobia and the isolation they 
experienced due to the compulsory housing dispersal policies for refugees. The Dutch-
Somalis were attracted to Leicester because of the possibility of living close to other Somalis 
and bringing up their children in the Muslim faith. Another factor that fundamentally 
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changed the condition for migrants in destination countries was the global financial crisis. 
Especially in Southern Europe, the economic downturn induced large-scale out-migration. 
There were many Latin American migrants who accepted the voluntary return programmes 
to go back to their countries of origin, but others decided to move onward to new 
destinations (Mas Giralt 2016; McIlwaine 2012). Mas Giralt (2016) conducted research with 
Latino onward migrants in the UK who experienced difficulty learning English, while 
working in several low-paid and precarious jobs in the British service sector. Recent policy 
changes brought in to restrict access to all public services for newly-arrived migrants in 
Britain made their onward migration more difficult. 
Even though studies regarding multiple migrants often focus on the trajectories of 
single migrants, there is evidence that migrant families also follow complex migration 
trajectories (Ahrens et al. 2016; Das Gupta 2015; Ong 1999; Siu 2005). However, it is not 
always possible for transnational families to reconcile the needs of all family members at 
the same time and in the same place, which can result in a temporally lagged migration of 
different family members. Das Gupta (2015) found that some professional South Asian 
families had lived in the Gulf States before deciding to relocate to Canada to provide their 
children with an English-language education. Owing to their skills and educational 
qualifications, the men were granted ‘highly-skilled knowledge worker’ visas and could 
sponsor their family members as ‘dependants’. Some men acquired citizenship in Canada 
within three years, but due to racism, professional downgrading in the Canadian labour 
market and considerably lower salaries, in many instances the fathers later decided to 
‘return’ to the Gulf. This led to the formation of many multi-local households. In fact, this 
pattern is so common that the area of Mississauga in Ontario is informally known as 
Begumpura, which translates to ‘city of wives’ (Das Gupta 2015: 27). This migration pattern 
in many ways is similar to the ‘flexible citizenship’ practices that Ong (1999) describes 
amongst wealthy Chinese ‘astronaut families’ that use the fluid ‘comparative advantages’ of 
multiple sites to their advantage. They send their children to study in North America and at 
times are accompanied by their mother, while the father moves back and forth with the 
long-term plan of establishing a family business in North America. 
Thus, multiple migration trajectories are not necessarily linear, but also involve 
circular mobilities and return moves. All international migrants can weigh up various 
possibilities in determining their trajectory: staying put, relocating to a new country or 
returning to their country of origin. However, multiple migrants have a further possibility 
of returning to a previous country of residence. In his ethnographic study with Indian IT 
workers, Biao (2007) found that Australia was regarded as a good destination to secure 
permanent residency and then move to the USA. Interestingly, Australia was not only 
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perceived as a ‘stepping stone’ to reach the USA, it also was regarded as a type of ‘insurance 
policy’ should the migration to the USA be unsuccessful or the American IT industry change 
recruitment practices. Furthermore, Zweig (2007) illustrates another possible 'return' 
trajectory. In his study about Chinese academics, lawyers and financial analysts who had 
lived in the USA and Canada, he argues that rather than returning to mainland China they 
opted to ‘park on the doorstop’ in Hong Kong. Again, this is not a return in the statistical 
sense, but rather the closest possible return to mainland China. On the one hand, this 
allowed the migrants to enjoy proximity to family and home, while on the other hand they 
were also benefiting from higher salaries, better job conditions, business opportunities and 
cultural comfort (Zweig 2007). Some informants appear to have also followed the patriotic 
message from Chinese consulates abroad that ‘returning’ to Hong Kong was equivalent to 
returning to China, whereas others expressed that this option allowed them to combine the 
‘best of both worlds’. 
In sum, the current literature on multiple migrations includes numerous distinct 
migration trajectories that involve diverse migration motivations and migrant types. For 
some migrants from the outset this trajectory is a deliberate and planned migration strategy 
to reach a particular destination (Biao 2007; Collyer 2007; Konadu-Agyemang 1999; Paul 
2011), whereas for others their migration pathways unfold progressively (Das Gupta 2015; 
Mas Giralt 2016; Ossman 2015; van Liempt 2011). The extant literature identifies several 
factors that influence the strategies aspirant migrants use to leave their origin country. For 
‘transit migrants’ or ‘stepwise migrants’ their complex trajectories are a means of 
accumulating further necessary resources, which can facilitate their progression to their 
desired destination (Collyer 2007; Konadu-Agyemang 1999). These migrants often pay for 
part of their journey by accumulating debt with recruitment agencies, migration brokers, 
smugglers or traffickers, while others borrow money from family members. By contrast, for 
‘serial migrants’ their continued moves across several countries represent an end in itself. 
Living in different countries throughout their lives denotes a lifestyle choice. 
Fewer studies discuss other possible reasons for multiple migration, such as 
changing circumstances in the destination countries (Mas Giralt 2016; van Liempt 2011), 
changing wellbeing needs over the life course (Das Gupta 2015), new aspirations that are 
formed in the destination countries, as well as unforeseen opportunities to relocate. Further 
research is also needed on institutionalised and everyday discrimination that migrants 
experience due to their embodied characteristics such as gender, ‘race’, religion or sexuality 
which may compel them to relocate to places where they feel more welcome and at ease to 
live their lives (Ahrens et al. 2016; Das Gupta 2015). Finally, the outcome of multiple 
migrations is frequently analysed in terms of the financial gains that migrants have achieved 
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by moving to another destination. Further research is needed on other possible outcomes 
of multiple migrations as regards social relations, wellbeing needs and feelings of 
transnational identities and belonging.  
2.2 Assessing Nigerian (onward) migration through migration theory 
Based on the foregoing overview of multiple migrations, it is unreasonable to expect that 
these diverse and evolving migration trajectories can be explained with a single theory. 
Migration scholars even have gone as far as to argue that there will never be a one-size-fits-
all migration theory that can explain the complexity and diversity of all migration processes 
(Castles et al. 2014). Nevertheless, it is possible to discern spatial patterns and social 
structures that have an impact on migration processes. Early theorisations of migration 
were rather rigid and developed in isolation of each other; more recent attempts to 
integrate a variety of approaches enable researchers to more fully account for the complex 
realities of migration. Due to restrictions of space, I am not able to explain the various 
theories in great detail nor will I attempt to evaluate them in relation to all the different 
types of migration they could be applied to. Instead, in this section my aim is to assess what 
insights can be garnered from the major migration theories for the study of Nigerian 
migration and onward mobilities. 
Early migration theory already identified multiple migration patterns. In his ‘laws 
of migration’ Ravenstein described ‘migration by stages’ (Ravenstein 1885; 1889). Writing 
at the time of large-scale population movement following the Industrial Revolution, 
Ravenstein gives the example of Irish migrants living in London. He argues that they are 
unlikely to have travelled directly from their hometown, but instead first arrived in 
Liverpool and then worked in several other English counties before settling in the British 
capital. The ‘push factors’ in this model are unemployment, rapid population growth, low 
social status and poverty, and the ‘pull factors’ are defined as better income prospects, good 
living conditions, access to education and welfare systems. Thus, Ravenstein’s laws situated 
the rational choices of individuals within the broader context of rural-urban and social 
inequalities. Lee (1966) amended this model by including ‘intervening obstacles’, i.e. 
geographical distance, cost of the journey, language differences and immigration 
restrictions, which needed to be overcome in order for aspirant migrants to leave their 
origin country. Lee also emphasised the importance of ‘personal factors’, arguing that 
individuals respond to various pushes and pulls in different ways depending on their 
personality, life stage and social status. The main criticism of these push-pull models is that, 
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although they take into account a variety of factors, they remain largely descriptive and do 
not consider wider social processes (Afolayan 1999). Skeldon (1990: 125-6) has critiqued 
that there is no framework to bring these various factors together in an explanatory system. 
However, Paul (2011) has applied an amended version of Lee's (1966) push-pull model to 
Filipino stepwise migration, arguing that the different levels of 'intervening obstacles' that 
migrants encounter when wanting to reach particular destinations, can help explain the 
migration paths that migrants favour. This insight is worth considering when analysing 
Nigerian onward migration. 
Neoclassical economic theory states that migration is prompted by geographical 
differences in the supply and demand of labour. Initially absolute wage differentials 
between labour-surplus and labour-scarce regions were identified as the main reason why 
migrants decide to move. Later refinements of neoclassical economic theory, however, 
clarified that it is the expected wage gap that is most pertinent, as it considers the real 
earnings multiplied by the likelihood of obtaining employment in a given country (Todaro 
1976). Migrants are depicted as rational actors, who analyse the costs and benefits of 
different opportunities in terms of the returns on the investment in their human capital a 
migration project might offer (Sjastaad 1962). Migrants are said to move where they will be 
paid the highest salaries. There are, however, several shortcomings in the main 
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory. First, when applying the theory to long-
distance migration it seems improbable that migrants would have ‘perfect information’ 
concerning the expected costs and benefits of their migration while still residing in the 
origin country. Having said that, it is likely that aspirant intra-European onward migrants 
have access to more accurate information about wage differentials and a clearer picture of 
living costs in other member states. Second, this theory does not explain intra-European 
onward mobilities between countries where there is no expected international wage gap. 
Finally, it ignores non-economic reasons that influence migration decision, such 
immigration policies, family relations, love and the desire for adventure. 2 
The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) provides a more nuanced analysis 
of migration decision-making by including other household members into the process. 
According to NELM, it is not the migrant as an individual but rather the household as a 
whole that decides about a migration project. One additional consideration in this theory is 
                                                        
 
2 According to the 2011 Census, only 23 per cent of female Nigerian nationals and 34 per cent of male 
Nigerian nationals had a job in the formal sector in Spain at the height of the economic crisis when I 
was conducting fieldwork. It does not explain why so few Nigerians permanently relocated to 
elsewhere in North-Western Europe, because it does not account for difficulties that migrants may 
encounter when trying to enter foreign labour markets. 
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that households do not necessarily seek to maximise their household income, but they 
endeavour to minimise the risks to their livelihood (Goss and Lindquist 1995; Massey et al. 
1993). The household's objective is to diversify its income streams by having family 
members employed in different sectors and places. In addition, NELM theorist argue that it 
is not absolute poverty levels that induce migration; households also consider supporting 
the migration of a family member if it eases their perceived relative poverty to other 
households at the local level. Some scholars have critiqued the insufficient consideration 
given to the gendered dynamics within the household; therefore it is important to also pay 
attention to sources of disagreement and power struggles within the household (de Haas 
and Fokkema 2010). Given the extraordinarily high remittances that Nigeria receives – 
around US$20.77 billion in 2015 – this could be taken as evidence that migration represents 
an important livelihood strategy, especially in the context of rising income inequality 
(World Bank 2016). Although there is a detailed study about remittance mechanisms 
between the UK and Nigeria, it contains no information about the remittances uses 
(Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007). In another study about remittances, Osili (2007) 
conducted a matched household survey in the USA and Nigeria. Her findings indicate that 
poorer family members received larger transfers, and other remittances were used to 
support family businesses and community development projects. With regard to intra-
European onward mobilities, there is evidence that particularly the moves of Nigerians in 
Spain during the economic crisis helped to diversify the income avenues within the 
migrants’ households abroad (Ahrens 2013).  
We now turn to the theoretical models that are grouped together as historical-
structural approaches. They see historical macro-structural forces as the determinants of 
international migration and are inspired by Marxist interpretations of political economy. 
Historical-structuralists argue that migration is the result of capitalist expansion and unfair 
terms of trade between rich and poor countries (Massey et al. 2008: 35). Seeing that 
economic and political power are regarded as unequally distributed between developed 
and developing countries, access to resources is also unequal amongst different groups and 
classes within countries, and capitalist structures reinforce these inequalities over time 
(Castles and Kosack 1973; Cohen 1987). The Latin American dependency school sees the 
under-development of poor countries as the result of the exploitation of resources and 
workers during colonialism. In the post-colonial period, unfair terms of trade and migration 
to rich countries contributed to further under-development. Later these ideas were picked 
up and explored further by Wallerstein (1979) when he formulated world systems theory. 
The main proposition of world systems theory is that the world is one single capitalist 
system, where the ‘peripheral’ regions have been drawn in and are controlled by the ‘core’ 
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capitalist states. While in the past the penetration was facilitated by colonial 
administrations, it is today made possible by multinational firms. Migration therefore is 
seen as the result of interventions and disruptions that occur due to capitalist development.  
Historical-structuralist theories share in common that they regard migration as 
‘demand-led’, thus the business cycles of high-income countries are seen as the main 
determinants of migration. A critique of the historical-structuralist approaches is that they 
are too deterministic and that migrants are stripped of all agency to decide whether they 
want to move. Even though it is true that many migrants are exploited, underpaid and 
discriminated in destination countries, it is important to also acknowledge that other 
migrants make active choices to leave their origin country and eventually manage to 
improve their livelihoods through migration. Besides, the assertion that all migrants are 
being forcibly displaced from their land and community reflects a sedentary bias that sees 
immobility as the natural state (Bakewell 2008a: 1342). In Nigeria, just as in other African 
countries, various types of voluntary and forced migration within the country and the wider 
region have always formed part of the country’s history. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
migration patterns between Nigeria and Europe have waxed and waned due to exogenous 
factors like economic business cycles in Europe. For instance, Nigerian emigration to 
Germany and Spain intensified in the early 1990s and early 2000s, respectively, which were 
periods when these destination countries experienced high economic growth rates. 
Historical-structural approaches, however, do not sufficiently consider endogenous factors 
such as corruption, clientelism and political instability, even though these factors also 
influence emigration and return migration decision-making. 
Meanwhile, the dual (or segmented) labour market approaches claim that it is the 
existence of dual labour markets in high-income countries that drive emigration. In 
reference to the post-Fordist era, Piore (1979) argued that high-income countries also need 
low-skilled workers, because not all of these jobs can be outsourced, especially those in the 
service sector and construction. Native workers are concentrated in the ‘primary sector’, 
where they benefit from higher wages and more stable working conditions. By contrast, the 
‘secondary sector’ is dominated by migrant workers who are employed in low-paid jobs and 
are faced with more precarious working conditions. The presence of migrants in the 
secondary sector makes these jobs even less desirable and natives shun this sector. This 
theory takes into account the role of institutional factors, as well as ‘race’ and gender in 
producing segmented labour markets.  
In line with some of the aforementioned arguments, Sassen (1991) later put forward 
the global city hypothesis. Sassen opines that growth in ‘global cities’ has been mainly 
generated through the concentration of multinational headquarters and related ‘producer 
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services’ (i.e. accounting, law firms, IT services etc.) in these locations. This clustering of 
headquarters created a demand for highly-skilled workers, but also for low-income workers 
to cater for the needs of its high-income residents. Sassen (1991) suggests that 
multinational companies often make direct investments in developing countries, which 
results in certain counter-flows of goods, people and services. Migrant workers usually 
move from the periphery to the core along paths of these capital flows and in the direction 
of particular ‘global cities’. Given Britain’s colonial links and long-standing investments in 
the country, it might not come as a surprise that London is the most important Nigerian 
diaspora hub in Europe. In 2001, around 40 per cent out of all Nigerian migrants in Europe 
lived in the British capital. Although this figure dropped to 30 per cent by 2011 after many 
Nigerians moved outside of London, it is clear that the British capital remains a prominent 
diaspora hub for Nigerians.  
One major criticism is that segmented labour market theory and its link to the 
‘global cities’  ideas is too simplistic, seeing that migration is not only generated by labour-
demand but also by other institutions, networks and policies. In some cases migrant 
networks and policies might even reinforce segmentation and concentration in certain 
industries and professions. On the whole, the proportions of Black African men working in 
different industries was fairly equally spread in England and Wales, but there was some 
notable clustering. For instance, research with low-paid workers in London, found that 
Black African men (especially from Ghana and Nigeria) made up three quarters of the 
surveyed workforce in cleaning on the London Underground (Evans et al. 2005). By 
contrast, Black African women were highly concentrated in ‘human health and social work 
activities’ in England and Wales: 39 per cent of the Nigerian women workforce was 
employed in this sector (ONS 2011). Amongst the different ethnic groups, 54 per cent of 
Black African men (59 per cent Black African women) worked in low-skilled professions, 
compared to 37 per cent of the general male population and 58 per cent in the general 
female population (Aspinall and Chinouya 2016: 148). This point is often over-looked, but 
it is equally important to highlight, that 28 per cent of the male and 31 per cent of the female 
Black African population held managerial or professional positions (ONS 2011). For Black 
Africans at least, these figures do not suggest an ‘hour-glass’ shape of income and social 
structures (Sassen 1991).  
Nonetheless, the UK might still be a relatively attractive destination for intra-
European onward movers, because highly-skilled Nigerians perceive there to be a greater 
likelihood of obtaining professional and managerial jobs than elsewhere in Europe. It 
remains difficult, however, to operationalise segmented labour market approaches, 
especially in a cross-national context, because of the current lack of disaggregated labour 
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market data regarding ethnicity, ‘race’ or country of birth in other parts of Europe (Simon 
2012). Moreover, the contingent ways in which individuals and societies assign jobs to 
either the ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ sector does not readily lend itself to comparative 
research. For instance, informants repeatedly pointed out how in Germany and Spain a job 
such as working as a ‘security guard’ was dominated by native-born workers, whereas in 
the UK the same job was considered a migrant job.  
While the previous theories mainly outline the determinants that set a migration 
process into motion, the following theories on migrant networks, migration systems and 
transnationalism are meso-level theories that seek to explain how migration is perpetuated 
over time. Insights gained from research on ‘chain migration’ flows (MacDonald and 
MacDonald 1964) formed the basis for later research on network theories in migration 
studies (Boyd 1989; Fawcett 1989). The successive arrivals of migrants from the same point 
of origin to the same destination was conceptualised as chain migration. The rationale was 
that migrants ‘follow’ well-trodden paths which lead them to places with established 
migrant communities. Network theory provided further insights about the practices that 
sustain migration processes over generations, even when the original migration drivers no 
longer exist. The functions of networks have been analysed in relation to the different stages 
of the migration process. Networks are relevant in determining who is enabled to migrate, 
given that people with family members abroad will be more likely to migrate themselves 
(Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Massey 1988). Networks can help migrants lower the costs of 
their journeys and also make their trips safer when they are informed about potential risks 
(Palloni et al. 2001). After migrants’ arrival at their destination, another proposition of 
network theories is that social ties can also provide assistance with regard to housing, jobs, 
local information and emotional support (Waldinger 1996). Seeing that every new migrant 
is connected to non-migrants in the origin country ‘through networks of reciprocal 
obligations based on shared understandings of kinship and friendship’, migration is thereby 
perpetuated over time (Massey 1990). Although in general there has been a focus on co-
ethnic networks in the destination countries to explain emigration, in the case of African 
migration, visa brokers, smuggling and trafficking networks or other ‘weak ties’ are often 
crucial to the facilitation of the initial emigration (Alpes 2011; Plambech 2016). The 
prevalence of trafficking networks that bring Nigerian women to Europe can be seen as one 
example of how networks can become highly organised, or even institutionalised. By 
contrast, onward migrants engaging in intra-European moves are less likely to require the 
assistance of networks to relocate, given that the costs of these short-distance moves are 
lower and onward movers often have some mobility rights.  
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In contrast to migration networks that emphasise the role of social capital, 
migration systems theory focuses on the ways in which certain flows and exchanges of goods, 
ideas and money between origin and destination countries influence the conditions of 
migration. Therefore, migration is seen as embedded within wider processes of social 
transformation and development. The Nigerian geographer Mabogunje (1970) was the first 
to develop a more comprehensive migration system theory. In his detailed depiction of 
rural-urban migration, Mabogunje conceptualised the emigration environment as 
comprised by economic and social conditions, government policies, transportation and 
communication infrastructures and inheritance law. In addition, the general level of 
technological progress and development were taken into account as further determinants 
of migration. A novel feature was the incorporation of flows of information and feedback 
mechanisms to explain why migration continued and subsided. Other scholars applied 
migration systems theory to international migration and argued that migration systems 
usually consolidate prior links between countries that were forged through colonialism, 
trade, investments or cultural exchanges (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Similarly, the theory 
of circular and cumulative causation argues that migration processes change the social and 
economic context in which migrants and households make decisions and this increases the 
chances of further migration. This was a process first identified by Myrdal (1957) and then 
later reintroduced by Massey (1990). The drivers of migration are regarded as cumulative, 
because each act of migration creates social structures and networks that sustain further 
migrations. Over time migration opportunities that were confined to certain parts of society 
become available to broader segments of society as more people have network connections 
abroad (Massey 1990). If migration becomes strongly linked to the idea of ‘success’ in a 
society, then migration can create a ‘culture of migration’, whereby there are social 
pressures and expectations that people will migrate and those who stay are regarded as a 
‘failure’.  
The model proposed by Mabogunje (1970) has been critiqued for being rather 
mechanistic and that people in the rural areas are depicted as a pool of readily available 
labour. The introduction of information feedback mechanisms, however, does provide some 
explanation as to why migration might not continue ad infinitum, as migrants also inform 
their kin when opportunities in certain destinations are no longer attractive. Moreover, 
migration systems theory is innovative in that it helps to explain non-linear and multi-
directional moves. Even though particular routes and facilitating mechanisms have become 
very established in Nigerian post-colonial migration, and certain feedback mechanisms are 
also continuously directing migration to new destinations, it might have been over-stated 
to speak of a Europe-Nigeria migration system in the past. However, given the growing 
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importance of Europe as a destination for Nigerians, this may be about to change. At the 
individual level, cumulative causation could be one factor that stimulates onward migration, 
as migrants who move multiple times certainly acquire the confidence and tacit knowledge 
about how to move again more easily (Massey 1986). Nevertheless, this latter theory does 
not explain why some individuals would decide not to onward migrate and prefer to stay 
put in their current country of residence. 
Theories of transnationalism and diaspora emphasise how globalisation has enabled 
migrants to maintain network ties over long distances and how this has stimulated new 
identity formations. Through modern means of communication and travel, migrants are 
able to remain in touch with their friends and relatives who stayed behind in the origin 
countries. Furthermore, migrants can more easily keep up with the news in their region of 
origin, contribute to debates in online fora or campaign for political parties. Money transfer 
agencies allow migrants to remit money even to very remote small towns and in some 
countries pay school fees for their ‘left-behind’ children via mobile phone. Often the 
exchange of information and communication is instantaneous, fostering a sense of ‘virtual’ 
transnational community. Being able to feel embedded 'simultaneously' in their destination 
county and their origin country has also changed the ways in which migrants experience 
migration and how they construct their identity and belonging (Levitt and Glick Schiller 
2004). In their pioneering volume Basch et al. (1994: 7) defined transnationalism ‘as the 
process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement’. The focus is on transnational communities 
that involve ‘local communities’ in the origin and destination countries, as well as the globe-
spanning diasporas that have become implanted in several destinations (Glick Schiller et al. 
1992). Research has highlighted the practices within transnational social networks and the 
agentic capacity of migrants to move back and forth between their origin country and 
country of residence. Yet, Smith (2005: 238) argues that even though migrants and their 
household members might cross borders and practice spatial mobility, migrants are still 
‘classed, raced and gendered bodies in motion and in specific historical contexts, within 
certain political formations and spaces’. Thereby Smith was echoing the wider criticism of 
transnationalism that it was too de-territorialised and therefore did not account for more 
context-specific and ‘grounded’ processes (Mitchell 2007). Nevertheless, transnationalism 
and other network theories are adequate frameworks to explain why Nigerian migration to 
Europe has continued and even increased in the years since more stringent visa policies 
were introduced. In some European destination countries like Spain and Germany, for 
instance, most of the recent visas were issued in the family category, thus confirming the 
strong social ties that exist between migrants and the family members that stayed behind. 
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One more general shortcoming of the aforementioned meso-level theories on 
migrant networks, migration systems and transnationalism is that they mainly provide 
explanations as to why migration continues via established pathways. They do not provide 
reasons why migration starts or why ‘spontaneous’ migration might occur in the direction 
of new destinations (de Haas 2010c). Furthermore, they do not account for instances when 
settled migrants are hesitant or reluctant to assist aspirant migrants to move (Collyer 
2005). Overall, these approaches often over-emphasise the role of co-ethnic and kinship 
networks in migration processes, but do not pay sufficient attention to other types of 
networks. 
 
Especially in relation to African migration, the media and policy discussion often 
suggest that migration can be solved by addressing the underlying ‘root causes’ which are 
identified as inequality and under-development (Bakewell 2008b). However, empirical 
research has provided evidence that, as countries become more developed, emigration 
often increases (Skeldon 2014). This is because the poorest people lack the necessary 
resources in order to embark on long-distance journeys. Therefore, migration transition 
theories argue that migration is part and parcel of broader processes of development, social 
transformation and globalisation. Transition theories also highlight that migration patterns 
are associated with different levels of development. Influenced by modernisation theory, 
Zelinsky (1971) conceptualised a series of sequential stages in the ‘mobility transition’. In 
early transitional societies, emigration rises due to population growth, a decline in rural 
employment opportunities and swift technological development. Meanwhile in later 
transitional societies, emigration then decreases due to higher levels of industralisation, 
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Figure 2.1 Nigerian net migration rate, 1960-2012 (five year moving average) 
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slower population growth and higher wages. Finally in ‘advanced societies’, Zelinsky claims 
that low population growth, urban-to-urban migration and circular mobilities increase and 
countries transform into net immigration countries. The problem with transition theory is 
that it portrays development and demographic change as linear and irreversible processes. 
Social and economic development in Nigeria, at least, has been highly volatile and therefore 
early post-independence emigration patterns do not conform with this model. The available 
data (see Figure 2.1) indicate that Nigeria experienced a ‘reverse migration transition’, with 
net immigration reaching a historical peak of 854,649 in 1977 followed by an equally 
unprecedented net emigration of -671,640 in 1982 (Black et al. 2004; UN Population 
Division 2015). The initial net migration peak was due to rising oil revenue and expanding 
public service provision in the post-colonial period, which placed Nigeria amongst the 20 
most prosperous countries in the world in the 1970s. It made the country an attractive 
destination for migrant workers from other parts of West Africa, and the Nigerians who 
studied abroad at that time generally returned to Nigeria upon graduation. Later the falling 
oil prices and dramatic economic decline of the country, however, were used to justify an 
expulsion policy due to which an estimated 2 million migrant workers in 1983 and 1985 
were forced to leave the country (Van Hear 1998: 78). The slowly rising net emigration since 
the 1990s can more readily be explained with transition theory, as it coincided with rising 
GDP per capita growth. Migration transition theory sees development as the main driver of 
migration. Societies with a medium level of development generally experience higher levels 
of migration, and eventually emigration rates taper off when high levels of development  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The aspiration/ability model Carling (2002) 
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have been reached. Therefore, emigration intensities are linked to the general level of 
economic and social development of the country. However, transition theory does not 
explain how development processes influence the migration propensity of individuals. 
The final approach to consider is the aspiration/ability model. In order to offer an 
alternative to neoclassical micro-level explanation as to why individuals leave their origin 
countries, Carling (2002) and de Haas (2003) suggest the ‘behavioural’ explanation of 
migration as a function of aspirations and abilities to move. Figure 2.2 illustrates how 
Carling (2002) conceptualised the aspiration-ability model, which not only explained why 
people emigrated but also why many were not able to move despite having aspirations of 
doing so. Carling argues that the ‘immigration interface’ is a filter that only migrants with 
certain ‘abilities’ will be able to pass through or circumvent. The majority of aspirant 
migrants simply do not have the requisite resources to leave their origin countries and 
therefore remain ‘involuntarily immobile’. Amartya Sen’s definition of ‘capabilities’ is 
broader, seeing that he regards this as the ability of human beings to lead the lives they have 
reason to value and to expand their ‘freedoms’ (Sen 1999: 1959). Sen emphasised that 
freedom is an essential part of development processes given that income growth, better 
education, improved communication, as well as transport links can increase people’s 
capability to migrate. Furthermore, these factors are also likely to raise the awareness of 
individuals about the opportunities that might be available in other countries, which in turn 
can raise aspirations. This approach also takes into account how society and culture may 
influence aspirant migrants, seeing that these factors shape the context in which 
transnational aspirations and sensibilities are formed (Afolayan 1998). Research that falls 
within the migration-development nexus has been criticised for an incomplete application 
of the capabilities approach. The concrete issue is that the migration policies implemented 
as part of the migration-development nexus primarily aim to enhance development in the 
origin countries through an increase in remittances (Ratha et al. 2011). Overall, there is too 
much focus on how economic remittances might lead to more development in poor 
countries. According to the so-called ‘pragmatic’ approach of ‘managed’ migration (Ruhs 
2013), diminished civic rights for migrants are seen as necessary trade-offs for accessing 
higher wages – which ultimately are supposed to engender development (Preibisch et al. 
2016). An advantage of the aspiration/ability model is that it can be applied to migrant 
decision-making in different geographic contexts and by different migrant types. 
Furthermore, it can used to account for a wide variety of migration motivations and other 
determinants, which makes it potentially suitable for the analysis of onward migration.   
In sum, this long section has reviewed several migration theories. The challenge to 
understanding migration processes lies in finding a way of integrating approaches that 
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consider the interactions of various processes occurring at the micro-, meso- and macro-
level. Furthermore, it is difficult to find migration theories that can be applied 
simultaneously to different migrant types, such as permanent and temporary migrant or 
forced and voluntary migrants.  
2.3 Conceptualising the process of onward migration 
Based on the insights gained from the foregoing discussion about different migration 
theories, in Figure 2.3 I now introduce a conceptualisation of the onward migration 
decision-making process. This conceptualisation is inspired by Carling’s (2002) 
aspiration/ability model, but it contains several modifications to account for the specificity 
of onward migration. At the micro-level, migrants are influenced by the aspirations they 
form in relation to their individual characteristics and emigration environment. These often 
are not only aspirations for personal wellbeing, but also concerns for the wellbeing of the 
wider kinship network (Jackson 2013). These aspirations are influenced by individual 
characteristics such as gender, age, family status, etc. Importantly, consideration is given to 
how these factors change over the life course and throughout the migration project, thus 
potentially creating new aspirations linked to particular life stage transitions. Furthermore, 
the micro-level is also shaped by the different resources that migrants have at their disposal, 
and whether these resources can be utilised, activated or exchanged in specific contexts.  
At the meso-level, migrants are influenced by societal norms and expectations with 
regard to their social positioning; their current country of residence can foster new 
aspirations due to exposure to new societal norms or other consumption patterns. This can 
also refer to a possible ‘culture of onward migration’, should it be common in particular 
locations. Furthermore, this level also comprises facilitating factors such as transnational 
networks or particular services that can make migration easier. If migrants cannot fulfil 
their aspirations locally this can negatively impact on their wellbeing. At the macro-level, 
migrants weigh up the evolving constraints and opportunities in their current country of 
residence, their origin country and other possible new destinations and the likelihood of 
achieving their aspirations. At the macro-level, onward migrants also consider the 
requirements which they have to comply with in relation to immigration and labour market 
conditions in different contexts. Whether or not migrants decide to onward migrate to a 
particular place is dependent on their capabilities to overcome certain barriers. Migrants 
who lack resources are not able to onward migrate or might only be able to do so semi-
legally, which is a less sustainable, short-term and often precarious form of onward  
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
mobility. Those who manage to onward migrate are generally those who have the 
appropriate resources or can mobilise missing resources. 
In the remaining part of this section, I will discuss some issues in relation to this 
aspiration-capability approach for onward migration in more detail. The following 
subsections explain how the aspirations and capabilties of migrants continuously evolve, 
how transnational networks can perpertuate onward migration, and why wellbeing is a 
suitable framework to assess the outcomes of onward migration. 
2.3.1 Evolving aspirations and capabilities 
Research concerning international migration typically focuses on the beginning and 
(presumed) end points of the trajectory (Halfacree 2012). Thereby the analysis of migrant 
trajectories has been limited to two geographic nodes – one located in the origin country 
and another node in a destination country. Studies regarding the migration decision-making 
process tend to be conducted in the origin countries, thus migrants’ individual 
characteristics before departure and the emigration environment are often highlighted as 
factors that influence the realisation and direction of migration trajectories. Even though 
recent research into ‘transit migration’ (Collyer 2007; Collyer and de Haas 2012) and 
Figure 2.3 The aspiration-capability approach for onward migration 
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‘stepwise migration’ (Paul 2011) has shed light on the obstacles and dangers that migrants 
face in the ‘in-between places’ they pass through, these studies still suggest that migrants 
usually set off on their journeys with a desired destination in mind. Yet in order to 
understand the factors that can shape multiple migrations, it is necessary to also consider 
how migration decision-making can evolve throughout the trajectory. By conceptualising 
the trajectories of onward migrants as open-ended, non-linear and multi-directional, 
migrants are placed at the crossroads of several possible pathways. Multiple migrants can 
either stay at their current place of residence or return to their origin country, they may also 
decide to move on to a new destination or move back to a previous destination. 
In my view, the aspiration-capability approach is particularly well suited for the 
study of multiple migrations (see Chapter 6). In terms of the motivations for migration this 
approach does not solely focus on material considerations and the ‘rational choices’ of 
migrants, because ‘aspirations’ also signify dreams, wishes, hopes and other perspectives 
(Appadurai 2004; Carling 2002). Furthermore, research on migration aspirations 
emphasises the agency of migrants, an aspect not sufficiently addressed in other 
neoclassical and historical-structural theories of migration. Complimentary to this is the 
consideration given to the effects of structural constraints, such as immigration controls 
and access to resources, which determine migrants’ ‘capability’ to accomplish their 
aspirations (de Haas 2010b). The aspiration-capability model was originally conceived to 
analyse the determinants of emigration, therefore some aspects need to be adapted to 
operationalise it for the analysis of multiple migrations. In the following I will elaborate how 
migrant decision-making is a process that takes place across space and over time.  
Different life stages can affect the way in which individuals view their migration 
project. This is often linked to a re-constellation of aspirations and capabilities throughout 
the life course. Research on migrant decision-making typically centres on particular age 
cohorts. The majority of aspirant migrants in origin countries are young adults; we 
therefore know less about the aspirations of migrants at other life stages. Seeing that 
migrants acquire skills and information before and throughout their migration project, 
some might be in a position to fulfil their initial ambitions. Especially migrants who have 
resided for extended periods in a destination country, are likely to develop a greater sense 
of belonging, gain citizenship or find better-paid employment. Other migrants, however, can 
be spurred on to pursue unfulfilled aspirations in other countries and places. Older 
migrants, for instance, might develop new ambitions regarding career progression, family 
formation or lifestyle improvement. To understand how migration aspirations are 
embedded in individuals’ lives and are contingent on their experiences over time, it 
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therefore is useful to adopt a ‘life-course approach’ or ‘biographical approach’ (Halfacree 
and Boyle 1993).  
The conditions in destination countries are often portrayed as ‘static’ and newly 
arrived migrants are expected to simply ‘fit in’ or ‘integrate’ into rigid contexts. Yet  in reality 
structural constraints and opportunities in different places are constantly evolving. Given 
that some onward migrants may stay in one destination country for long periods of time, it 
is possible that certain macro-structural conditions undergo considerable shifts. 
Destination countries’ policies concerning immigrants may become more restrictive and 
destination societies can become less welcoming towards foreigners. Migrants who 
previously felt settled, therefore can feel more excluded and might decide to relocate 
elsewhere. Similarly, the favourable economic conditions and living standards that 
attracted migrants to certain destinations, can also rapidly deteriorate due to economic 
downturns or policy changes. Thus, it is important to understand how the particular 
contexts of the emigration and destination countries can frustrate or facilitate the ambitions 
and trajectories of migrants. Migrants who compare the evolving conditions in their origin 
country with the opportunities in their current country of residence and other possible 
destinations, might change their mind as to where they would prefer to live. 
In addition to the temporal and geographical dimensions, there are important social 
aspects inherent in migration aspirations. The emigration environment, including societal 
and media discourses, influences how migration is regarded in particular origin countries 
(de Haas 2010a). For some individuals, migration holds intrinsic value, in other words, 
migration itself is something worthwhile pursuing as a ‘rite of passage’ or ‘adventure’. For 
others, however, migration represents an instrumental value; meaning that migration is 
seen as a way to achieve other life aspirations relating to work, study, family, investments 
and lifestyle. Therefore, the formation of aspirations ultimately is also a reflection of the 
values and norms of wider society in the origin country. It is worthwhile considering to what 
extent, and indeed if at all, the aspirations that motivated the initial emigration from Nigeria 
are connected to the subsequent moves. When migrants embark on their journeys, they 
form new social connections and are exposed to other value systems. Therefore onward 
migration may also be the result of new aspirations formed at other stages of the migration 
project – influenced by destination societies, fellow migrants and other diasporic groups in 
new geographical contexts.  
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2.3.2 Multi-sited transnationalism and translocalities 
The 'transnational turn' in the social sciences has drawn researchers’ attention to the 
interactions of migrants with other individuals, kin and institutions across geographic 
borders (Basch et al. 1994). These studies challenge previously held understandings about 
nation states as bounded geographical units, and describe a variety of cross-border 
connections (Goss and Lindquist 1995). Furthermore, the study of transnational 
communities has been useful in challenging the linearity of international migration 
trajectories by illustrating how migrants move between 'here' and 'there' at various points 
in time. Yet, overall empirical research on transnationalism often reflects the assumption 
that migrants solely forge transnational connections with family members and communities 
located in their country of origin.  
Theoretical conceptualisations of transnationalism, however, have repeatedly 
emphasised the multi-locality of migrants’ practices, identifications and connections. In 
their seminal work Nations Unbound Basch and her colleagues (1994: 8 emphasis added) 
define ’transmigrants’ as individuals who ‘take actions, make decisions and develop 
subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them to 
two or more nation-states’. Likewise, Castles (2002: 1146 emphasis added) points out that 
migrants do not necessarily need to settle at one destination country or stay there before 
eventually returning to their country of origin; they may instead ‘orient their lives to two or 
more societies and develop transnational communities and consciousness’. Moreover, the 
study of diasporas fosters an awareness regarding the forced displacement of communities 
to several destinations, not least because the word diaspora itself is derived from the 
Ancient Greek meaning to ‘scatter’ (as in seeds) (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991). Nevertheless, 
studies within this field usually involve comparisons of the varying degrees of ‘homeland 
orientation’ of diasporans in different destinations – often disregarding evidence of 
migrants' and non-migrants’ multi-sited transnational connections across several countries. 
Onward migrants stay in touch with friends and family through various multi-directional 
‘enfolded mobilities’, these include ‘return’ visits to their previous country of residence, as 
well as other destinations (Williams et al. 2011). 
An explicitly multi-sited conceptualisation of transnationalism, I argue, facilitates a 
broader understanding of migrants’ transnational practices (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, 
it is also valuable for analysing how onward migration is facilitated and perpetuated. Due 
to growing emigrant communities abroad and the diversification of migration patterns to 
new destinations, even non-migrants are part of ‘transnational social fields’ that comprise 
geographical nodes located in several destination countries (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). 
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The mobility and frictions resulting from the movement of people, goods, capital and ideas, 
however, create specific ‘translocalities’ reflecting particular power relationships (Brickell 
and Datta 2011). I concur with other scholars’ work on space (see Harvey 2006; Massey 
1993) that it is useful to understand ‘emplacement’ as an ongoing and constantly negotiated 
process which focuses our attention to the interactions of space, place and power.  
Moreover, we need to pay attention to the connections between emplacement and mobility 
in order to understand how individuals are situated in differentiated ways in transnational 
space and experience wellbeing.  
Transnational connections can increase migrants’ capabilities to leave the origin 
country and realise their migration project. Even aspirant migrants who can mobilise the 
funds to pay for air travel need to know someone abroad who is willing to act as a sponsor 
for their visa application. In addition, migrants form new social ties throughout their 
migration trajectory. ‘Transit migrants’ join spontaneous networks with fellow nationals 
and other people they encounter in the ‘in-between places’ of their trajectory; these 
relationships can be strategic, mutually supportive or exploitative (Collyer 2007; Kastner 
2010). Intra-European onward migrants wishing to relocate may also make use of their 
evolving transnational connections in order to visit and familiarise themselves with new 
destinations. This allows them to make necessary preparations for their next move.  
Multi-sited transnationalism also draws attention to the ways in which migrants 
maintain social ties with people in a variety of places, including former places of residence. 
Onward migrants do not only ‘live dual lives’ across ‘two countries’, their transnational 
practices are more complex and difficult to pin down (Portes et al. 1999: 217). Onward 
migrants usually speak numerous languages, have feelings of (non-)belonging for a number 
of countries, and some make a living through continuous and regular contact across several 
national borders. Onward migrants also need to re-negotiate their ‘hybrid’ ways of being 
and belonging in new social contexts. The experiences and identifications of onward 
migrants are shaped by their manifold cultural repertoires. The degree of transnational 
home orientation may differ between first and second-generation migrants. The second 
generation often feel a greater belonging to their European country of birth or the current 
country of residence, but identify much less with their parents ‘ancestral homeland’. 
2.3.3 Social inequality and wellbeing  
Intra-European mobilities have been described as ‘liquid’ migrations, because native-born 
Europeans can move flexibly and are often ‘invisible’ (Engbersen and Snel 2013). This group 
predominantly includes the so-called young ‘Eurostars’ who are pursuing high-flying 
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careers (Favell 2008), as well as the often highly-skilled but low-paid East-West migrants 
who gained the right to free movement after the accession of new member states in 2004 
and 2007 (Black et al. 2010). These migrants often adopt a cosmopolitan way of life that 
generally lets them live comfortably and improve their situation over time. Yet, recent 
studies have suggested that migrants from low-income countries outside Europe, and 
especially People of Colour, can experience greater impediments to their mobility and 
settlement as they face considerable discrimination (Ahrens et al. 2016; della Puppa 2016; 
Mas Giralt 2016). The outcomes of their mobility are oftentimes multi-dimensional, given 
that some individuals do not possess all the requisite resources that facilitate smooth 
mobility and settlement. Prospective onward migrants generally try to prepare their 
relocations to avoid situations where their living standards are negatively affected. 
Nonetheless, some onward migrants encounter problems when they move to another place 
or country and go through a period of adjustment. In some instances, onward migration can 
be just as difficult as the initial migration and settlement, especially where migrants lack 
agency, face unexpected situations or cannot count on support from others. 
The flourishing of multi-sited research as part of the transnationalism approach in 
migration studies has generated new insights about international migrants and the impact 
of their transnational activities, such as remittance sending, political participation, religious 
practices and ethnic entrepreneurship (Basch et al. 1994; Mohan and Zack Williams 2007; 
Østergaard‐Nielsen 2003). Several studies have highlighted that stark differences persist 
between migrants’ social position in their origin and destination countries (Levitt and Glick 
Schiller 2004). Due to the material status symbols migrants can accumulate and the 
remittances they send from abroad, migrants are able to enhance their own social position 
in their origin communities. However, in order to obtain these resources migrants are 
usually required to do demeaning and low-paid jobs in destination countries. These 
incongruent and complex social status positions have been described as a ‘status paradox’ 
(Nieswand 2011), because the transnational perspective challenges the discourse that a 
person has a stable social status related to only one national society. The question then is 
how further geographical mobility affects the social position and the aspirations of onward 
migrants. 
Usually migration outcomes are analysed either in terms of integration in the 
destination country or development impacts in the origin country. But given that onward 
migration emphasises the open-ended nature of migration trajectories and multiple 
emplacements of migrants, these two common measures at best reflect only part of 
migrants’ life worlds. As I have argued in previous sections, onward migration is driven by 
peoples’ desire to find a place where they can lead a life that they value and with a sense of 
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purpose. Therefore, I propose to utilise the ‘wellbeing approach’ as a lens to unpack the 
outcomes of onward migration (see Chapter 8). First and foremost, this way of analysing 
migration outcomes provides a subjective understanding of what ‘quality of life’ and ‘social 
progress’ mean and how individuals believe this can be achieved. This approach enables 
individuals to enrich our understanding of how they experience their situation in terms of 
‘a state of being with others, where human needs are met, where one can act meaningfully 
to pursue one's goals and where one enjoys satisfactory quality of life’ (Gough and McGregor 
2007: 34).  
Within migration studies the framework of wellbeing has been used by scholars 
studying the vulnerability and livelihoods of (‘left-behind’) non-migrants in poorer 
countries (see Nguyen et al. 2006). Fewer academic studies (e.g. Chase 2013; Warnes et al. 
1999; Wright 2012) and international reports (IOM 2013) have focused on the perceptions 
of wellbeing amongst migrants in destination countries. Although the wellbeing approach 
takes inspiration from the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen and others, it 
differs in the methods used and its focus on the interactions between three different 
dimensions of human wellbeing (Gough and McGregor 2007; Sumner and Mallet 2011). The 
first is that of material wellbeing, which is shaped by conditions, such as accommodation 
and employment, which may affect individuals’ standard of living. Second, relational 
wellbeing is influenced by intimate relationships, as well as connections with family 
members and the wider community. Finally, perceptual wellbeing (also referred to as 
subjective wellbeing) reflects a person's individual assessment of the aforementioned 
conditions, together with values, perceptions and mental health. Instead of considering 
material, relational and perceptual wellbeing as categories that operate separately, special 
attention needs to be paid to the continuous interplay of these dimensions (Sumner and 
Mallet 2011).  
A particular advantage for the study of onward migration is that wellbeing ‘travels’ 
with the migrant (Wright 2012: 471). In her study Wright investigates how migrants 
construct wellbeing following their migration from Peru to either London or Madrid, thus 
in her study migration trajectories are fixed between two geographical nodes.  However, I 
argue that the wellbeing approach allows us to compare migrants’ wellbeing across time 
and in a variety of places that formed part of their migration trajectory. Wellbeing allows us 
to analyse how migrants’ current state of wellbeing is related to their emplaced and 
embodied experiences within several societal and spatial structures. For instance, 
Kobayashi and Peake (2000) argue that racism is a highly contextualised and place-specific 
process. Feminist scholars have proposed an ‘intersectional’ approach to draw attention to 
the ways in which social inequalities (and privileges) based on gender, ‘race’ and class as 
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interdependent are interconnected, interdependent and ‘interlocked’ (Crenshaw 1991; 
Riaño 2011). Moreover, the wellbeing approach is dynamic in that it acknowledges how 
migrants’ capabilities can evolve – in terms of economic, cultural, social and mobility 
resources – throughout their life course and during their migration trajectory. By contrast, 
policies and research concerned with migrants’ integration often focus on their deficits, i.e. 
the supposedly few resources they bring with them and the many others they lack. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that migrants can simply bring their resources in a ‘rucksack’ 
(Erel 2010), thereby disregarding structural barriers that negatively affect migrants’ 
wellbeing when resources cannot be utilised or exchanged. Although migrants sometimes 
find creative ways to re-activate some resources, other resources might remain de-valued 
through the process of (onward) migration. This helps to explain why the experiences of 
wellbeing can vary significantly between migrants and from one social context to another. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter examined the various definitions of multiple migration in the academic 
literature. Although this particular migration trajectory has received more scholarly 
attention in recent years, it still remains relatively under-researched. Efforts to 
conceptualise multiple migration have resulted in ever new labels being attached to this 
migrant group, which underscores the great variety of motivations and experiences 
inherent in this migration process. Nevertheless, there is a need to more explicitly draw on 
migration theories and models in order to clarify the ways in which multiple migrations 
might challenge or confirm previous theoretical insights.  
Therefore, the second section considered a range of theoretical approaches and 
their suitability for explaining the drivers of Nigerian onward migration. Migration theory 
has tended to focus on the drivers of migration that affect individuals when they are still 
living in their origin countries by accounting for the initial motivations of the migrants, as 
well as the macro- and meso-level determinants. While some migration theories emphasise 
macro-level determinants, other theories focus on the micro-level. Carling’s (2002) 
ability/capability model helps to integrate different levels of analysis relevant to the 
migration process from an actor-oriented perspective. Importantly, this approach is 
dynamic and therefore also helps account for changes across space and time. I then 
proposed several amendments to adapt the aspiration/ability model for the study of 
onward migration. Furthermore, I discussed how onward migration challenges received 
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theoretical understandings of transnationalism and migration outcomes, and I 
subsequently explained how this study will address these issues. 
The next chapter outlines the methodology of my thesis. It explains the multi-sited 
and mixed-method approach of this study and describes the rationale for the research 
techniques that were employed.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Methodology  
 
The main objective of this thesis, as explained in the introduction, is to study the 
motivations, patterns and outcomes of the intra-European mobility of Nigerian migrants. 
To this end, I opted for a multi-sited and mixed-methods approach. I employed research 
methods and techniques that would help me to unpack the multi-dimensional process of 
onward migration and understand particular social and spatial trajectories. This included 
interviews with key informants who had knowledge about onward migrants, and in-depth 
interviews with Nigerian migrants in three European countries – namely Germany, the UK 
and Spain. Furthermore, I also made use of a range of other ethnographic methods and 
analysed statistical data and other secondary data sources. 
In this chapter, I discuss how I conducted my research with Nigerians who moved 
from their origin country towards and within Europe. In the first section, I explain the 
rationale underlying the research design. The next section deals with the specific methods 
I used to address my research questions. I then discuss the ethical concerns regarding 
informed consent, the rights of research participants and the possible outcomes of this 
study. The last section deals with data analysis and reflexivity. Throughout the chapter, I 
will elaborate on the specific challenges I encountered during the research process. 
3.1 Research design 
This first section outlines my research design and I enlarge on the reasons why I developed 
a mixed-method and multi-sited study. I also explain my focus on Nigerian migrants, the 
selection of research sites, the planning of the different phases and the research techniques 
of the study. 
3.1.1 Mixed-methods research 
In terms of research design, I was open to and familiar with the use of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. During my studies and while working as a research assistant 
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and associate researcher working on projects about international student migration and 
migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE), I had already gained experience with a 
variety of methods. Mixed-methods research has become increasingly popular in the social 
sciences, because ‘methodological pluralism’ allows researchers to compensate for the 
drawbacks that can result from only using a single type of method or data source (Bergmann 
2008). Nonetheless, Hammersley (2008) insists that the scientific rigour of studies resulting 
from mixed-methods research depends on how well the methods are applied and integrated 
with each other. Furthermore, it has been suggested that migration research could be 
enhanced by combining methods from different disciplines in order to analyse migration 
processes across extended time periods, as well as connect multiple geographical contexts 
and scales (Castles 2012). 
My initial chance encounter with Harrison made me question the academic 
literature of the time, in which the intra-European onward migration of third-country 
nationals was depicted as a migration trajectory especially common amongst former 
refugees. Therefore, I set about exploring more primary and secondary data sources, such 
as official statistics, newspaper articles and government reports etc., to get a broader 
overview of onward migration. However, it soon became clear that the published statistical 
data only provided limited information concerning onward migration (for a discussion 
about the various limitations of the published statistical data, see section 3.3.4). Yet, a public 
announcement in relation to the EU-wide 2011 Census promised the availability of new and 
more reliable data concerning onward migrants. It was the first time that EU member states 
had decided to harmonise the census questions and intended to include questions for both 
the variables ‘country of birth’ and ‘nationality’. The prospect of having data about these 
two variables was going to make it possible to estimate, at least, the onward migration of 
foreign-born migrants with EU citizenship. However, the results of the 2011 Census were 
only scheduled to be progressively released from late-2013 onwards, which was after my 
fieldwork.  
In the meantime, I took a closer look at the statistics that were publicly available in 
2010 to compare and contrast general trends in onward migration. My aim was to identify 
a suitable group of onward migrants to focus on for this study. The British Annual 
Population Survey (APS) data indicated a great variety of countries of birth amongst onward 
migrants residing in the UK. Furthermore, the APS data confirmed that onward migrants in 
the UK also originated from countries that had produced relatively low numbers of refugees 
or ‘mixed migration flows’ in the recent past. I decided to focus on Nigerian migrants for 
four reasons. First, Nigerian migrants in Europe had arrived via various migration channels,  
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Table 3.1  Nigerian-born working age population in the UK by nationality (‘000)        
 Nigerian-born migrants in the UK  
with British nationality with Nigerian nationality with another nationality 
    
 Year estimate CIb +/- estimate CIb +/- estimate CIb +/- 
2015 97 14 91 14 12 5 
2014 86 13 84 13 8 4 
2013 81 13 99 14 5 3 
2012 83 13 98 14 4 3 
2011 92 13 97 14 7 4 
2010 65 11 85 13 6 3 
2009 67 11 88 13 4 3 
2008 56 10 81 12 5 3 
2007 61 10 75 11 6 3 
2006 62 10 67 10 3 2 
2005 46 9 63 10 3 2 
2004 41 8 47 9 3 2 
2003 47 8 43 8 2 2 
2002 39 8 38 8 2 2 
2001 32 7 44 8 2 2 
2000 30 7 35 8 1 1 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics, Annual Population Survey (APS)a 
Notes: a The APS is made up of wave 1 and wave 5 of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) plus annual booster 
samples. The LFS excludes some residents in communal establishments (e.g. student residences, 
boarding houses, hostels, etc.). The results of the APS shown here were re-weighted in light of the 
results from the 2011 Census. b In this table the 95% confidence interval (Cl) is applied to indicate the 
reliability of the estimates. 
 
as labour migrants, students, family migrants, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking and 
irregular migrants. Second, Nigerians were the second-fastest growing migrant community 
in the UK, after the Polish. Table 3.1 evidences that the growth of the Nigerian-born 
population in the UK showed a large percentage increase between 2001 and 2010 in fact, it 
constituted the highest percentage increase out of all non-EU-born migrants groups during 
this time period.3 Third, the ratio of Nigerian onward migrants with EU citizenship as part 
of the total Nigerian-born population in the UK indicated a slow but steady upward trend in 
the years before 2010 (and this did not even capture all the different types of onward 
migrants, seeing that others move on as Nigerian nationals). Finally, relative to the size of 
their emigrant community in Europe, Nigerians were an extremely under-studied migrant 
group. 
                                                        
 
3 For the sake of completeness, I have updated Table 3.1 with the more recent APS data that were 
published after 2010. The new data suggest a marked rise in onward migration intensity towards the 
UK amongst Nigerian-born migrants.   
 
 
41 
 
In order to answer my research questions and study how onward migration was 
measured, represented and experienced, I decided to combine the analysis of statistical data 
and other secondary data sources with extensive ethnographic research. Overall, the 
research for this study followed a ‘sequential’ mixed-methods design (Bergmann 2008) that 
was structured in four phases:  
 
• First, I carried out a review of the academic literature on onward migration. I got in touch 
with potential informants, through personal and professional contacts. In addition, I 
spent a week in London visiting Nigerian businesses, associations and identifying key 
informants in South London. I also undertook a two-week pilot visit in Berlin during 
April 2011 in order to understand how prevalent onward migration was amongst 
Nigerians in the Schengen zone and to test my research techniques.  
• The main part of my empirical research consisted of 17 months ethnographic fieldwork 
with Nigerian migrants living in Germany, the UK and Spain. Between June 2011 and 
December 2012, I conducted a total of 120 interviews with Nigerian migrants (n=40 per 
country). I also interviewed 21 key informants who worked with or had knowledge 
about Nigerian migrants – including religious leaders, association presidents, 
employment advisors, local council officials, authors and migrants’ rights activists. 
Although I do not quote directly from the key informant interviews they inform the 
broader background in this thesis.  Through ethnographic methods I gathered a variety 
of data through which I learnt how Nigerians experienced (onward) migration, as well 
as how it was represented by other individuals and institutions. 
• The initial findings and themes from the first two phases informed and guided the 
quantitative phase during which I assessed how onward migration was captured in 
statistical data. Once the 2011 Census data was released, I produced some general 
descriptive statistical analysis and explored recurring topics from the qualitative data in 
more depth. The complexity of migrant trajectories I found out about during my 
ethnographic research helped me to evaluate and understand the limitations of the 
quantitative data. Unfortunately, the subsamples of onward movers with EU citizenship 
that were reported in the 2011 Census round were very small and thereby ruled out 
further comparative statistical analysis. 
• Through continued contact with 45 of my informants and several key informants after 
completion of the fieldwork, I was able to add a longitudinal element to this study. 
Therefore, I could see how the trajectories of some of my informants continued to evolve. 
Only information that was shared in direct communications with me forms part of this 
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study. I decided to exclude any updates that people posted on social media. 4  The 
sustained contact with some of the informants enabled me to discuss and reflect on my 
data analysis. Sharing drafts of chapters and research papers with informants gave them 
the opportunity to provide feedback on the research findings before they were 
published. 
3.1.2 Multi-sited research 
In order to address my research question concerning the motivations due to which 
Nigerians engage in onward migration, it was obvious that I would need to conduct 
ethnographic research with Nigerian migrants in Europe. Most other research projects 
concerning intra-European onward migration of third-country nationals were carried out 
in the UK and identified the UK as an important destination of intra-European onward 
mobilities (Kelly 2013; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; Mas Giralt 2016; van Liempt 2011). 
Restricting my research to only one European country would have meant that I was also 
limiting what I could find out about the patterns and outcomes of intra-European onward 
migration. At the outset, it was unclear whether onward migrants constituted a particular 
group of migrants that were engaging in these more complex migration trajectories; or 
whether onward migration formed part of a wider trend, which meant that migration 
trajectories in general were diversifying in terms of the range and number of destination 
countries. 
To evaluate the scale and patterns of onward migration beyond the UK context, I 
therefore opted for a comparative and multi-sited research design. In his seminal paper on 
multi-sited research, Marcus (1995) proposed various alternative ‘modes of construction’ 
in order to move away from classical anthropological studies that focused on a single 
research site. Multi-sited research enables the researcher to follow the people, the thing, the 
metaphor, the plot, the life, or the conflict (Marcus 1995: 106). Although I did not join 
onward migrants while they traversed intra-European borders, my aim was to trace ‘the 
global in the local’ and see how transnational and translocal mobilities are interwoven in 
people’s everyday lives (Appadurai 1995; Anthias 2012; Brickell and Datta 2011; Burawoy 
2000: xiv).  
                                                        
 
4 Many informants asked me to add them on social networks and I found that this was useful in order 
not to lose contact should phone numbers change. With some of my informants over time, I also 
developed friendships. However, I decided not to analyse any private updates my informants posted 
on social media, because these were posts intended for family and friends, but not a research 
audience. In direct communication with informants, it was possible to remind my informants that I 
was still working on my research project and was interested to hear how ‘their story’ continued.  
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My choice to focus on the UK, Germany and Spain as field sites was based on four 
main reasons. First, the three countries represent three very different immigration policy 
regimes: the UK used to be characterised by relative openness toward immigration but is 
becoming increasingly restrictive; Germany’s immigration policies appear to be travelling 
in the opposite direction, from restrictiveness to a greater focus on migrant integration; 
meanwhile Spain has traditionally been very open to immigration. Second, I have lived in 
all these three countries and I am fluent in English, German and Spanish, which was likely 
to make the research process easier. Third, the comparison of the UK with Germany and 
Spain also meant that I could study whether the onward mobilities within the Schengen 
zone differed from those trajectories in the direction of the UK. Third-country nationals with 
short-term and permanent residence permits can visit other member states in the Schengen 
zone for up to 90 days as tourists. The new EU long-term residence permit even grants third-
country nationals 'freedom of movement' rights to live and work in another member state. 
However, third-country nationals who want to relocate to the UK need to wait to acquire an 
EEA or Swiss passport through naturalisation or have to apply for a separate visa.5 Finally, 
these three European destination countries also represent the three different post-colonial 
migration phases that will be outlined in Chapter 4. The UK was the principal destination of 
Nigerian migrants and had attracted the majority of been-to migrants in Europe since the 
1960s. Germany drew a proportion of the highly-skilled Andrews from the 1980s onwards, 
although most of them were unable to find work at their skill-level.6  Meanwhile Spain 
represented a newer destination of Nigerian migrations towards Europe and was a country 
where many Nigerian migrants were employed in low-paid jobs after the 2000s.  
Multi-sited research at times has been critiqued, because spreading a study over 
several field sites raises doubts of the depth and quality of the research (Falzon 2009). Yet, 
I believe that the inclusion of various field sites allowed me to gain deeper insights about 
the connections between mobility and emplacement for onward migrants in specific 
localities (Smith 2001). My aim was to get a sense of the ‘translocal’ geographies within 
which my informants’ trajectories and practices unfolded between Nigeria and in Europe 
(Appadurai 1995; Brickell and Datta 2011). I divided the fieldwork between the capital 
cities of the UK, Germany and Spain, as well as Manchester, Cologne and Málaga. By 
                                                        
 
5 More recently, the Brexit referendum, of course, has thrown into question whether EU citizens can 
still make use of their freedom of movement to move to the UK. And it is also unclear which rights EU 
citizens already residing in the UK will continue to enjoy. 
6 These migrant labels – ‘been-tos’ and ‘Andrews’ – will be described in detail later. In brief, ‘been-
tos’ are the early graduate migrants who returned to Nigeria after advanced studies abroad, whereas 
‘Andrews’ are much later skilled emigrants quitting the country because it held no future for them, 
in their view. For more details, Chapter 4 (section 4.1.2). 
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including several cities and neighbourhoods in this study, I had the opportunity to draw 
attention to the particular ‘locatedness’ and ‘situatedness’ of the everyday lives of Nigerian 
onward migrants (Brickell and Datta 2011: 3). The cities differed considerably in terms of 
size, regional governance structures, global connectedness, hierarchical position within the 
Nigerian diaspora and ethnic diversity. Even though in all cities the general workforce was 
principally employed in the service sector, the particular industries varied, as did the 
particular labour market segments and networks that Nigerians could access. 
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the key features of the cities 
in which fieldwork was conducted, as well as details about the respective Nigerian migrant 
communities in these locations: 
 
• London is the capital of the UK and also the metropole of the former British Empire. The 
Black presence in the city dates back to the 16th century. The city has been the destination 
of many post-colonial migrants and its large migrant communities greatly contribute to 
the city’s cosmopolitan character. Today London is a world city renowned for the global 
role it plays in the arts, finance, media, tourism and education. A large number of 
universities are located in London, thus offering many educational opportunities. Out of 
the 201,184 Nigerian-born residents in the UK in 2011 around 57 per cent (114,718) 
lived in the capital and were concentrated in South East and North East London. 
Especially the main streets of the district of Peckham are seamed with Nigerian shops, 
churches and mosques. The city’s importance as a diasporic hub is further reflected and 
reinforced by the fact that around a third of all Nigerian migrants in Europe resided in 
London and large shares also lived close to the capital in South East England and East 
England (also see Table 4.2). 
• Manchester is located in North West England. The raw materials acquired in Britain’s 
colonies fuelled the industrial revolution, which centred in this region. Large quantities 
of linens, towels and colourful wax prints, known as ‘Manchester goods’, were produced 
in the cotton mills of nearby Oldham and then sold in the markets in West Africa and 
other parts of the world. Amongst the city’s main industries today are media, culture and 
sports. Between 2001 and 2011 the share of the Nigerian-born population residing 
outside of London increased considerably. In 2011 there were 13,903 (7 per cent) 
Nigerian-born migrants living in North West England, a particular popular region due to 
its more affordable living costs. Smaller concentrations of Nigerian businesses and 
churches are located in two rather deprived areas of Manchester: Moston Lane in 
Harpurhey in North Manchester and in Gorton, southeast from the city centre. 
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• The capital of Germany, Berlin, is located within the territory of former East Germany. 
The Black presence in the city dates back to the 18th century and the number of Black 
residents increased after World War II when African-American soldiers were stationed 
there. As in many other German cities, guestworkers from Southern Europe were 
recruited to assist post-war reconstruction and later became settled in Berlin. Refugees 
arriving in the 1990s were often dispersed and confined to asylum camps in the rural 
and eastern parts of the country, where they awaited the outcome of their asylum claim 
and often experienced racism (Hinger 2016). Following Germany’s reunification, 
numerous government ministries, embassies and (international) company head offices 
re-located from Bonn to Berlin. Despite its status as a capital city and a major industrial 
centre, Berlin has been plagued by high unemployment rates and persisting public debt. 
In 2011 an estimated 557,000 people with an African migration background lived in 
Germany,7 out of which 19,898 were Nigerian citizens and 1,593 (8 per cent) lived in 
Berlin in 2011 (UNHRC 2017; Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). Small clusters of African 
and Nigerian businesses and churches are located in Neukölln, Kreuzberg and Wedding, 
though Nigerians choose to live in a wide range of different neighbourhoods in Berlin. 
• Cologne is the largest city within Germany’s most populous federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia. Around 30 per cent (5,985) of Nigerian citizens lived in North Rhine-
Westphalia in 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). As part of the Rhine-Ruhr metro-
region, Cologne benefits from a close-knit transport network that makes the city very 
accessible to Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Essen, as well as the neighbouring countries 
Belgium and the Netherlands. There is an international airport situated between Cologne 
and Bonn, which provides international flight connections.  Cologne and the wider region 
offer employment opportunities in the automotive, media, insurance, trade and chemical 
industry. Several African and Nigerian businesses can be found along the first ring road 
that circles the old city centre, as well as further afield in the districts of Ehrenfeld and 
across the river in Mülheim.  
• Madrid, located in the centre of the country, is the capital of Spain is and the largest 
municipality in the autonomous Community of Madrid. In the early 2000s Spain 
experienced an economic boom and the influx of migrants peaked. Migrants were chiefly 
working in the construction, tourism, hospitality and domestic-service sectors – many of 
whom were employed illegally before regularising their status. It is assumed that most 
                                                        
 
7 This data is based on the German 2011 micro census and includes individuals born in Africa and 
those with at least one parent born in Africa (Nwabuzo 2015). However, this data omits third-
generation migrants and subsequent generations. The overall number of African descendants and 
Afro-Germans living in Germany therefore is likely to be higher.    
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Nigerians flew to Spain on tourist visas, while others entered the country irregularly 
across the Mediterranean or as failed asylum seekers from Northern Europe. A total of 
38,280 Nigerian-born migrants lived in Spain in 2011, out of which 8,599 (22 per cent) 
resided in the Community of Madrid (INE 2012). The vast majority of Nigerians lived and 
worked in the outskirts of Madrid, e.g. there were concentrations of Nigerian 
communities located towards the Northeast of the city around Torrejón de Ardoz and in 
the Southwest close to Móstoles. 
• Málaga is a port city located in southern Spain in the autonomous region of Andalucía, 
as well as the capital of Málaga province. Generally, unemployment rates in southern 
Spain have been amongst the highest in the country. Málaga is a transport hub for the 
Costa del Sol and its beaches attract many tourists in the summer months. Andalucía’s 
coastline is also the main region of arrival for African migrants, who cross the 
Mediterranean irregularly via the Strait of Gibraltar. In the past many Nigerians worked 
in the agricultural sector in Andalucía, but preference now is given to temporary foreign 
workers from other countries. There were 5,985 (16 per cent) Nigerian-born migrants 
living in Málaga province in 2011 (INE 2012). Over a dozen Nigerian grocery shops, hair 
dressers, eateries and associations are situated close to Málaga’s central bus station, 
while many Nigerians live and attend churches located in neighbourhoods along Avenida 
de Velázquez and towards the north in Palma-La Palmilla . 
3.2  A transnational and translocal research field 
3.2.1 Negotiating access 
Due to the multi-sited nature of this study, I devised several strategies that helped me to 
negotiate access to my research field. O’Reilly (2012: 113) has noted that in ethnographic 
research access to informants has to be ‘negotiated and renegotiated’ across different 
groups and in different settings. My strategies principally consisted of online networking, 
getting in touch with gatekeepers, ‘hanging out’ in the premises of Nigerian businesses and 
attending Nigerian churches and mosques, which allowed me to build up a network of 
contacts and find out about social gatherings and other events. 
In the first year of my PhD, I created social media pages on Facebook and Twitter to 
document the research process, engage online with Nigerians and the general public, as well 
as disseminate relevant information and research findings. In addition, having a social 
media presence allowed me to follow the public posts of individuals, businesses and 
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community associations (Kissau and Hunger 2010; Schrooten 2012). This was a useful way 
to build contacts before I arrived in a new field site and to become aware of events I could 
attend. Unexpectedly, my social media engagement also resulted in two individuals 
contacting me because they were interested in participating in the study. Although they 
fitted my informant profile, their current place of residence did not permit me to conduct 
an interview in person and we decided to use Skype instead. Thus, online networking 
became, albeit unintentionally, another means for me to diversify the entry points for 
recruiting informants.  
In all fieldwork sites, I got in touch with Nigerian community associations. These 
associations were organised around particular topics that included: hometown 
associations, ethno-regional associations, diaspora associations (mainly local chapters of 
the ‘Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation’ in Europe NIDO), professional associations, 
women’s groups, football teams, cultural and music associations, etc. I then asked for 
permission to attend an upcoming association meeting to introduce myself and the research 
project to the association members. My presentations at the association meetings only in 
very few cases resulted in immediate interview appointments. Nonetheless, the public 
endorsements from the presidents and other elected members of the executive committee 
of the migrant associations were important for me to gain trust in the places where I 
conducted fieldwork. It meant that I could later regularly return to the offices and 
communal spaces of the associations and socialise with the members after the meetings. 
Furthermore, it made it easier to strike up conversations with Nigerians in other settings, 
because people would recognise me. 
Seeing that some Nigerians were not part of any association, I also tried to create 
other means of unmediated access to the research field.  In all fieldwork sites I found a great 
variety of Nigerian-owned businesses, such as food stores, barber shops, tailors, shipping 
agents, money transfer agents, restaurants and bars that were frequented by Nigerians. 
During my fieldwork it was also these businesses that I patronised for my grocery shopping 
and other everyday purchases. In this way I hoped to at least indirectly reciprocate the 
wider community support I received in conducting the research. I had many informal 
conversations and also used these interactions to ask if anyone knew Nigerians who had 
lived in several European countries. Many of the people I spoke to could think of least two 
onward movers. Nevertheless, it was common for the people I met to be hesitant about 
immediately sharing the contact details of their relatives and friends, which I respected. 
Therefore, I usually suggested to call my interlocutors within the next few days, to give them 
time to seek permission for the sharing of contact details.  
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3.2.2 Sampling techniques 
Onward migration is only one of several possible migration trajectories. In order to 
understand whether there is anything particular about onward migrants, it was therefore 
equally important for me to interview Nigerian migrants, who had not (yet) opted for this 
trajectory. Thereby I hoped to understand how different socio-economic backgrounds, life 
aspirations, wellbeing needs and mobility rights impinged on the migrants’ desire and 
capacity for onward mobility. Thus, I was interested in interviewing Nigerians who: i) had 
not (yet) onward migrated within the EU; ii) had onward migrated; or iii) were 
(temporarily) returning after onward migrating elsewhere. In other words, the total 
population of interest to me in this study were Nigerian-born migrants present in the 
research sites at the time of the interview, including undocumented individuals. However, 
there was no complete or easily accessible total sampling frame available, which in turn 
made a random representative sample impossible. 
 
Table 3.2  Gender composition of informants 
 
Interview 
Location 
Sex Total 
male female  
UK 26 14 40 
London 15 8 23 
Manchester 7 4 11 
Other 4 2 6 
Germany 23 17 40 
Berlin 9 6 15 
Cologne 8 7 15 
Other 6 4 10 
Spain 20 20 40 
Madrid 10 9 19 
Málaga 8 10 18 
Other 2 1 3 
 
 
Table 3.3  Age range of informants 
       
Interview 
Location 
Age range 
18-24 25-34 35-44 Over 45 
UK 2 7 24 7 
Germany 0 14 14 12 
Spain 1 8 20 11 
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The difficulty of knowing the actual size of the Nigerian emigrant population and 
identifying the onward migrants mixed within this population indicates that Nigerian 
migrants can be defined as a ‘hard-to-reach’ population. Different sampling methods have 
been recommended to engage so-called ‘rare’ and ‘hidden’ populations. Lee (1993) and 
Mendez and Font (2014) present the advantages and drawbacks of a range of sampling 
methods, including respondent-driven sampling, network sampling, peer group research, 
participatory methods, social media and locational sampling. It has been noted, however, 
that the most productive sampling approaches for hard-to-reach populations are the ones 
that utilise a ‘judicious blend of strategies and techniques’ (Thompson and Phillips 2007: 
1296). 
As I outlined in the previous section 3.2.1, my informants were contacted through a 
variety of starting points, principally using locational sampling, networking, participatory 
methods, and to a lesser extent social media. The combination of these sampling methods 
allowed me to mitigate some of the bias that can be introduced into a sample when relying 
on a single sampling method. A disadvantage of the locational sampling, for instance, is that 
the individuals who are present in places with geographical concentrations of community 
members may have characteristics that are not representative of the sampling frame as a 
whole. Through my regular attendance of social events and by networking, however, I was 
also able to establish contact with ‘spatially integrated’ Nigerian migrants, i.e. those who 
had found housing and work outside of ethnic enclaves. In several instances, I was also able 
to transnationally network between field sites and obtain the contact details of onward 
migrants who I interviewed at a later stage. 
Nigerians in Europe are a very heterogeneous population and therefore I wanted to 
include informants with a variety of backgrounds and perspectives in my sample, even 
though I was aware that it would be impossible for me to construct a fully representative 
sample. Nevertheless, I took care to include a variety of interviewees through purposive 
sampling across a range of characteristics, i.e. age, gender, socio-economic background, 
ethnicity, occupational status and legal status. 
3.3  Research techniques 
3.3.1 Participant observation 
Traditionally, ethnographies provided written in-depth accounts of geographically 
bounded groups of people. More recently ethnographers also have turned their attention to 
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other aspects of contemporary social life, by studying the practices that connect places, 
institutions and people across social and geographic boundaries (Marcus 1995). In order to 
understand why Nigerians engage in onward migration, I wanted to unpick how onward 
migration was represented – not just by migrants, but also by other stakeholders. Using 
ethnographic methods allowed me to capture and make sense of the production of meaning. 
In this way I could learn how the practice of onward migration was understood and 
interpreted.   
The Nigerians I met throughout my fieldwork were aware of the practice of onward 
migration within Europe and could usually name a few acquaintances or family members 
who had lived in multiple European countries. But there was no formal acknowledgment of 
Nigerian onward migrants on the part of public institutions in Europe.8 Neither did the 
Nigerian onward migrants I spoke to necessarily identify themselves as a distinct social 
group. I therefore do not claim that my study is about some kind of ‘special’ or ‘unique’ 
community, but my intention is rather to explore how a particular migration trajectory is 
practised and experienced by Nigerian migrants in Europe.  
Ethnographic research is characterised by a wide range of data collection methods. 
During this study, I relied on participant observation, visual methods and informal 
conversations, as well as in-depth interviews. Information conveyed during the participant 
observation and informal conversations was recorded in field diaries that I kept during the 
fieldwork. Through the initial entry points described in the previous section, I learned about 
a variety of social events that were oftentimes publicly advertised on flyers, noticeboards 
and in diaspora magazines. These events included concerts, book launches, film screenings, 
fashion shows, beauty pageants, sport events and exhibitions. On a weekly basis, I also 
attended churches and mosques that were either Nigerian-led or had a substantial Nigerian 
congregation. Informants were oftentimes keen to invite me along to the church or mosque 
where they worshipped. This was especially true for Pentecostal Christians, seeing that 
their churches actively encouraged the recruitment of new church members. As a result, I 
sometimes followed invitations to a second later Sunday church service elsewhere, mid-
week bible-study meetings and other celebrations.   
After getting to know some of my informants better, spending time in their homes 
and being introduced to their family and friends, I could observe how local and 
transnational practices and connections formed part of their lives. At times, their personal 
                                                        
 
8 Conversely, the intra-European onward moves of other third-country nationals have gained a more 
public profile. Research with Somali onward migrants in the UK has illustrated how their 
concentrated settlement across a few British cities prompted a greater awareness on the part of local 
authorities and an adaptation of service provision (Ahrens et al. 2016; van Liempt 2011). 
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lives echoed the countries in which they had lived. Particular objects, foods, media, 
expressions and habits proved essential to home-making practices and provided meaning 
for their multi-local lives. The social ties with friends and family members who lived close 
by and others in more distant locations could be maintained, but also frustrated, by 
communication via phone, messages and social media (Vertovec 2004). Through the 
sustained engagement with some of my informants I learnt about various rhythms of their 
mobilities – their everyday commutes within the city; cross-border livelihood strategies; 
virtual mobilities; their trips to visit friends and relatives and their return trips to Nigeria 
(see Cresswell 2006; Janta et al. 2015; Urry 2007). 
3.3.2 Visual methods 
In addition to the participant observation, I also made use of visual methods. The ways in 
which I employed visual methods were informed by the visual practices of the Nigerians I 
met. With my mobile phone I took pictures of the places and events I attended. This felt less 
obtrusive than using a bigger camera. At the time of my fieldwork, most Nigerians also 
owned smartphones with cameras. Through street photography I documented details of the 
different field sites, the shop fronts of Nigerian businesses and the public places where 
people congregated. At the end of the Sunday church service especially younger church 
members would ‘snap’ each other with their smartphones. While socialising in a communal 
space or milling around outside the church, they would pose with friends to take pictures 
in their ‘Sunday best’. I often was asked to be in a picture and I would also ask Nigerians for 
permission to take their picture.  
At social gatherings, I also took videos to capture speeches, performances, music and 
the general atmosphere. As part of the larger Nigerian community events, such as concerts, 
independence day celebrations, weddings, child naming ceremonies and birthdays, it was 
common for a so-called ‘video man’ and photographer to be hired to document the occasion 
(Shaka 2003).9 In some cases, I later had the opportunity to buy a copy of the edited DVDs 
that were sold publicly, or see videos and photographs that had been uploaded to Youtube 
or other social media. These visual practices made it possible that the images of such 
celebrations circulated in the transnational space between the diaspora and Nigeria. But 
new smartphone technology means that visual practices are evolving fast; messaging 
                                                        
 
9 Shaka (2003) argues that in Nigeria films used to be predominantly produced by colonial and state-
led film production companies. But after the 1970s a domestication of ‘video coverage’ occurred 
when Igbo electronics importers and dealers, who were trading in Asia, introduced the technology 
into private households. 
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applications now facilitate the instant sharing of images or even ‘live’ video calling. Some of 
the informants I stayed in touch with sent me pictures of the places they visited and their 
families, while we were updating each other about what was happening in our lives. But 
only the images I took with the explicit consent of participants are included in this thesis. 
3.3.3 In-depth interviews 
Within my mixed-method approach, the main source of information about the experiences 
of onward migrants were the in-depth interviews. The data generated from the interviews 
provided me with insights about my informants’ everyday lifeworlds – as well as how 
individuals had arrived where they were now, their experiences of living in different places 
and where they saw themselves in future. Furthermore, I could analyse the various 
meanings that migrants attached to their imagined, completed and discarded trajectories.  
The vast majority of interviews lasted between one and two hours, although a few 
informants spoke to me for up to four hours. Nearly all interviews were recorded during 
one single encounter, which was due to practical reasons. Seeing that I had to travel long 
distances to meet some of my participants, it was not feasible to interview all informants 
multiple times. Furthermore, many participants led very busy lives and therefore struggled 
to make time for one interview appointment and would simply not have been able to meet 
up with me on multiple occasions.  
The interviews took place in the participants’ preferred location, either public 
spaces or their homes. In two instances, I conducted recorded interviews over Skype, 
because my informants lived too far away for me to travel to meet them in person. Before 
each interview, I explained the objectives of my research, stating that I was interested to 
hear about the life stories of Nigerian migrants who lived in Europe. If they had not done so 
already, at this point my informants took the opportunity to ask me questions concerning 
my motivations for doing this research and my personal background. I answered the 
questions in the detail that was required. Given the amount of information that my 
participants were willing to share during the interview, I thought it only fair to also give my 
interviewees the opportunity to know more about me.  
 I asked my informants for permission to record the in-depth interviews. In three 
cases informants said that they were uncomfortable for their voices to be recorded, which 
meant that I took extensive notes during the interview instead. Recording the interviews 
enabled me to focus on listening to what the informants were saying and to pay attention to 
their body language. Having recordings of the interviews also allowed me to capture 
particular expressions that informants used to narrate their experiences. The interviews 
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were mainly conducted in English, although participants occasionally also used words in 
other languages when describing details of the places where they had lived.  
I did not impose a structure on how informants told me ‘their stories’; nonetheless 
the narratives of my informants usually followed a chronological order. Most informants 
required hardly any prompting to include information about their lives before migration, 
their decision to emigrate and their lives abroad. Once the informants had completed their 
narratives, in the second part of the interview, I switched to a more interactive and 
conversational mode. This allowed me to pose follow-up questions about issues that had 
not been touched on or remained unclear in the narratives. In addition, I asked my 
informants’ about their views concerning themes that I had come across in other interviews. 
Furthermore, I encouraged my informants to tell me about their ‘future plans’, because most 
informants provided a retrospective account of their lives but did not mention future plans 
without my prompting. Finally, I recorded basic demographic data about my 
informants. Some informants I continued to meet after conducting the interviews, which 
permitted me to have informal conversations with them afterwards or join them for 
everyday activities, like going shopping, sharing meals, running errands, visiting 
neighbours or picking up children from school. 
In this study, I understand my informants’ narratives as both ‘experience-centred’ 
and ‘co-constructed narratives’ (Andrews et al. 2013). On the one hand, this means that the 
type of data that I was able to generate through the interviews are not generalisable facts 
about onward migration, but should be rather interpreted as subjective and ‘situated 
knowledge’ (Haraway 1991). This became especially apparent to me, when I continued to 
be in touch with several of my informants after the interviews and witnessed how their 
views and trajectories evolved over time. On the other hand, this is a reflection of how my 
interlocutors presented themselves and their stories to me as a researcher. The way in 
which individuals convey information is undeniably influenced by the audience – in this 
case the researcher and individuals reading any publications arising from the research. 
After an initial informal conversation, one of my informants changed some of his personal 
details during the recorded interview. When he saw the slightly puzzled look on my face, 
the informant gave me a wink and smiled, to indicate that he was taking charge of 
anonymising his narrative in the way I had explained before we started the recording. 
Overall, I conducted in-depth interviews with 120 migrants from Nigeria, involving 
40 migrants each in Germany, the UK and Spain. I also tried to achieve a gender balance in 
my sample and in total I interviewed 69 male and 51 female Nigerian migrants. Actually, in 
some research sites, especially London, I encountered difficulties achieving a balanced 
gender composition. This was not due to a relatively smaller presence of Nigerian women 
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in these locations, but rather an effect of the long working hours of women and their 
childcare responsibilities. This meant that potential female informants simply had less time 
to participate in interviews. To address this issue, I suggested to schedule more interviews 
straight after church services and offered to conduct interviews while helping with cooking 
preparations in my informants’ home. 
The age range of the informants was 23-67 years, although the modal group were in 
their 30s. The majority of the interviewees originated from the South of Nigeria or had spent 
a considerable time living in Lagos before leaving Nigeria. My study included 107 first-
generation migrants, as well as 13 migrants who were part of the 1.5 generation that joined 
their parents in Europe as teenagers. Before their emigration to Europe, 15 informants had 
engaged in migration spells to other countries within Africa or another continent; a 
considerable number also had migrated internally within Nigeria. Most of my informants 
said they identified with either the Igbo, Yoruba or Edo ethno-regional groups, while a 
minority of individuals said they pertained to the Ijaw, Efik, Esan and Hausa ethnic groups. 
Several informants stressed that they had mixed ethnic identities, because they were raised 
by parents of different ethno-regional heritage and spoke several Nigerian languages. The 
overwhelming majority of my informants identified as Christian, only two were Muslim.10 
In terms of educational background, the majority had obtained secondary and tertiary 
qualifications in Nigeria, only 2 informants in Spain and 3 in Germany had not attended 
school beyond primary level. In general, my informants’ families were part of the lower and 
upper middle-class in Nigeria, but several women mentioned that they came from very poor 
families. 
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Throughout this study, I incorporate data published by several national and international 
statistics agencies, as well as relevant legislation and policies to provide insights about how 
Nigerian (onward) migration is measured. In Chapter 4, I present data regarding the size 
and demographic characteristics of the Nigerian migrant population in various parts of the 
world, which indicate that Europe is becoming an increasingly important destination for 
                                                        
 
10 In general, Muslims of the Hausa and other ethno-regional groups from Northern Nigeria are more 
likely to migrate to the Gulf states (de Haas 2007a). Most Nigerians I met attested that they had never 
met a Hausa or Fulani Nigerian in continental Europe, except in Bonn where Deutsche Welle operated 
a dedicated Hausa radio programme and recruited Hausa staff. Even though, there are many Yoruba 
from Southern Nigeria who are Muslim, nearly all of these individuals I spoke to had migrated 
directly to their destination country. In the UK, the 2001 Census indicates that 9 per cent of the 
Nigerian-born population was Muslim, equivalent to around 12,000 to 14,000 individuals. There is 
no similar data available for Spain or Germany (Change Institute 2009: 51). 
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Nigerian migrants. Secondary data analysis of the statistics concerning visas and asylum 
applications also illustrates the variegated nature of Nigerian migration flows to different 
European destination countries.  
Data about onward migrants remains difficult to locate in migration statistics. 
Although countries pay considerable attention to registering the arrival of new immigrants, 
most countries keep no records of immigrants who later decide to leave. As a result, there 
are limitations to what can be deduced from the available statistics. First, emigration 
statistics are generally somewhat unreliable, because they are essentially an estimate of 
‘disappearances’ from a specific population cohort. To estimate how many immigrants have 
emigrated it is necessary to combine various types of datasets: formal de-registrations of 
former residents; periodic administrative de-registrations of non-tax filers; reported deaths 
and estimated deaths. 11  Second, only very few national statistics agencies collect data 
regarding ‘country of next usual residence’ after emigration, thereby making it difficult to 
distinguish between emigrants who are onward migrating to a third country and those who 
are returning to their origin country.12 Third, the ‘country of previous residence’ is usually 
recorded either 5 years or 1 year prior to the survey date. This variable thus only captures 
recent onward migrations of those individuals who were residing in a third country at a 
particular point in time. Finally, none of the current immigration statistics have the capacity 
to ‘track’ international moves that involve more than two countries, nor do they capture 
shorter onward mobilities that lasted under a year (Ahrens 2013).13 
In this thesis, the descriptive statistics regarding intra-European onward migrants 
are mainly based on the 2011 Census round. This is the first EU-wide census in which all 
member states harmonised the census questions and included both the variables of ‘country 
of birth’ and ‘nationality’. In general, census data have a higher reliability for the analysis of 
small subgroups than the Labour Force Surveys. It is important to note, however, that the 
enumerated population of the Census 2011 varied across member states. In the UK, the 
census 2011 included a full census return from all usual residents. Meanwhile in Germany 
                                                        
 
11  The results of the 2011 Census revealed that Germany had 1.5 million fewer residents than 
previously estimated. In particular, the number of foreign passport-holders resident in Germany had 
been over-estimated by 1.1 million. BBC (2013) Census reveals German population lower than 
thought, BBC News, 31 May http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22727898 
12 Amongst the few notable exceptions that record emigration destinations are Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Australia (Bratsberg et al. 2007; Hugo 2008; Nekby 2006; van Heelsum 
and Hessels 2006). 
13 However, by using innovative sampling methods the PIONEUR project collected data about mobile 
EU citizens and found that around half already had a previous migration experience and further 25 
per cent even had lived in a third country (Kuhn 2011: 138; Recchi and Favell 2009) 
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a stratified sample of 10 per cent and in Spain of 12 per cent of the population and 
households was enumerated, which was then matched with data from municipal registers 
and several other statistical sources.14 In addition to the standard output of the 2011 Census 
data, I also made requests for Commissioned Tables to include further variables. This option 
of accessing data was slow and, unfortunately, the estimated costs exceeded my budget. 
Besides, my interest in a relatively small population meant that my requested 
Commissioned Tables did not meet confidentiality restrictions, consequently particular 
variables would have had to be provided in aggregate form thus not allowing sufficient new 
insights. 
The standard output from the 2011 Census, allowed me to identify Nigerian-born 
residents who naturalised in one EU member state before onward migrating to another. 
However, this estimate still under-represents the incidence and different types of onward 
migration. From my empirical research, I became aware that a substantial number of 
Nigerians were mobile within the Schengen zone before acquiring a European passport. 
Thus, this estimate does not account for the intra-European onward mobilities of third-
country nationals who use their short-term residence permit, a permanent residence 
permit or the new EU long-term residence permit to (temporarily) relocate to other 
member states – and irregular onward migration is not accounted for at all. Furthermore, 
the census data fail to capture multiple onward mobilities within the EU, relocations with a 
duration of under a year or the potentially multiple places of residence of third-country 
nationals prior to their arrival in Europe.  
3.4  Positionalities 
Aware of the ‘situatedness’ of knowledge, feminist and post-colonial scholars have argued 
that it is important to be conscious about the context in which knowledge is produced 
(Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002). Researchers have to account for the ways in which their 
various senses of being and belonging influence their interactions with the research 
process. The positionality of researchers conducting qualitative research is said to be 
characterised by clearly defined ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positions. However, I agree with 
Carling et al. (2013) that researchers – especially in a transnational context – occupy 
complex and shifting positionalities based on the interplay between the research context, 
                                                        
 
14  The other data sources included: population registers; a housing census; a household sample 
survey; survey of special shared housing facilities (prisons, student residences, etc.); tax registers; 
and a follow-up survey. 
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the characteristics of the researcher and the individuals they are conducting research with. 
Furthermore, certain cultural codes, physical traits and language competences might be 
more visible than other identity markers. The positionality a researcher is assigned also 
depends on the extent to which these various layers of identity are shared with informants. 
The rapport and trust a researcher is able to build with particular individuals might depend 
on emphasising certain shared identity markers. In the following, I will outline, from my 
own subjective viewpoint, how different personal characteristics and research contexts 
affected my positionality during the fieldwork. 
As a white European woman carrying out research with Nigerians in Europe, my 
researcher position could be imbued with colonial connotations (Huisman 2008). Upon our 
first encounter, many Nigerians would refer to me as Oyinbo or Oyibo – a word used in 
Nigerian Pidgin, Yoruba and Igbo to refer to a person that is not African and typically of 
European origin. My Nigerian interlocutors generally assumed that I was British due to my 
fluency in English and my first name. In the casual conversations that followed, I was nearly 
always asked a quick succession of questions that enquired about my origin, the origin of 
my parents, my occupation, my place of residence, whom I lived with, my marital status and 
whether I had children. As a result, I was perceived in more nuanced and, in at times, 
conflicting ways.  
Although I had a long-term partner, most Nigerians did not understand why I was 
not married and had no children. Both women and men alike stated that an African woman 
in her early thirties would have long since married. Yet, several first-generation migrants 
told me that they themselves did not comply with these societal norms. After coming to 
Europe many were postponing marriage plans. Meanwhile others were cohabitating with a 
partner, and in many cases married according to European law, but had not travelled to 
Nigeria to celebrate the marriage according to customary marriage laws. However, in most 
systems of customary marriage law in Nigeria, a marriage is not recognised until all 
mandatory elements of the marriage are completed. 
Besides, my responses allowed my interlocutors to know about my kinship ties. My 
dual Irish-German nationality led one Nigerian-Irish interviewee to identify me as a subject 
‘colonised by the British’, whereas several Igbo informants were curious to know whether I 
shared their Catholic faith. These remarks illustrate Ireland’s complex relationship with 
Nigeria and other African countries. Even though Ireland did not officially colonise any 
country in Africa, it had a strong presence through Catholic missionaries and migrant 
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workers. Therefore Ireland ‘was fundamentally and intrinsically part and parcel of the 
European, if not British, imperialist apparatus on the continent’ (Ejorh 2012: 587).15  
Revealing my ethno-national background meant that Nigerians did not consider me 
part of the majority population in the UK and Spain, which possibly made it easier for my 
informants to share more critical remarks with me about their experiences. By contrast, in 
Germany I had to make an extra effort to assure a few of my informants that I was not 
working for the German immigration authorities. I found that learning basic greetings in 
various Nigerian languages was a good way of creating bonds. Although it was beyond my 
abilities to learn several Nigerian languages in-depth, my efforts were usually appreciated. 
Over time, I became able to follow conversations in Nigerian Pidgin, which allowed me to 
join in some of the banter and jokes that people shared. On the whole, I think the ways in 
which I reflexively used my positionality were successful because I had very low interview 
refusal rates across all fieldsites and managed to interview a wide range of participants. 
It is common for social scientists to conduct research on topics they have an affinity 
with. Similar to the majority of my informants, I have lived in several countries and 
therefore felt I had some insights into what it meant to be ‘on the move’ and the effort it 
took to ‘settle in’. Many informants expressed that I must know what it was like to be a 
‘migrant’ and expected me to have a more ‘international’ and ‘open-minded’ perspective 
than the Europeans they knew who had never lived outside of their origin country. On 
hearing about my geographical attachments many Nigerians I met started sharing their own 
stories about the places they lived and visited, but also the places they could not reach or 
were forced to leave. Therefore, I was acutely aware that I had more formal mobility rights 
than many of the informants I spoke to and on occasions this power imbalance made me 
feel very uneasy. 
Across all research sites, I introduced myself as a worker-student. Although I was 
awarded a grant for my fieldwork in Germany and later also for part of the writing-up stage 
of my thesis, these funds were limited and that is why I worked in several part-time jobs 
throughout the PhD. Having to balance work and study was an experience that many 
Nigerians could relate to. Amongst Nigerians, education is held in high regard, and therefore 
even individuals who did not have an advanced level of education understood what doctoral 
research entailed. Informants often proudly told me about the siblings or children they 
supported to become ‘graduates’. By presenting myself as a student and not as a researcher, 
                                                        
 
15 None of my informants remarked upon Germany’s history as a colonial power. This is particularly 
interesting given the fact that two former German colonial ‘protectorates’ – namely Mahinland, an 
area around Lagos (1884-1885), and part of German Kamerun (1884-1916) – are constituent 
territories of present-day Nigeria. 
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I also hoped to manage my informants’ expectations in terms of the potential benefits of 
their participation in this study. I made clear that I had limited influence on policy-makers 
and therefore was unlikely to effect substantial change for them personally. Nevertheless, I 
do see it as my responsibility to draw attention to injustices and unfair conditions that 
negatively affected people’s lives.  
3.5  Ethical concerns 
Before starting the interviews, I obtained informed consent from the interviewees. In most 
cases this was written consent, and in a few cases interviewees gave recorded verbal 
consent to participate in the study. Seeing that I recruited the majority of my participants in 
public places or via their personal networks, our interview appointment was usually the 
first opportunity we had to talk one-to-one. Before starting the interview, I explained the 
objectives of the study, the rights of the informants, as well as the risks and benefits of 
participation. Concerning the rights of research participants, I made potential interviewees 
aware that all the information they shared during the course of the study would remain 
confidential. Furthermore, I assured informants that all data would be securely stored in a 
password-protected environment and handled in accordance with ethical standards and 
guidelines. In terms of the dissemination of the findings, I explained that in any 
presentations and publications arising from the research I would remove any revealing 
personal information from their narratives to ensure anonymity. 
The informants themselves chose the pseudonyms used in this thesis. I felt it was 
appropriate to let my informants choose their own pseudonyms, because Nigerian names 
often reveal the ethno-regional origin of the person. My concern was that, for instance, a 
Yoruba name, alongside information about the migration trajectory and the current place 
of residence of the informant, may not ensure a sufficient level of anonymity. Indeed, many 
of my informants picked English names. Others said that they wanted to use their ‘traveling 
names’, as they did not mind other people in Europe recognising the names, but preferred 
not to be identified by their families in Nigeria. Unexpectedly, several individuals insisted 
on using their real names, because they said they were tired of assuming other identities 
and names. There are general concerns when research participants waive their ‘right to 
anonymity’ (Guenther 2009). Yet there is hardly any discussion about this issue in the wider 
academic literature and I believe it needs to be addressed more fully in ethical guidelines. 
Following a longer conversation about the possible ramifications of using their real names, 
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I ultimately accepted my informants’ self-asserted ‘right to identity’ and ‘ownership’ over 
their narratives. 
 Furthermore, I informed my interviewees that the risks involved in participating in 
the study were minimal to them. Nevertheless, I made clear that talking about experiences, 
such as moving to another country, can be difficult or traumatic. I highlighted that if any 
question made them feel uneasy, they were not obliged to answer and we could stop the 
interview at any point, without the need to provide a reason. One informant, in particular, 
got very upset relating his story to me and asked me to stop the recording. But he insisted 
that he wanted to resume the interview with me the following day and we then met again, 
stopping and starting the recording at various points to let him compose himself while he 
told me his story. Several other informants told me when they were preferred to omit 
certain parts of their experiences from their narrative. 
Additionally, I made sure that the informants knew that the participation in the 
research was voluntary and they would not be compensated for participating. Nevertheless, 
out of common courtesy, I did usually offer to buy a soft drink for informants when in a 
public place. I explained how the interview itself would proceed, by making clear that in the 
first part of the interview it would be up to them to tell me their story in their own words 
and then in the second part of the interview I would ask them a few questions. I informed 
the interviewees that they had the right to stop the interview at any point and that even at 
a later stage they could withdraw their consent to participate in the research, without any 
need to provide an explanation. In this case, all their data would be immediately and 
permanently destroyed. Before we started with the interview, I gave informants the 
opportunity to ask further questions. 
Contributions about the ethical issues involved in doing migration research usually 
focus on the particular concerns when doing research with refugees and irregular migrants 
(van Liempt and Bilger 2009; RFC 2007). In general, the Nigerians I interviewed were not 
especially vulnerable because most had legal residence papers and a livelihood strategy. 
Only in Spain my sample included individuals who had an irregular migration status at the 
time of the interview. The perceived greater threat of deportation in the UK and the fear of 
the ‘police state’ in Germany are likely to have prevented Nigerians with an irregular status 
from engaging with me. Nevertheless, across all research sites I interviewed individuals 
who had experienced periods of irregularity at earlier stages of their migration project. 
Interestingly, Nigerians often perceived me as vulnerable, because I was new to their city. 
Except for Manchester, I had not ever lived in any of the cities where I conducted research 
and compared to my informants therefore had less ‘local’ knowledge. On several occasions, 
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individuals insisted on waiting with me at the next bus stop or giving me a ride in the car 
and I was very touched by their care. 
3.6 Data analysis  
Having discussed the various stages and sources that formed part of my data collection, I 
now turn to how I proceeded with the data analysis. A mixed-methods approach entails that 
researchers not only need to integrate data collection methods, but also have to consider 
how they integrate the data sources at the stage of analysis (Bergmann 2008). An initial 
analysis already took place during the data collection phase. I kept a field diary where I 
noted down my observations and impressions while doing fieldwork, which was an 
important way of recording and thinking through my qualitative data. In addition, I 
compiled summaries of the interviews, including information about the demographic 
details and the migration trajectories of the interviewees, as well as the main themes of the 
interviews. The themes that were repeatedly mentioned by Nigerians in some cases 
influenced which key informants I approached for interviewing, with the aim of gaining 
different perspectives on the issues that had been raised by informants. Some of my key 
informants, for instance, included representatives who worked at migrant associations, 
migrant rights NGOs, employment agencies, citizens’ advice bureaus, churches and school 
administrations. Due to restrictions of space in the thesis, I did not include quotes from the 
key informants directly, but the insights I gained were invaluable for me to triangulate some 
of my findings. 
Despite taking regular short breaks during the fieldwork, I felt quite exhausted on 
returning from the field. I underestimated how physically and mentally demanding it would 
be to conduct multi-sited research. Therefore, I had to take a step back before I could 
proceed to analyse the interviews in-depth. I then listened to all the interviews in full and 
created a more detailed standardised summary containing the main characteristics of the 
informants, their migration trajectories, as well as an index of main interview themes. This 
provided me with a comprehensive overview of my interview sample and allowed me to see 
different patterns emerge. I selected 44 interviews to be transcribed in full. The criteria for 
selecting interviews for transcription was to reflect a wide range of onward migration 
experiences and interviewee backgrounds. The remaining interviews were transcribed 
selectively. I proceeded to inductively code the transcripts, as well as my fieldnotes, using a 
structured coding technique. Once further themes emerged, I re-coded the transcripts. 
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It was a key concern for me to accurately represent my informants’ ‘voices’, which 
influenced how I chose to analyse and present the narrative material. First, the aim for me 
was to focus on interviews on the basis that they were either representative or exceptional 
compared to the experiences of other onward migrants who were part of this study (Kvale 
2007). Therefore, the quotations included in this thesis are not exhaustive but instead are 
to be understood as illustrative examples of experiences that several participants 
expressed. Second, I opted for a verbatim transcription of the interviews, which left all 
linguistic expressions unchanged, including the occasional use of Nigerian Pidgin. When I 
gave papers at conferences, other researchers suggested that I should have corrected the 
quotations to standard British English and removed what were perceived to be odd 
syntactic turns and lexis. Yet, I felt that this linguistic editing in fact would have erased the 
important local appropriation and hybridisation of English that has taken place in Nigeria. 
As Bhabha noted, hybridisation is the ‘strategic reversal of the process of domination 
through disavowal… It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power’ 
(Bhabha 1994: 112). Nonetheless, it is true that in Nigeria and the diaspora, despite its 
importance as a contact language between the over 200 ethno-linguistic groups, the use of 
Nigerian Pidgin remains contested – viewed by some as an emancipatory post-colonial 
project, while others aspire to speak American or British English.  
The sequential research design meant that the empirical fieldwork and most of the 
analysis of the qualitative data was complete, when the quantitative data from the 2011 
Census was released. In addition to exploring the general statistical trends, I therefore also 
explored some of the main themes from the in-depth interviews via the statistical data 
(Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). Yet, a full integration of my data sources was not possible. 
Some themes that my informants repeatedly mentioned in the interviews could not be 
explored further through statistical data sources, because they simply were not covered by 
the census questions or the data were not available in disaggregated form. The training I 
received in data visualisation techniques was tremendously useful for uncovering further 
patterns in the statistical data, which I had overlooked with standard data analysis.  
Remaining in touch with key informants and interviewees, was not only useful in 
order to remotely ‘follow the people’ and their trajectories (Marcus 1995). The continued 
contact also enabled me to share drafts of my research for feedback. This way it was possible 
for me to ensure that interviewees agreed with the way in which I used and interpreted 
their narratives. Furthermore, this was also a way of confirming that I had correctly 
implemented the level of anonymity that my informants had requested me to provide them 
with (see discussion in section 3.5). In fact, two articles stemming from my doctoral 
research have been published in academic journals. One paper analyses the various forms 
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of semi-legal mobilities of Nigerians in Spain (Ahrens, J. (2013) Suspended in Eurocrisis: 
new immobilities and semi-legal migrations amongst Nigerians living in Spain. Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies, 22(1): 115-140). In a second article I co-authored with Melissa Kelly 
and Ilse van Liempt, we compare the onward mobilities of three different migrant groups 
in the direction of the UK and present a typology of intra-European onward movers (Ahrens, 
J., Kelly, M. and van Liempt, I. (2016) Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens 
born in Somalia, Iran, and Nigeria. Population, Space and Place, 22(1): 84-98).  
The feedback I received on the draft papers in most instances consisted of small 
changes and amendments, but informants also provided me with valuable new information 
about policy practices and their own trajectories. Remaining in touch with participants, 
however, also had its own challenges. Sometimes I felt that I never really exited the field. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I outlined the methodological design of this study, as well as the context in 
which the data was generated. Furthermore, I explained how I addressed several ethical 
concerns. This thesis involved both a triangulation of research sites and methods. Overall, I 
carried out 120 interviews and extended participant observation in Berlin, Cologne, 
London, Manchester, Madrid and Málaga. In addition, an analysis of the secondary statistical 
data from the 2011 Census was carried out to provide further demographic insights about 
Nigerians who onward migrate after acquiring EU citizenship. Unfortunately, the currently 
available statistical data do not fully capture the intra-European onward migration of 
individuals who relocate with their short-term or permanent residence papers. 
Furthermore, I highlighted how the positionality of the researcher is dependent on 
the specific interactions of various identity markers with different research participants 
and with the research contexts. I explained how my various positionalities were constituted 
and evolved across the different field sites. I emphasised that the knowledge that is co-
produced during these encounters is unavoidably subjective and situated. In order to 
overcome ethical concerns during the research process, I argued that it was important for 
me to involve my informants and get their feedback on how to resolve certain issues. As a 
result, the names used in this thesis are pseudonyms the informants chose themselves, 
including fictitious names, nicknames and real names. In agreement with feminist scholars, 
I argue that thinking through knowledge production with research participants in this way 
can help to avoid colonial ethnological approaches. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Europe in Africa, Africa in Europe: 
Nigerian Migration and Diaspora 
 
Nigerians have migrated internally, regionally and beyond the African continent, though the 
direction and intensity of these mobilities have varied over time. In this chapter, I embed 
the main features of contemporary Nigerian international migration within several social, 
and indeed global, transformations. This examination reveals certain continuities between 
historical and present-day Nigerian mobility and migration patterns, but also highlights 
overlooked features and new patterns. Both Africa and Europe have witnessed profound 
social, economic and political changes throughout their inextricably linked history. 
Migration oftentimes played an integral part in these developments. The first section 
provides some background concerning the long history of out-migration from Nigeria, 
dating back to the trans-Saharan trade of the middle ages and the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
between the 17th to 19th centuries. These forced migrations are distinct from the colonial 
and post-independence migrations, which were motivated by personal aspirations for 
better opportunities relating to education and work, as well as the need to escape from 
political violence and socio-economic hardship. I reappraise the main post-colonial Nigerian 
migration phases with its key ‘figures’ – the ‘been-to’ migrants, ‘Andrews’, ‘hustlers’ and 
refugees. In light of the over-looked phenomenon of onward migration, I argue that 
narratives about particular Nigerian migration phases and ‘figures’ can be criticized for 
‘fixing’ often complex, ongoing migration trajectories to particular destinations, time 
periods, migration cohorts and ethno-regional groups. These sections also form the basis 
for my discussion in Chapter 7 about how the previous, current and future emplacements 
and mobility of my informants and their family members lead to the emergence of what I 
define as ‘multi-sited transnationalism’. Then, the next section turns to the analysis of the 
main features of the contemporary Nigerian diaspora. I analyse the wider social conditions 
that contributed to the entrenchment of migration aspirations amongst the youth during 
the period when most of my informants left Nigeria. Finally, I examine the scale of migration 
and the geographic distribution of the Nigerian migrant communities. Therefore, this 
chapter provides insights into the turbulent history of Africa’s demographic giant, as well 
as its multi-faceted migration.  
 
 
65 
 
4.1 Multi-faceted Nigerian migration dynamics  
4.1.1 Pre-colonial migration patterns 
During the pre-colonial era several kingdoms and empires such as the Benin, Ile-Ife, Kanem-
Borno and Sokoto Caliphate rose and fell in the area around the River Niger (Falola and 
Heaton 2008). The social structures in this region were based on ethnicity and kinship. Even 
though there is little known about the ancient times of kin-based societies, there is 
‘linguistic, cultural and economic evidence’ that patrilineal structures in West Africa date 
back to the early 16th century (Lovejoy 2011: 12).16 In these societies elders maintained 
political power, because they controlled access to the means of production and women. 
Women were usually the main workers on the agricultural land, therefore economic 
production and social reproduction were connected. An elder’s position in society was 
determined by the number of wives, the number of children born to each wife, support from 
younger kin, as well as access to land and other resources (Eades 1980: 53). In addition, 
societies based on kinship practised various forms of dependency, such as slavery and 
pawnship. Dependent individuals had no kinship connections to their masters and 
performed similar tasks as lineage members. But an increase in the number of dependents 
meant that elders could mobilise more individuals and this augmented their gerontocratic 
authority (Lovejoy and Falola 2003). 
Various migrations to and from the territory that is now known as Nigeria resulted 
in the settlement of over 200 ethno-linguistic groups that speak over 250 different 
languages  (Falola and Heaton 2008). But the understanding of Nigerian ethnicities was in 
fact conceived as a result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, missionisation and 
colonialism in West Africa – prior to that, group identities were mostly based on 
geographic locality and kinship ties (Eltis and Richardson 2010). There were two 
migration patterns that dominated the pre-colonial period. First, the trans-Saharan trade of 
the Hausa states and the Kingdom of Kanem-Borno in northern Nigeria fostered intensive 
social and commercial connections with the Maghreb states of North Africa, the Middle East 
and Europe. Over the centuries the trans-Saharan trade involved conventional goods, such 
as salt, textiles, iron and weapons. In addition to the exchange of goods and people, this 
trade route also served as a means for the diffusion of Islam to northern Nigeria. Later 
pilgrimages to Medina and Mecca sustained these transnational links and individuals who 
                                                        
 
16 The exception being the matrilineal Akan on the Gold Coast, which today is Ghana. 
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were unable to complete their journeys became ‘permanent pilgrims’ in Sudan and Chad. 
By the 14th and 16th centuries the trans-Saharan trade intensified, due to the high profits 
that could be achieved from trading with gold and slaves. There are no accurate estimates 
about the extent of this trans-Saharan slave trade, but given the dangerous conditions 
involved in crossing the Sahara on foot, it is assumed that a significant proportion of slaves 
lost their lives during the journey (Lovejoy 2011: 35). Around this time an increasing 
number of wars and slave raids between different ethno-regional groups and kingdoms 
were documented. 
The second dominant migration pattern was the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
Following the arrival of Europeans on the West African coast in the 15th century, the focus 
of trade shifted south and the trans-Saharan trade diminished. Initially trans-Atlantic trade 
centred on high-value items such as textiles, pepper and gold. But after the Europeans 
landed in the Americas the demand for plantation labour increased in the 16th century, 
therefore the focus shifted to the trade with slaves. By the turn of the 19th century, ‘slave 
trade with Europeans had become integral aspects of the economies of states and societies 
throughout the greater Nigerian area’ (Falola and Heaton 2008: 59). The shipping records 
compiled so far show that in the period between 1622 and 1851 there were 944,046 slaves 
purchased between Badagry and Calabar ports, which now constitute the Nigerian 
coastline.17 On vessels sailing under British, French and Portuguese flag, slaves were taken 
for forced labour in plantation economies of the Americas, including 741,495 to the 
Caribbean (78.5 per cent), 85,067 to Brazil (9 per cent), 44,194 to North America (4.7 per 
cent) and 18,261 to other, mainly South American, destinations (1.9 per cent). The slaves 
mainly were Yoruba-speaking and Igbo-speaking peoples, although there were also 
significant numbers of Hausa and Ibibio (Eltis and Richardson 2010; Lovejoy 2011).  
Slavery also caused the emergence of a particular type of diaspora, namely the 
‘Black Atlantic’, which involved the circulation of ideas and people (Gilroy 1993). After the 
abolition of slavery, this social institution continued to form an integral part of the political 
economy of West Africa as domestic slavery became more common. Many historians and 
geographers argue that this in turn has influenced the current population distribution in 
Nigeria. Especially minority ethnic groups that were unable to defend themselves from the 
                                                        
 
17 These data were extracted from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Database www.slavevoyages.org (Eltis et 
al. 2009) in September 2016. Not included in my selection are data relating to other nearby ports in 
the Bight of Benin and Bight of Biafra, where Yoruba-speaking and Igbo-speaking slaves were also 
purchased. Out of the 944,046 slaves circa 16.8 per cent died during these particular voyages. 
Furthermore, various slaving vessels embarking after 1810 were intercepted and taken to African 
ports with 53,432 slaves on board, many of whom were declared free following international 
tribunals mostly held in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
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slave raiding of larger states, fled to remote terrains in the hills and plateaus (Adepujo and 
van der Wiel 2010: 23). Partly due to these historic migrations, the central Jos Plateau is 
characterised by a high cultural and ethnic diversity. 
During the colonial period, ethnic groups were divided by new geographic borders 
imposed by the colonial powers. This resulted, for example, in the Yoruba being split 
between Nigeria and Benin – suddenly changing customary regional mobility patterns into 
international border crossings. In addition, Britain sought to control the productive means 
of the Nigerian people to ensure a cheap and steady supply of raw materials for its own 
industrial revolution (Binaisa 2013). The colonial administration focused major 
investments on the intensive cultivation of cash crops in southern Nigeria, which also 
involved labour migrants from northern Nigeria in the generation of exports, such as cocoa, 
palm oil, cotton, groundnuts and rubber. Moreover, the introduction of poll taxes and hut 
taxes resulted in new mobility patterns amongst Nigerian subsistence farmers, who had to 
seek wage-paying work. The urban expansion in the South motivated an unprecedented 
number of people to move to cities like Lagos and Enugu, but urbanisation also occurred in 
the north in cities like Kano, Kaduna and Jos (Meagher 1997). Urbanisation was one of the 
drivers of rural-urban migration systems, and led to novel land distribution patterns of the 
plots that migrants left behind (Eades 1980: 37; Mabogunje 1970).  
In addition, Nigerians sought livelihood opportunities across the wider West African 
region. During the colonial and post-colonial period Nigerian migrants were working in 
mines, plantations, and construction sites, as well as engaged in trading (kola nuts, livestock 
and foodstuff) in both Ghana and Cameroon for several decades. The 1960s saw a major 
economic downturn in Ghana and migrants were blamed for the deteriorating conditions 
that followed. This resulted in the expulsion of 200,000 Nigerians in 1969 (Van Hear 1998: 
78). In sum, mobility and migration, including forced migration, were fundamental to the 
social and economic history of Nigeria. 
4.1.2 Colonial and post-independence migration patterns 
During the colonial period and after Nigeria gained political independence from Britain, 
international migration intensified and it is possible to discern four broad migration phases, 
as well ‘key figures’ of migration. Bredeloup (2013) analyses several figures which have 
been employed by scholars to describe African migrations. In the following, I will delineate 
particular key figures of post-colonial migration that are specific to the Nigerian socio-
historical context. The first emigration phase encompassed the late colonial era up until 
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1960, during which time Nigerian elites and skilled migrants migrated to the UK and the 
USA, as well as the USSR, in pursuit of education and professional development (Adi 1998; 
Matusevich 2003, 2009). In order to bolster their respective ideological and economic 
agendas in the ‘third world’, the Cold War powers sought to attract African students from 
decolonising nations through the provision of generous scholarships. Migrants of this era 
were referred to as the ‘been-to’ generation, 18  because graduates usually returned to 
Nigeria after completing their studies.19 Their new qualifications enabled them to secure 
jobs in the bureaucracy and oil sector that paid internationally competitive wages (Falola 
and Heaton 2008: 138). Even though Nigeria experienced a comparatively high emigration 
intensity during this period, the emigrant stocks remained relatively stable due to the steady 
return migration (Table 4.1). While pursuing degrees abroad African student associations 
actively contributed to the independence movements by exerting pressure on the Colonial 
Office in London (Adi 1998: 134). When Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960, 
                                                        
 
18 Novels by acclaimed Nigerian authors, like No Longer at Ease (1960) by Chinua Achebe, Jagua 
Nana (1961) by Cyprian Ekwensi and The Interpreters (1964) by Wole Soyinka, all include characters 
who studied abroad and obtained well-paid posts on their return to Nigeria. In the wider Anglophone 
West-African literature set in the same era, the ‘been-to’ figure is also very common. See Egbunike 
(2014). 
19 While abroad and after their return to Nigeria, ‘been-to’ migrants often formed associations to 
meet up with other alumni. During my fieldwork in London I also had informal conversations with 
Nigerian graduates who trained in the former Soviet Union. Their associations were evocatively 
named Soyuznik (Russian for: ally) or Sputnik (after the first earth satellite launched by the USSR in 
1957). 
 
 
Table 4.1 Emigrant and Immigrant Populations of Nigeria 1960-2013 
          
  Population  
in Nigeria  
Emigrant  
stock 
Emigration 
intensity (%) 
Immigrant 
stock 
Immigration 
intensity (%) 
2013   172 817 000   1 117 901 0.65   1 233 592 0.71 
2010   159 425 000   1 000 523 0.63   1 127 668 0.71 
2000   122 877 000    659 197 0.54    744 018 0.61 
1990   95 617 000    433 256 0.45    443 723 0.46 
1980   73 698 000    369 574 0.50   1 264 645 1.72 
1970   56 132 000    375 556 0.67    157 826 0.28 
1960   45 212 000    335 201 0.74    94 126 0.21 
          
Sources: Data compiled from UN Population Division and the World Bank Global Bilateral 
Migration database.  
Note: It is important to note that ‘emigration intensity’ and ‘immigration intensity’ are based on 
migrant stock data and should therefore not be confused with ‘migration rates’ which are 
based on annual flow data (Flahaux and de Haas 2016).  
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many Nigerians returned to take up positions that had opened in the public service after the 
departure of the administrators of colonial rule. 
The second migration phase, which lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s, was initially 
precipitated by ethnic and religious tensions within the country, culminating in a military 
coup in 1966. The ensuing Nigerian-Biafran Civil War lasted from 1967 to 1970 and left 
over one million people dead due to conflict and starvation. Many Nigerians, mainly from 
the Igbo ethnic group, were internally displaced and others sought asylum abroad. This 
period was also marked by relocations back to ancestral regions, because of the 
discrimination regarding housing and education that ‘strangers’ faced elsewhere (Bakewell 
2008a).20 ‘Been-to’ migrants who were attending universities abroad delayed their return 
to Nigeria and settled in the destination countries. The Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) high-price policy meant that oil-rich Nigeria experienced a 
tremendous rise in revenue. As a result, Nigeria became the main destination in West Africa 
for low-skilled workers from the region. Later, environmental factors repeatedly induced 
internal migration; because of crop failures and lack of water in the early 1970s and 1980s 
thousands of farmers and pastoralists moved southward during periods of severe drought 
(Meagher 1997: 83).  
The third migration phase commenced in the 1980s. Due to economic 
mismanagement, as well as a decline in oil production and oil prices, the country 
experienced a severe economic downturn. Therefore, in 1983 and 1985, Nigeria expelled an 
estimated two million West African migrant workers, including around one million 
Ghanaians (Van Hear 1998: 78). Migration patterns within West Africa underwent further 
shifts when an increasing number of countries suffered economic decline due to the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions and 
this heightened xenophobia towards migrant workers. In Nigeria the implementation of the 
SAP under General Babangida in 1986 brought about economic hardship; the retrenchment 
of the public sector increased urban unemployment and inflation skyrocketed. By 1987, the 
real wage of a lower-ranking civil servant was worth only 37 per cent of its 1975 value 
                                                        
 
20 This is a legacy of the British colonial policies of divide-and-rule, which accorded more rights to 
‘indigenes’ and discriminated against (internal) migrants, who were labelled ‘strangers’. Especially 
in northern Nigeria, separate areas of habitation based on ethnicity, so-called ‘strangers’ quarters’, 
were rigidly enforced during colonial rule (Kraxberger 2005). These discriminatory practices remain 
embedded in Nigerian law. In some states ‘certificates of indigeneity’ need to be requested from local 
government areas (LGA) for residents to gain access to civil service jobs, public education and basic 
services. Yet, there is no clear definition of what defines ‘indigeneity’ and therefore these certificates 
are often issued arbitrarily and thus are not recognised. 
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(Birks and Sinclair 1991, cited in Meagher 1997). Deficient employment opportunities and 
political repression in Nigeria meant that more skilled and professional workers started to 
leave the country with the intention of settling abroad (Reynolds 2002). Therefore, the 
period from 1970 to 1986 Nigeria witnessed a ‘reverse migration transition’, going from 
high net immigration to high net emigration (Black et al. 2004). Between 1965 and 1990, 
the USA operated dedicated visa programmes to attract highly-skilled migrants (Martin 
2003).21 And indeed, the Global Bilateral Migration Database (Özden et al. 2011) shows that 
Nigerian emigrant stocks in the USA increased by 37,408, whereas in the UK there was a 
more modest increase of 19,094 between 1980 and 1990. By broadcasting a series of 
propaganda short films on the state-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) channels, 
the Nigerian regime tried to dissuade its young and skilled citizens from emigrating, and 
thereby halt the country’s ‘brain drain’. The adverts featured the self-assured main 
character called Andrew standing in front of Murtala Muhammed International Airport in 
Lagos. ‘Men, I’m checkin’ out’, Andrew says in an American slur, then reeling off the reasons 
for his departure: ‘No good roads, no light, no water. Men, you can't even get a bottle of soft 
drink!’ (Adichie 2014: 188). The regime’s intention was to highlight that these 
infrastructural problems were being fixed and foster a sense of patriotism amongst 
Nigeria’s diverse peoples. But instead young Nigerians identified with the main character 
and emigrants of this era then referred to themselves as Andrews. It was no coincidence that 
Enebeli Elebuwa, a famous Igbo actor, portrayed the character of Andrew, seeing that this 
particular migration flow is said to have involved many Igbos. Although the NTA short films 
portrayed this as a male-dominated migration, a substantial number of these highly-skilled 
migrants were in fact women. 
The fourth migration phase began in the 1990s. Under General Abacha’s military 
dictatorship between 1993 and 1998, the country turned into a pariah state. Wole Soyinka, 
a renowned Nigerian playwright, and other members of NADECO (National Democratic 
Coalition, a pro-democracy group) fled the country for fear of persecution by the Abacha 
regime. The deepening economic crisis and severe civilian repression compelled a wider 
range of migrants to leave, including migrant workers, asylum-seekers and irregular 
migrants. In addition, the region was ravaged by civil wars in Sierra Leone (1991-2000), 
Liberia (1989-1996 and 1999-2003), Guinea (1999-2000) and Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2005) 
(Bakewell and de Haas 2007). However, during this period many traditional destination 
                                                        
 
21 The terms highly-skilled, highly-educated, and tertiary-educated are used interchangeably in the 
academic and policy literature; though I think it is, of course, problematic to define ‘skilled’ workers 
solely with regard of their educational attainment, as this fails to valorise other types of skills and 
knowledge. 
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countries had introduced more stringent visa requirements, especially for African migrants 
(Flahaux and de Haas 2016). This led to a spatial diversification of migration, which appears 
to indicate the declining importance of ‘colonial links’ in African emigration patterns. More 
Nigerians moved to Germany and the Netherlands in search of work and study 
opportunities, where they also started engaging in the export of second-hand vehicles to 
Nigeria.22 Meanwhile countries like Spain, Italy and Saudi Arabia also had a strong demand 
for low-paid migrant workers and their immigration policies (or, in the case of Spain and 
Italy, lax entry controls) constituted an attraction for these workers (de Haas 2007a). These 
migrants were often aware that life in Europe meant that they would need to hustle,23 in 
other words they were prepared to do menial and demeaning jobs to make a living, even 
though some of them possessed skills and had ambitions to obtain better-paid work. 
Finally, I argue that there has been another, under-studied and under-theorised 
migration pattern, which involves more complex trajectories. It is likely that these patterns 
were always in existence and formed part of the aforementioned migration phases, but 
were simply overlooked. There certainly is evidence that intra-European onward mobilities 
of Africans have started becoming more prominent since 1995, as I will demonstrate in the 
next chapter (see discussion in section 5.2). The itineraries of onward migrants can take the 
shape of open-ended trajectories towards Europe and beyond, back-and-forward moves 
across destination countries and Nigeria, as well as circular mobility between destination 
countries. Meanwhile, others might stepwise migrate in order to reach a desired 
destination. These migrants usually maintain multi-stranded transnational ties to various 
places. Onward migrants’ social position within these places, their capability to access and 
use resources and social networks, as well as their embodied experiences are shaped by 
particular configurations of constraints and opportunities at various scales. I will take up 
this discussion again in Chapter 7 where I analyse the multi-sited and ‘grounded’ 
transnationalism of onward migrants. Yet importantly, an understanding of onward 
migrants and their complex, ongoing and transformative migration trajectories destabilises 
                                                        
 
22 Following the lead of several former British colonies, Nigeria switched from driving on the left side 
of the road to driving on the right side on 2 April 1972. This change was to improve road safety and 
commerce in West Africa, seeing that these former British colonies share extensive borders with 
former French colonies, where cars drive on the right. In order to source left-hand drive vehicles, 
Nigerian traders started migrating to other European countries like the Netherlands and Germany. 
Shipping containers became commonplace in maritime trade in Africa, as in other parts of the world, 
around the same time in the 1970s. Shipping costs to Lagos and Cotonou vary greatly across Europe; 
ports in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain generally offer the cheapest rates. For other accounts 
of the Nigerian second-hand trade, see (Jedlowski 2016; Omobowale 2013; Şaul 2014). 
23 ‘Hustling’ is a word used in Nigerian Pidgin, which refers to someone trying hard to make a living 
and accepting any type of work. The term is also used by migrants, who want to work in Europe. On 
the use of the word and practice of hustling in West Africa see Chernoff (2003).  
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the narratives about  the archetypical Nigerian ‘figures’ of the ‘been-to’ migrant, ‘Andrews’, 
the ‘refugees’ and the ‘hustlers’, that have been ‘fixed’ to particular destinations, ethno-
regional groups and migration cohorts. 
4.2 From ‘waithood’ in Nigeria to ‘migranthood’ in Europe 
4.2.1 The formation of migration aspirations in Nigeria after 1990 
Most of my informants came to Europe during the 1990s and 2000s, a period when more 
individuals sought to permanently leave Nigeria and emigrant stocks rapidly rose from 
433,256 to 1,000,523 (see Table 4.1). At the time of their departure, most were under 35 
years old and had been unable to secure wage-paying employment, although women who 
joined their husbands in Europe often gave up well-paid jobs. The overwhelming majority 
of Nigerian migrants in Europe had completed formal secondary and even tertiary 
education, and their families belonged to the lower and upper middle-class parts of society. 
The youth population in Sub-Saharan Africa has received particular attention from 
demographers, because the total number of young people in this region is growing faster 
than in anywhere else in the world.24 Moreover, the African youth population is unlikely to 
peak for another 20 years, whereas in other world regions fertility rates are already starting 
to decline (World Bank 2014: 3). Currently an estimated 76.7 per cent of the population in 
Nigeria are aged under 35 (UN Population Division 2015). Despite their numerical 
significance, young people in Africa today tend to play only a minor role in the economic, 
political and cultural processes in their countries, thus they often feel relegated to the 
margins of society.  
In the recent literature on African youth, this demographic shift has heightened 
longstanding crisis discourses regarding the supposed breakdown of traditional structures 
of economic, social, cultural and political organisation. The main claim is that young people 
across Africa find it hard to reach ‘social’ adulthood due to the lack of opportunities for a 
stable livelihood. Vigh (2006) has described this phenomenon as ‘a social moratorium of 
youth’, which he defines as a social position that young people are involuntarily confined to 
                                                        
 
24  The World Bank (2006) and the United Nations (2007) classify the age of youth as 15-24. In 
contrast, the African Union (2006) and many African states, including Nigeria, define youth to be 15-
35 years of age. 
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as a result of a longstanding decline in social possibilities. Honwana (2012) later used the 
similar concept of ‘waithood’ – a composite term meaning ‘waiting for adulthood’.25 She 
claims that enduring societal problems have diminished young people’s capability to 
support themselves and their families. As a result, many young people are unable to attain 
social adulthood, which traditionally has been defined by markers such as earning a 
livelihood, starting a family, building a home, and providing for their offspring and relatives. 
Without any means of achieving these goals, young people remain dependents of their 
families for longer than they wish to. Meanwhile Waller (2006) has highlighted that these 
discourses revolving around the supposed ‘idleness’ and ‘immaturity’ of young Africans 
date back to the colonial period when they faced similar challenges of finding employment 
and making their voices heard. 
In reality, there have always been a variety of pathways to achieving social 
adulthood. Furthermore, these pathways have been continuously evolving over time 
influenced by both ‘Western’ and ‘traditional’ family norms. In the following, I will map 
various factors that contributed to shifts in the way that young Nigerians imagined their 
futures: the decline in the quality of education, growing corruption and persistent violence. 
Furthermore, I outline how young people have responded to these challenges; either by 
trying to comply with traditional paths to adulthood or charting alternative routes. 
Recent generations in Nigeria are no longer able to rely on education alone to 
achieve social status or a decent livelihood. Their parents’ generation benefited from the 
rapid expansion of professional opportunities, as Nigerians moved into occupations from 
which European colonisers departed when independence was realised in 1960. In addition, 
the discovery of oil in 1956 fuelled an economic boom that enabled Nigeria to expand the 
bureaucracy and state services and to join the ranks of the wealthiest economies in the 
1970s. These changes in the Nigerian state and the economy thus created a demand for 
knowledge and skills, which, at that point, was mainly fulfilled through Western education. 
But the drop in oil prices between 1976 and 1979 and again in the early 1980s brought 
about a severe economic downturn that was accompanied by political repression. The 
dramatic decline of the country was also attributed to the austerity measures of the SAP and 
the contraction of the labour market, which led to a ‘rolling back of the state’ and an 
unprecedented economic crisis in the region (Mohan 2000). In spite of the purge of 
positions in the civil service and other branches of government, many young Nigerians 
today still aspire to obtain jobs that offer similar social status and security, in terms of salary 
                                                        
 
25 The term ‘waithood’ was first coined by Singerman (2007) based on her research in the Middle 
East. 
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and pensions. This expectation of reproducing a middle-class status through civil service 
employment is strongly reinforced by the parents' generations. 
The conditionalities of the SAP also required the state to reduce expenditure in the 
sector of education, which led to lower provisions for students and staff, as well as less 
investment in the infrastructure, equipment and learning materials. From 1986 onwards, 
teachers at primary, secondary and tertiary level have engaged in extensive industrial 
action to push for improved working conditions (Adejumobi 2000: 212). Although students 
generally are sympathetic to the grievances of the university employees, the lengthy strikes 
prolong their studies and delay their graduation dates indefinitely. Even though education 
facilities in Nigeria used to be renowned in the past, chronic under-funding and delay in the 
expansion of education institutions means that the state is failing to educate a large 
proportion of its youth. The gross enrolment ratio26 at secondary-school level in Nigeria was 
44 per cent in 2010, and thus 4 percentage points higher than the Sub-Saharan average, but 
this figure is 21 percentage points below the global average (Unesco 2016). Furthermore, 
secondary schools and universities are blamed for not transmitting adequate transferable 
skills that can be used for innovation and entrepreneurship – instead the curricula still focus 
on skills for wage-paying formal jobs, which have become scarce.27 Nonetheless, university 
education remains highly coveted, and therefore more private and even fake universities 
are opening in Nigeria (also see Chapter 5). An alternative for young people is to join Quran 
schools or the multitude of newly-established Pentecostal churches to access education and 
training (Osaghae 1999). Others opt to become apprentices in the hope of eventually 
receiving a wage or taking over the business, but the conditions of these arrangements are 
not always clearly spelled out and can become exploitative.28 
Macro-economic mismanagement, social exclusion and political marginalisation 
have contributed to rising levels of poverty and income inequalities. Traditionally social 
structures in West Africa have been rooted in systems of reciprocity associated with kinship 
and clientelism. Even though both the prosperous and the poor sometimes feel frustrated 
                                                        
 
26 The gross enrolment ratio refers to the number of enrolments at this level as a percentage of the 
total population of that cohort. 
27 The wealthy Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote announced in 2012 that he had advertised 100 
training positions for truck drivers in his business and received 13,000 applications, including from 
six PhD holders, as well as 704 applicants with postgraduate and 8,460 with undergraduate degrees. 
In the national press and online media this was interpreted as an indication of the level of desperation 
amongst highly-educated young Nigerians, who remained unemployed. See: Abayomi, A. (2012) PhD 
holders as truck drivers: Fallout of government’s unseriousness? Vanguard, 5 November.  
28 Amongst my informants three complained that their families had placed them in businesses as 
apprentices to learn a trade, where they received a very low salary and hardly any food. Eventually 
they ran away and tried to find a different job. Several others said that the death of their parents 
meant that they lacked 'connections' to arrange a university place or an apprenticeship. 
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by the burdens and obligations of kinship and patron-clientelism, at least these social bonds 
used to ensure a degree of redistribution of resources (Smith 2001). But the fast growth of 
the oil sector in the 1970s led to the development of a ‘rentier-state’ – meaning that the 
governing elites grew disinterested in the needs of the citizens and instead became 
primarily concerned with seeking rent and royalties from multi-national oil corporations. 
During the years of successive military and civilian regimes, government officials plundered 
and mismanaged the state’s revenue (Falola and Heaton 2008: 183). Even after the 
transition to democracy in 1999, these dynamics of large-scale corruption continued 
amongst politicians, bureaucrats and business elites. Although Nigerians are not necessarily 
surprised that public funds are being squandered, they no longer are as complacent about 
these actions given that looted money is now largely invested abroad. The general 
population therefore no longer trusts that public funds will reach poorer people in Nigeria 
(Falola and Heaton 2008).29 One example of how this corruption was challenged at the local 
level was through the formation of ‘area boys’.  The Bakassi Boys were youth vigilante 
groups that came together to fight crime that the police were not dealing with, but later 
many of these vigilante groups were politically captured for power struggles between the 
federal and state governments (Meagher 2007; Smith 2004). 
   The level of peacetime violence and political unrest in Nigeria is considerably 
higher than in other African countries. Environmental factors such as land degradation and 
pollution due to oil exploitation have been vehemently opposed by the affected local 
communities since the 1990s. Several identity-based social movements were founded, some 
of which later became formally organised into ethnic militant groups (Gore and Pratten 
2003: 212). This included the Ogoni people, and later the Ijaw Egbesu youth in the Niger 
Delta who tried to regain control over their land and stop further environmental 
degradation due to oil exploitation. More recently, numerous intercommunal and ethno-
religious conflicts in different parts of the country have displaced thousands of Nigerians 
over the last decade. At the end of 2016, an estimated 1,822,541 Nigerians were internally 
displaced; some lived in host communities while others stayed in camps (UNHCR 2016). 
Especially the young and unemployed are said to be at risk of recruitment by Islamist 
insurgents Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. 
                                                        
 
29 In May 2016 the then British Prime Minister, David Cameron, was overheard saying that some 
‘fantastically corrupt’ states like Nigeria and Afghanistan were sending government representatives 
to attend the global anti-corruption summit in London. The response from the Nigerian President 
Muhammadu Buhari was not to deny this fact, but rather to ask the British government for support 
in returning the stolen assets, which had been invested in the UK, back to Nigeria. See: BBC (2016) 
David Cameron calls Nigeria and Afghanistan 'fantastically corrupt'. BBC News, 10 May. 
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The ultimate exit strategy from the state is migration. To put things into perspective 
it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of Nigerians who have motivations 
to emigrate do not realise their migration projects. Despite their willingness to move, most 
aspirant migrants find it impossible to overcome the barriers created by the increasingly 
restrictive policies implemented by both Nigeria and European destination countries, and 
they thus experience ‘involuntary immobility’ (Carling 2002: 5; de Haas 2007b).   
4.2.2 Characteristics and dispersion of Nigerian migrants 
This section now turns to the analysis of Nigerians living abroad by considering the scale of 
migration, as well as the geographical distribution and new migration patterns. Nigeria’s 
National Migration Policy, which was adopted in 2015, for the first time defines the nation’s 
diaspora as: 
[…] people of Nigerian nationality and/or descent who have migrated to or were born 
and live in other countries, who share a common identity and sense of belonging (FEC 
2015) 
Previously there was no consensus in Nigeria about how to delimit the diaspora and 
this partly explains the widely diverging figures being cited for the diaspora population. 
Another issue is that statistical sources still use varying definitions and some data are based 
on estimates, thus the following findings need to be interpreted with caution. Unfortunately, 
it is difficult to remedy this situation, because there is a general lack of reliable or even 
approximate statistical data on Nigerian migration. Until recently the authorities in Nigeria 
did not record or estimate emigration, and the Nigerian state showed a fairly low interest 
in the matter (Binaisa 2013; de Haas 2007a). Furthermore, migration rates are likely to be 
inaccurate because the results of population censuses in Nigeria are highly contested (see 
Table 4.1 in section 4.2.2). This has to do with problems during the data collection phase30 
and elites disputing results because seats in parliament and ethno-regional resource 
allocation are linked to census figures (Suberu 2001). Statistical data from destination 
countries is also incomplete, given that most sources do not include naturalised, second-
generation or undocumented migrants in immigrant statistics. 
                                                        
 
30 Communities living in remote or inaccessible areas are often not included in the census exercise. 
Furthermore, inaccuracies arise from the phenomenon of ‘census migration’, which sees individuals 
relocating from their usual place of residence to their ethno-regional home community during the 
census enumeration period. These strategic relocations are an attempt to enhance the demographic 
weight and political power of certain ethnic-regional groups (Suberu 2001) 
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Therefore, the following sources provide an overview of the Nigerian emigrant 
population, and do not reflect the total Nigerian diaspora, as defined in the Nigerian 
Migration Policy issued in 2015. Based on the 2000 census round, the Global Migrant Origin 
Database puts the stock of Nigerian emigrants at 1,041,284, whereas the Global Bilateral 
Migration Database indicates that there were 659,212 Nigerians living abroad in 2000. 
Meanwhile in 2007, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joy Ogwu, estimated the Nigerian 
diaspora encompassed 20 million, a figure that has also been cited by many other Nigerian 
politicians (Adepoju and van der Wiel 2010: 117). The latter certainly is an inflated number 
that lacks empirical underpinning. Nevertheless, Adepoju and van der Wiel (2010) assert 
that the aforementioned estimates under-represent the true size of the Nigerian diaspora. 
This is mainly due to the fact that current datasets do not adequately capture the actual level 
of intra-continental migration of Nigerians. A recent research report published by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (2007) estimates migration within 
Africa to be seven times higher than inter-continental migration, the authors argue that a 
more realistic estimate of the Nigerian diaspora for 2005 is 4 million. This figure is also 
closer to the estimate of 5 million put forward by Hernández-Coss and Bun (2007) and 
Orozco and Mills (2007). 
It is also relevant to consider the geographic distribution of the Nigerian diaspora. I 
already discussed the likely under-representation of the Nigerian diaspora in existing 
statistical sources. Table 4.2 suggests that in 2015 around a third (34 per cent) of Nigerian 
emigrants resided in other African countries – most of them living in neighbouring 
countries within the region such as Cameroon, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger and Gabon. In 
addition, there are also sizable Nigerian migrant communities to be found further afield in 
Sudan, South Africa and Northern African countries. It is important to highlight the size of 
this population, because African diasporans are often regarded as those who live outside of 
the continent, despite their significant presence within Africa (Bakewell 2008a; Olatuyi et 
al. 2013). Empirical research about this migrant group is scarce; notable exceptions are the 
studies conducted by Collyer (2007) and Kastner (2014) with Nigerian transit migrants in 
Morocco. Besides, Omobowale (2013) provides a detailed account of the Tukunbo trade 
networks 31  operating between the UK, Benin and Nigeria. Moreover, Adida (2011) 
                                                        
 
31 As Omobowale (2013) explains, tokunbo is a Yoruba word, which means ‘from across the seas’. It 
used to refer to children that were born outside of Nigeria, usually in the USA and the UK. The term 
conveyed the elite status of these children. Eventually tokunbo was associated with desirable 
products that were imported from overseas and perceived to be superior to locally produced aloku 
products. 
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conducted an innovative comparative study about the integration of Nigerian Yorubas and 
Hausas, who live in Benin, Ghana and Niger. 
Furthermore, Table 4.2 corroborates the importance of the USA and the UK for 
Nigerian migration patterns. Nigerian communities were initially able to establish 
themselves in these two destination countries due to favourable entry conditions. For 
instance, in 1995 the US visa lottery was expanded and as a result facilitated the entry of 
skilled and educated African applicants (Wasem 2011). The high educational attainment of 
Nigerians in these two destinations has also been the focus of academic research. Reynolds 
(2013) has engaged in extensive ethnographic research with Igbo migrants in Chicago, 
during which she also has explored the transmission of educational aspirations. In her 
comparative study with second-generation Nigerians in the USA and the UK, Imoagene 
(2017) found that virtually all of her respondents experienced further social mobility 
relative to their parents. From a destination country perspective, Nigerians represent the 
largest single national group amongst African migrants in the UK and the USA (Black et al. 
2004: 17; Capps et al. 2012). Meanwhile, from an origin country perspective, the emigration 
intensity towards the UK and the USA has also rapidly increased; 23 per cent out of all 
Nigerian emigrants lived in these two destinations in 1990 and this figure had risen to 41 
per cent by 2015 (see Table 4.2). 
However, spatial diversification of migration patterns means that now there are 
substantial Nigerian migrant communities in other parts of the world (Flahaux and de Haas 
2016). This is mirrored in the geographical broadening of research conducted with Nigerian 
migrants in the newly emerging destination countries, such as Italy (Campani 2000), Spain 
(Ahrens 2013; Kastner 2014), Germany (Ahrens et al. 2016; Carstensen-Egwuom 2011), 
Ireland (Iroh 2010; Kómoláfé 2008; Veale and Andres 2014), the Netherlands (Haagsman 
and Mazzucato 2014; Knibbe 2009; van Dijk 2009), France (Mai 2016), Greece 
(Antonopoulos et al. 2011), Turkey (Schapendonk 2013; Şaul 2014; Suter 2012) and China 
(Castillo 2014; Haugen 2012). However, Table 4.2 suggests that emigration intensity 
towards Europe, as a proportion of total emigration intensity has significantly increased – 
from 88,170 (20 per cent) in 1990 to 398,476 (36 per cent) in 2015. This is despite the fact 
that the growth of the Nigerian-born migrant stocks has been slowing, or even plateauing, 
in the European destination countries most affected by the financial crisis of 2008. I argue 
that this is due to a rise in onward migration of Nigerians who naturalised as European 
citizens, as well as a decrease in new arrivals. In the case of Spain, stocks of Nigerian-born 
migrants appear to have even dropped from 36,852 in 2010 to 30,995 in 2015. At the same 
time, other continents like North America and Asia have been hosting growing Nigerian   
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Table 4.2 Geographic distribution of Nigerian migrants by destination 1990-2015 
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migrant communities. Yet, despite the diversification of migration patterns to other world 
regions, linguistic affinity appears to be an important factor in shaping Nigerian migration 
flows. The disaggregated data suggest that 65 per cent (706,555) of Nigerian migrants 
resided in Anglophone destination countries in 2015 (UN Population Division 2015).32 
Even though Nigerian migrants who are living in Europe trace their ethno-regional 
origins to various parts of the country, there is evidence that most of them originate from 
the South of Nigeria. The chain migration of certain ethnic groups to particular destination 
countries is oftentimes a reflection of strong social networks and varied labour market 
opportunities. Research conducted with Nigerians in the UK shows that the majority are 
Yoruba and Igbos, with a smaller proportion of Edo and Ogoni and other ethnic groups 
(Harris 2006; Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007). Meanwhile the Igbo are likely to dominate 
in other parts of Europe, such as Germany and the Netherlands (Carling 2006). The Edo are 
the main ethnic group in Spain and Italy, where many women are victims of human 
trafficking (Carling 2006; Plambech 2014). By contrast, the migration of the Hausa and 
Fulani population of Northern Nigeria is principally orientated towards Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and other Muslim-majority countries (Bakewell 2008a; de Haas 2007a). There has 
been a growing body of literature on the Christian religious practices of Nigerian migrants, 
such as the Yoruba Cherubim and Seraphim church (Harris 2006), the Igbo Catholic church 
(Knowles 2013), as well as several Pentecostal churches (Botticello 2007; Glick Schiller et 
al. 2006; Knibbe 2009; Maier and Coleman 2011) in the UK and other European destination 
countries. During my fieldwork I found that processes of self-identification, such as  African, 
migrants, Black, Nigerian, Igbo, Christian, or in fact as German, are dependent on situation 
and context – thus the use of social identifiers is highly flexible (see Carstensen-Egwuom 
2011).  
Nevertheless, Nigerians are aware that they face considerable stigmatisation in 
Europe due to the negative reports in the media (Carling 2006). In many parts of Europe, 
the news frequently features Nigerian migrants accused of highly politicised crimes of 
human trafficking, drug-dealing, credit card fraud and email scams. For instance, 30 
individuals were convicted in 2016 in relation to the fake national lottery letters that were 
sent out across various countries asking for payment of advance fees to disburse the 
winnings.33 Variations of this type of scam used to be known as ‘Spanish prisoner letters’ 
and had been circulating around the world since the French Revolution, but due to the 
                                                        
 
32 In this case Anglophone countries are defined as those countries where English is the official 
language or one of the official languages. 
33 El Paí s (2016) Condenas de hasta 11 años a 30 acusados por estafa con las cartas nigerianas. El 
País, 1 July. 
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widely-reported arrests of Nigerians they are now commonly referred to as lotería 
nigeriana in Spain. Amongst Nigerians these crimes are called ‘419 scams’, in reference to 
the section in the Nigerian criminal code addressing fraud. Nigerians themselves appear to 
have internalised these exaggerated claims of criminality, as I was repeatedly told that 
‘Spanish prisons are full of Nigerians’ (Ahrens 2013). In 2016, President Muhammadu 
Buhari was quoted in an interview that ‘[Nigerians abroad] made it difficult for Europeans 
and Americans to accept them because of the number of Nigerians in prisons all over the 
world accused of drug trafficking or human trafficking.’34 But these accounts are likely to be 
the result of a conflation with the number of Nigerians in detention for immigration-related 
issues, especially given that many countries use prison buildings as detention centres. All 
this negative attention has tarnished the image of Nigerians and means that they are met 
with considerable scepticism by Europeans and other migrant groups. Nigerians have tried 
to actively challenge these conceptions via social media with hashtags like 
#NigeriansAreNotCriminals that put forward many examples of hard-working and law-
abiding individuals. 
Different types of networks have shaped and reinforced contemporary 
international migration patterns in Nigeria. These networks include Nigerian second-hand 
trade networks that offer opportunities for migration when import-export apprentices 
graduate to international buyers (Omobowale 2013). Increasingly selective immigration 
policies also mean that some migrants are contracting the services of specialised visa 
brokers to assist them with the preparation of their travel documents and access particular 
travel ‘connections’ (Alpes 2011). Other migrants pay smugglers or human traffickers to 
arrange their journey and take them to a destination country. 35 More recently, the 
‘internationalisation’ of higher education has fostered active student recruitment in origin 
countries, involving either alumni or university employees who approach potential 
international students. Recent data show that the share of family members and dependents 
migrating to Europe for the purpose of family reunification is increasing. 
Similar to other countries, Nigeria has experienced a feminisation of migration. The 
migration flows within West Africa always included substantial numbers of independent 
business women. In 2015 women constituted 43 per cent of the Nigerian emigrant stock in 
West Africa and 41 per cent in Africa as a whole (UN Population Division 2015). Over the 
last two decades, more women have also been migrating outside of the continent. In Europe 
                                                        
 
34 BBC News (2016) 'We are not criminals' Nigerians tell their president, BBC News, 9 February. 
35  Smuggling and trafficking are distinguished one from the other by the level of deception and 
coercion that is exercised; an agreement that started out as smuggling can turn into trafficking (Mai 
2016; Plambech 2014). 
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47 per cent of the resident Nigerians were women in 2015, although the gender 
composition differs considerably across individual destination countries (UN Population 
Division 2015). Phizacklea (1998: 31) pointed out that ‘sex, marriage and maids’ are the 
predominant themes in research about the channels that migrant women utilise to enter 
Europe. Yet in the case of Nigerian women, research about prostitution, as well as the 
women’s experiences and (self-)representations as victims of trafficking, appears to have 
captured most of the academic and media attention (Campani 2000; Carling 2006; Mai 
2016; Plambech 2014; van Dijk 2001). There are a few studies about Nigerian women who 
independently migrated to Ireland as asylum-seekers, because up until 2005 ius soli 
provisions in Irish citizenship law meant that children born in Ireland were eligible for 
citizenship, even if their parents were migrants with an irregular status (Iroh 2010; 
Kómoláfé 2008; Veale and Dona 2014). More recently research has also included the 
gendered transnational caring arrangements of Nigerian families in Europe (Haagsman and 
Mazzucato 2014; Iroh 2010; Veale and Dona 2014). Suprisingly, no research has been 
conducted with Nigerian women in the UK, despite the fact that they have dominated 
migration flows since the pre-independence period (Adepoju and van der Wiel 2011: 146). 
Moreover, nothing is known about the experiences of women who arrived in Europe as 
highly-skilled migrants and students. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Nigerian tertiary-educated migrants (>15 years) in OECD countries 
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In terms of the educational background of the Nigerian migrant population, Figure 
4.1 presents an overview of the proportions of tertiary-educated Nigerians in selected OECD 
countries. In 2000, half of the Nigerian migrants (50 per cent) living in OECD countries were 
residing in the USA and this group comprised a disproportionately high share (57 per cent) 
of Nigerian highly-skilled emigrants. In comparison, the UK attracted 30 per cent of Nigerian 
highly-skilled migrants and Canada and Australia together hosted 5 per cent. In 2001, only 
8 per cent of tertiary-educated migrants from Nigeria chose the other EEA countries or 
Switzerland as their destination (Figure 4.1). From these figures alone, it is not possible to 
ascertain the country of training, seeing that highly-skilled migrants may have attended 
universities in the destination countries.  Yet, a study that controlled for the ‘age of entry’ of 
highly-skilled migrants in 2001 suggested that virtually all highly-skilled Nigerian migrants 
obtained their tertiary degree in Nigeria (Beine et al. 2007). Furthermore, other research 
found that the emigration rate of low-skilled Nigerians towards OECD countries ‘was 
extremely low’, also suggesting that Sub-Saharan migrants are particularly positively 
selected on skills (Docquier et al. 2009). Figure 4.1 illustrates that by 2011 Europe hosted 
the majority (56 per cent) of Nigerian working-age migrants in the OECD, including 48 per 
cent of the tertiary-educated Nigerian migrants. The UK witnessed the biggest percentage 
increase of highly-skilled Nigerian migrants between 2001 and 2011. This was presumably 
driven by the UK’s ‘selective openness’ to immigration since 1997, which included a 
dedicated highly-skilled visa programme between 2002 and 2010. However, since 2010 
most other highly-skilled visa categories introduced as part of the 2008 points-based 
system have been restricted, causing a ‘balloon effect’ in the number of student visas and 
visitor visas issued.36  
Forced migration has been a major component of the international migration of 
Nigerians. At the end of 2016 there were 191,529 Nigerian refugees being hosted in 
neighbouring African countries (UNHCR 2016). According to UNHCR estimates, the US, the 
UK, Germany and Canada received 45,396 Nigerian resettlement refugees between 1996-
2005 (Mberu and Pongou 2010). As the brutality of the dictatorships and militarisation of 
civilian life intensified in the 1990s, Nigerian migration towards Europe started to 
encompass more refugees and asylum-seekers. Due to the limited migration channels 
available to them, these groups were often exposed to greater risks of exploitation and 
abuse. Surges in asylum applications in Europe over the past decades have coincided with 
outbreaks of political violence in Nigeria (Figure 4.2). This is also substantiated by the 
                                                        
 
36  Consterdine, E. (2015) How the coalition effectively scrapped points-based immigration, 
Politics.co.uk, 25 March. 
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comprehensive Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project dataset (1997-
2015) that shows increases in conflict fatalities in the years 2004, 2010 and between 2012-
2015 (Dowd 2013; Raleigh et al. 2010). Nigerians initially applied for asylum in the UK  then 
also in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, France, and later Italy – in 2004 
Nigerians were the fifth-largest group to seek asylum in Europe (Carling 2006). 
Nevertheless, the acceptance rates of asylum applications filed by Nigerian nationals in 
general have remained low. This is because destination countries often take the view that  
there are other regions within Nigeria that refugees could relocate to in order to escape the 
violence (Carling 2006: 39). Nigerians still try to seek asylum because even rejected asylum-
seekers are not always deported. It is very likely that a large number of Nigerians stayed in 
Europe and gained legal status by other means. 
Modern mass media, and most notably the advent of the internet and social media, 
have raised people’s awareness of the opportunities in other countries, which in turn has 
Figure 4.2 First-time asylum applications by Nigerian nationals 
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also raised their aspirations (de Haas 2012). The visibility of remittance-financed goods and 
houses in Nigeria also serves as a powerful advertisement for the lifestyle that migration 
can provide (Hernández-Coss and Bun 2007; Osili 2007). With US$20.77 billion in 2015, 
Nigeria is amongst the top-five remittance receiving countries in the world (World Bank 
2016). Included in these flows are collective remittances sent via home-town associations 
and other migrant associations (Lampert 2009). Remittance flows to Nigeria alone account 
for two-thirds of total remittance inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa. However, official reports 
on remittances do not capture remittances that are sent through informal channels, nor do 
they record reverse remittances that migrants receive from family members in the origin 
countries (Mazzucato 2009). Policy-makers and academics focusing on the migration-
development nexus, have generally celebrated the global rise in remittances37 as one of the 
positive effects of migration and a potential tool for alleviating poverty in migrant origin 
countries. However, this enthusiasm has worn off in recent years, as there is a growing 
realisation that migration can also ‘reinforce pre-existing inequalities by mainly serving the 
material interests of the already well-off and by maintaining the (often authoritarian) 
political status quo’ (de Haas 2012).  
The current-day situation in Nigeria continues to influence Nigerian diasporans 
even if they live far away from their origin country. Those who have family members and 
other kin in Nigeria often remain in close contact. Despite supposed strong economic 
growth between 2000 and 2015, only a rapidly shrinking segment of Nigerian society is 
benefitting. Overall Nigeria still is classified as a low-income country; 54.7 per cent of the 
population lived in absolute poverty in 2004, which increased to 60.9 per cent in 2010.38 At 
the same time subjective poverty, based on respondents’ self-assessment, stood at 75.5 per 
cent in 2004 and reached 93.9 per cent in 2010 (NBS 2010). Since then socio-economic 
conditions have worsened even further. In 2012, massive flooding destroyed 600,000 
homes and displaced more than 2.1 million people throughout the country. Reponses by the 
state to these sudden losses of livelihood have largely been considered inadequate and thus 
resulted in further tensions in communities hosting internally displaced people.  In 2012 
the protest movement ‘Occupy Nigeria’ mobilised thousands on the streets of major 
Nigerian cities and further protests were organised at embassies in destination countries in 
response to the removal of the fuel subsidy by the administration of President Goodluck 
                                                        
 
37  The global rise in remittance was partly attributable to more accurate ways of tracking and 
recording remittances, as well as the formalisation of informal remittance channels.  
38 These are the most recent available data regarding poverty levels. 
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Jonathan.39 Given the lack of steady electricity supply in Nigeria, the removal of the fuel 
subsidy had an enormous impact on the price of other goods and services. Furthermore, 
Nigerians were aggrieved because they had come to perceive the fuel subsidy as the only 
tangible benefit they still received from the state. By 2016 inflation reached an 11-year high 
and the Nigerian economy entered a recession, thus making the cost of everyday items 
unaffordable and further threatening livelihoods. 
4.3 Summary 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I have illustrated the main patterns in Nigerian 
migration in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence periods. We were able to see 
that Nigerian migration is multi-faceted in many respects and was influenced by global and 
local social transformations. Over time, it has involved various destination countries and 
different migrant types, and since the 1990s Nigerian migration has intensified and become 
more dynamic. Moreover, I have identified a recent post-colonial migration pattern that so 
far has not been addressed in the academic literature. Europe is becoming an increasingly 
popular migration destination, seeing that here the Nigerian migrant population has been 
growing more rapidly than in other destinations over the last decade. I also suggested that 
contemporary African migration is defined by growing complexity; it now involves more 
labour migrants, students, family movers and onward migrants (Plaza et al. 2011; 
Schoumakers et al. 2015). Similarly, I argue that it is becoming more common for migrants 
to experience several shifts between legal status and migrant type. Yet research about 
international migrants often ‘fixes’ their experience to one particular destination country 
or migrant type and therefore does not capture how migrants cross various boundaries – 
not just geographical, but also legal, social and discursive (Castles 2002). These are 
discussions that I will return to in Chapter 7, where I address this phenomenon of multi-
sited transnational practices of onward migrants.  
 The last two sections of this chapter addressed the emigration context and the key 
features of the Nigerian diaspora. Given that most of my informants left Nigeria in the 1990s 
                                                        
 
39 The mass protests of ‘Occupy Nigeria’ followed, and were also inspired by other youth uprisings 
that erupted in 2011 across many other countries like Mozambique, Senegal, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, 
Chile, the USA and the UK (Honwana 2012). While the movements formed as a result of particular 
local events and conditions, the grievances the young people expressed typically included 
unemployment, corrupt governments, socio-economic marginalisation and unsound economic 
policies. Across North Africa and the Middle East these youth-led movements also played an 
important role in the revolutions of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. 
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and 2000s, I provided some background on this particular emigration context. I suggested 
that the austerity measures of the SAP in Nigeria brought about profound changes in the 
country and that the declining socio-economic conditions meant that young Nigerians 
experienced prolonged ‘waithood’. As a result, international migration has become an 
appealing prospect for many young Nigerians, for whom leaving their country signifies not 
only a symbolic ‘rite of passage’ but also the opportunity to attain material markers of social 
adulthood. I will pick up again on these themes in Chapter 6, where I discuss how 
aspirations and capabilities influence international (onward) migration. Finally, in the 
section about the Nigerian diaspora I analysed statistical data concerning the Nigerian 
migration stocks and flows. Furthermore, I discussed some of the main characteristics that 
define the Nigerian migrant communities, namely their educational profile, the gender 
balance, forced migration, stigmatisation and migration networks.  
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Chapter 5  
 
 
Policies and Statistics on  
African Migration and Onward Migration 
5.1 European policies concerning African migration 
Today an estimated 15 million people of African descent live in Europe (Nwabuzo 2015). 
Changing immigration policies were one of the many factors that shaped the timings and 
patterns of African migrations towards Europe. Due to the different history and national 
priorities of the EU member states, it has been difficult to realise a common European 
migration policy. Overall the EU’s migration governance remains strongly defined by 
individual states, which in turn has contributed to the countries’ distinctive migration 
profiles. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed account of all European 
immigration policy initiatives and funding instruments, therefore the focus will be on recent 
initiatives that are relevant to African migrations. Before 1962, for instance, Nigerians were 
able to travel visa-free to the UK and many other European destinations, but with time, 
complex policies have been put in place to restrict migration flows. When EU member states 
agreed to weaken border controls at their national frontiers, this occurred alongside a 
simultaneous creation of new bordering practices. The EU’s immigration control is moving 
‘upwards’ to intergovernmental bodies, ‘downward’ to localities and ‘outward’ to non-state 
actors (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000: 176). It is also being ‘externalised’ to other countries 
(Carrera 2007). While some policies are directed towards ever-tighter border controls, 
another approach has been to address the presumed ‘root causes’ of migration – such as 
poverty and unrest in the origin countries – with the aim of removing the need for people 
to migrate, even though there is little evidence that this approach works in practice 
(Bakewell 2008b). The following sections summarise the two ideational frames that 
characterise both the proposals for a common EU approach to migration and the initiatives 
of individual member states, namely the migration-security nexus (Huysmans 2006) and the 
emergence of the migration-development nexus (Sørensen et al. 2002). Overall, these 
policies have not stopped African migrants from coming to Europe, but they have made 
international migration an increasingly selective, costly and at times dangerous process. I 
show how EU policies have an impact on migrants at different stages of their migration 
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project. Onward migration forms part of more diverse and complex migration trajectories, 
not just towards, but also within and beyond Europe. 
5.1.1 Securitisation and networks of immigration control 
In post-war North-Western Europe, migrant workers were actively recruited as a ‘solution’ 
for reconstruction and industrial expansion. But after the 1973 ‘oil crisis’ and subsequent 
recession, immigration started to be viewed as a ‘problem’ that needed to be addressed with 
appropriate policies (Hollifield 2004: 10). Nonetheless, socio-political pressure to restrict 
immigration contrasted starkly with the socio-economic realities. Demand for migrant 
workers soon exceeded the number that were able to enter via the more limited legal modes 
for migration. As a result, more migrants opted to travel as tourists with the intention of 
‘overstaying’ their visa or used other modes of irregular entry. These factors also drove the 
remarkable ‘migration turnaround’ of Southern Europe – a region that between the 1950s 
and 1970s had been characterised by mass emigration and from the 1990s onwards became 
a region of mass immigration. Migrant workers, especially those with an irregular status, 
often do the ‘3D jobs’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) that are also precarious and badly 
paid. It is common knowledge amongst industry leaders and governments that migrant 
workers are illegally employed in sectors like construction, agriculture and services, but 
little is done to remedy the situation. Castles and Davidson (2000: 73) assert that the 
resulting inconsistency in state policy is in fact intentional, because ‘illegal’ migration ‘is 
often tacitly permitted or even encouraged, just because illegals lack rights and are easy to 
exploit’.  
In 2002, the Council adopted a ‘comprehensive plan to combat illegal migration and 
human trafficking in the European Union’ (Council of the European Union 2002) and since 
then significant investments have been made in this area. Although the securitisation of 
immigration and the association of immigration with terrorism date back a lot further than 
the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the adoption of measures for 
security-driven border control has gathered pace since these events (Bigo 2016). These 
measures are adopted even though there appears to be no direct evidence of a connection 
between migration and terrorism. But without doubt, this has contributed to the perception 
that the migration of third-country nationals is ‘suspicious’ and ‘undesirable’, while the 
mobility of EU citizens and highly-skilled migrants has been promoted. The importance of 
‘free movement’ of goods, capital, and services in what now constitutes the EU was 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome from the very beginning. The freedom of movement – the 
 
 
90 
 
so-called ‘fourth freedom’ – for workers was progressively extended to all EU citizens and 
now also includes non-workers, i.e. students, pensioners and unemployed. 
Since then, further complex legal status categories have been created. Migrants who 
do not have the citizenship of their destination country have been subjected to a process of 
‘civic stratification’ that accords different amounts of rights to different migrant categories 
(Kofman 2002; Morris 2002). When the Schengen Agreement came into force in 1995, 
member states agreed to remove border controls from fixed positions along the internal 
borderlines of the EU member states. Although some member states have reinstated 
national border checks and installed new razor-wired fences since the refugee ‘crisis’ in 
2015,40 on the whole the policing of national borders within the EU has decreased. Instead, 
there has been a significant increase in sub-national and cross-national bordering practices. 
Amongst other things, these control measures include police cooperation; sharing of 
(digital) information; common visa requirements and gradual harmonisation of the EU 
migration and asylum policy.  
There now also are smart borders that digitally monitor migrants at various stages 
of their migration trajectory (Broeders 2007; Walters 2006). The Schengen Information 
System (SIS) is used to store information about individuals or objects (mainly lost or stolen 
‘identity papers’).41 Information requests can be submitted to the system and are used as a 
basis to refuse migrants’ entrance at the border, as well as apprehend individuals who are 
already present in the EU’s territory. Additionally, the Eurodac central database linked with 
the Dublin II regulation became operational in 2003 and contains the fingerprints of all 
asylum applicants over the age of 14. Gradually the Eurodac has been extended to also 
include information about irregular migrants (Broeders 2007). 
Other initiatives aim to decrease the number of irregular migrants arriving in 
Europe by stopping migration further ‘upstream’. In 2001, EU member states drew up a 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ list that is used as a criterion for visa applications, but there is no 
publicly available information as to how countries are assigned these markers (van Houtum 
2010: 964). Nigerians nowadays have a relatively ‘weak passport’ that only provides visa-
free or visa upon arrival access to 44 countries (Czaika and Hobolth 2016).42 In general,  
                                                        
 
40 The term refugee ‘crisis’ is placed in inverted commas to draw attention to the uncritical nature in 
which the term is used in public discourse, often disregarding the policy dynamics preceding the 
situation and the measures used to address it. (see Crawley 2016; Crawley et al. 2016).  
41 The UK, which is not part of Schengen, decided to opt-in to SIS (Broeders 2007). 
42  According to the website www.passportindex.org, in 2016 Swedish and German passports 
provided the greatest ease of international travel by facilitating visa-free or visa upon arrival access 
to 158 countries. Spanish and British passport holders do not require a pre-departure visa in 157 
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aspirant migrants wanting to apply for a Schengen short-term visa have to present in person 
at a consular office abroad, and provide evidence of income and substantial ties to their 
origin countries, in order to demonstrate that they will return. 
Recent research on visa barriers suggests that the international travel for African 
nationals is particularly restricted; destination countries are introducing more arduous visa 
application procedures (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). Figure 5.1 illustrates that the visa 
                                                        
 
countries respectively. By contrast, the Nigerian passport only permits visa-free or visa on arrival 
access to 44 of countries. This includes the rights of free movement, residence and establishment of 
business within ECOWAS member states introduced for its citizens in 2014. Furthermore, the African 
Union has called for visa-free travel for all Africans in Africa by 2018. 
Table 5.1 Visa refusal rates for Nigerian applicants by destination (in %) 
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refusal rates for Nigerians vary tremendously across European destination countries, and 
at times they also change dramatically from one year to another (Hobolth 2012). The green 
shading indicates a low visa refusal rate and the red colour a high visa refusal rate. While 
some destination countries create ‘closures’ of certain migration channels by rejecting more 
visa applications, at the same time other countries generate ‘openings’. This means that the 
outcome of visa applications and the chances of reaching a particular destination are 
extremely unpredictable. But ultimately it is not in the economic and political interest of 
destination countries to completely stop travel and migration opportunities. 43 
In addition, carrier sanctions were introduced into the Schengen Implementation 
Convention and subsequently have also been adopted into member states’ legislation 
(Guiraudon 2006). This means airlines and other private carriers that bring individuals who 
lack appropriate travel documentation to a destination country are either fined or required 
to pay for the return journey (Bigo and Guild 2005). Moreover, since the mid-1990s EU 
member states have stationed immigration liaison officers in origin countries. However, in 
the case of Nigeria, it is not clear how many European border officers have been stationed 
there in order to assist and train local immigration officers. 44  In addition, several 
destination countries now conduct pre-departure biometrical screening and since 2008 
Nigeria is amongst the countries issuing her citizens with e-passports that are more difficult 
to falsify. It is important to note that recently, there has been a significant increase in the 
recorded number of Nigerians who were refused departure at various departure points in 
the country. In 2012 and 2013, a total of 79,483 and 106,739 Nigerians respectively were 
stopped from travelling abroad (Isiugo-Abanihe and IOM 2016). By contrast, in 2011 only 
4,808 Nigerians were refused departure.45 This intensifying emigration control in Nigeria, 
together with the EU member states’ unwillingness to make existing legal migration 
channels work, is likely to have contributed to a rise in irregular migration (Czaika and 
Hobolth 2016; Düvell 2011). 
Furthermore, a growing number of actors is being drawn into the complex internal 
‘network of immigration control’ that now carries out the functions that used to be 
exclusively performed by immigration officers (Bigo and Guild 2005). Public sector workers 
                                                        
 
43 The over 1 million visas issued to Nigerian nationals to travel to the UK between 2003-2012, will 
have certainly contributed in making Nigerians the fourth largest foreign spenders in 2011. Harrods 
department store in London advertised in Hausa language on the shopfloors during 2011. See: 
Elbagir, N. (2013) Hey, big spender: Nigerians shop ‘til they drop in London. CNN News, 11 January. 
44 I could only find evidence that Austrian immigration liaison officers have carried out missions at 
Lagos airport since 2003 (Jandl 2008: 33). 
45 These Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) data concerning ‘refused departures’ is not made publicly 
available. 
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and private individuals in destination countries are progressively being tasked with 
excluding irregular migrants from main institutions, such as the formal labour market, state 
education, the housing market, health insurance and social security benefits. In the UK, since 
2009 British universities are required to report international students that ‘miss 10 
lectures’ to the Home Office and since 2010 the Home Office has been using National Health 
Service (NHS) patient records to track down irregular migrants. In 2013, the then Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, announced plans to create a ‘hostile environment’ in Britain for 
‘illegal migrants’. 46  Several proposed measures have now come into force under the 
Immigration Act 2016, which, amongst other things, has resulted in private landlords facing 
criminal charges if they rent out properties to irregular migrants. These new bordering 
practices represent another shift in immigration control. Illustrations 5.1 shows the 
Invisible Borders exhibition I visited at Bielefeld University. Every red line represents a 
different administrative ‘route’, as well as several borders, turning points and procedures 
that migrants face in Germany. 
Similarly, in Spain a whole host of measures introduced after the 2008 financial 
crises had a negative impact on migrant communities, although some of the measures were 
subsequently reverted or withdrawn due to public opposition (Ahrens 2013). Racial 
profiling in police work had been an on-going issue for migrants, as Spanish police forces 
illegally targeted People of Colour in public spaces and checked their residence permits. A 
document leaked to the press revealed that in 2008 certain police stations in Madrid were 
                                                        
 
46 Travis, A. (2013) Immigration bill: Theresa May defends plans to create 'hostile environment', The 
Guardian, 10 October. 
Illustrations 5.1  Invisible Borders exhibition at Bielefeld University 
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given weekly quotas for the number of irregular migrants they had to detain (Amnesty 
International 2011). In addition, the withdrawal of universal healthcare came into force in 
September 2012, which meant that irregular migrants no longer had access to basic 
healthcare – only children, pregnant women and people in need of emergency assistance 
continued to be eligible. Many health practitioners conscientiously objected to this law and 
the autonomous regions resisted enacting it; as a result, universal healthcare was informally 
reinstated in 2015, but not guaranteed by law.  
Despite the overall political rhetoric that is aimed at ‘fighting irregular migration’, 
Frontex statistics indicate that the interceptions of irregular migrants at the EU’s external 
borders remain high and the EU’s policy documents also acknowledge an estimated ‘stock’ 
of 3 million irregular migrants. There have been continuous attempts to speed up the 
removal of detained migrants and failed asylum seekers from the EU’s territory, through 
deportations and assisted voluntary returns programmes. To this end, several member 
states have signed bilateral agreements with various countries of origin. Nigeria is signatory 
to several bilateral ‘migration deals’ concerning readmission with the governments of Italy 
(2000), Spain (2001) and Switzerland (2009) (Adepujo et al. 2010; IOM 2010: 84-85).47  
No such migration deals were signed between Nigeria and Germany, nor between 
Nigeria and the UK. However, since 2006 German authorities have been working with 
Nigerian embassy officials to conduct ‘mobile hearings’, which means they travel between 
regions to identify groups of ‘stateless’ failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants 
(Atsenuwa and Adepoju 2010: 32). There are no formal criteria as to how nationality should 
be confirmed. It is alleged that since 2006 Nigerian embassy officials in Germany received a 
€500 cash payment for every identification and issuance of an ‘emergency travel certificate’ 
for deportation. After several years of campaigning by Nigerian activists and the occupation 
of the Nigerian embassy in Berlin, this practice was halted in 2012, because several African 
migrants were wrongly identified as Nigerian and deported.48 Regarding the UK, a non-
published Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning migrant removals was signed 
with the government of Nigeria in 2016, updating a bilateral agreement from 2005.49 A 2016 
                                                        
 
47 In general, my informants appeared to be unaware of these bilateral and multilateral agreements 
concerning migrant returns and deportations that the Nigerian government had signed. In Germany, 
two key informants attributed the increase in deportations of Nigerians to corrupt embassy staff, 
who were paid by the German government for issuing travel documents. Meanwhile in Spain, several 
informants mentioned that they believed Barack Obama’s presidency had a positive influence on 
policing practices in Spain. 
48 Mützel, D. (2016) Der Pass wird passend gemacht. der Freitag. 26 January.  
49 Nigerian Ministry of Interior (2016) Nigeria/UK sign MoU on the return of migrants. Press Release. 
Abuja: Ministry of Interior. 
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Freedom of Information request revealed that £70 is paid to the Nigerian embassy for each 
‘emergency travel certificate’ issued. However, deportations are costly and have often 
resulted in arbitrary treatment and the violation of human rights. Therefore, member states 
have also started offering assisted voluntary return programmes implemented by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Nevertheless, the ‘voluntary’ nature of 
these returns can be disputed, given that the only other option provided to migrants in this 
situation is deportation or destitution. An unofficial third option for irregular migrants is to 
go to another member state, seeing that deportation orders usually state they should leave 
the national territory, but do not actually require them to leave Europe. 
5.1.2 The EU’s ‘externalisation’ of migration control 
Within the field of EU external migration policy, a vast number of funding instruments is 
directed towards migration-related projects in third countries. Since 2005 the overarching 
framework of the EU’s external migration and asylum policy is based on the ‘Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)’, which was re-worked in 2011 (EC 2011a). 
This agenda for migration management relies on four main principles: fostering well-
managed mobility; preventing irregular migration and tackling human trafficking; 
maximising the development impact of migration and mobility; and the promotion of 
international protection. With the introduction of the 2015 European Agenda on Migration 
(EC 2015) and the 2016 Partnership Framework (EC 2016), it is not clear if these 
instruments will replace the GAMM as overarching frameworks. From an overview of the 
funding decisions there is strong evidence, however, that ‘security and irregular migration 
have been deemed the highest priority’ and that there is ‘a strong geographical focus on 
countries in the southern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa’ (den Hertog 2016: 1).  
The GAMM builds on the concentric circles model that was introduced in 1998 with 
the Vienna Action Plan, which set out the securitised line of policymaking on matters of 
asylum and immigration (Lavenex 2011). In relation to African migration this approach 
takes the shape of an inner circle (the Schengen area), the second circle (the Mediterranean 
countries), the third circle (the EU’s neighbourhood regions) and the outer circle (the 
countries beyond the neighbouring region). Thus, the EU and member state initiatives aim 
to manage migration at various geographical scales. The external borders of the EU have 
been reinforced with fences, and more intensive land and maritime patrols. Nearly all of 
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these activities are coordinated by the border agency Frontex.50 Since 2010 virtually all 
irregular Mediterranean maritime crossings of small pateras and zodiacs are said to have 
been intercepted (Andersson 2014: 86). In response to the refugee ‘crisis’ in the 
Mediterranean, the most recent Commission communication, A European Agenda on 
Migration (EC 2015), exemplifies a renewed focus on securitisation. This is to be achieved 
through a three-fold increase of the budget for Frontex; measures to reduce irregular 
migration, the targeting of smuggling networks; and commitment to stronger common 
asylum policy and promotion of legal migration (King and Lulle 2016: 119). 
In addition, the EU’s migration control has been ‘externalised’ or outsourced to 
countries of transit and origin (Carrera 2007). The European Neighbourhood Programme 
(ENP) (with a budget of €15.4 billion for 2014-2020) provides a detailed catalogue of 
initiatives in which North African countries (as well as Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries) cooperate in EU border control practices. Countries located in the immediate 
vicinity of the EU have been requested to conduct ‘transit checks’ on individuals crossing 
their territory. Furthermore, under the Dublin regulation asylum-seekers are sent back to 
‘safe third countries’ they transited on route to the EU, even though at times such returns 
violate the principle of non-refoulement. Neighbouring countries are obliged to readmit any 
transit migrants who entered the EU irregularly, and this is also a priority in the EU-North 
Africa negotiations. These measures mean that EU member states, especially the founding 
EC member states at the geographical core of Europe, have effectively transferred the 
responsibility for irregular migrants and asylum seekers to the member states located at 
the external borders of the EU, as well as neighbouring countries located beyond the EU’s 
borders. In response, the EU member states at the periphery of Europe have called for more 
‘burden sharing’ of the financial costs associated with the reception of asylum-seekers.  
Moreover, the spatial reach of the EU border control practices has been extended to 
sub-Saharan African origin countries. The European Development Fund (EDF)(with a budget 
of  €30.5 billion for 2014-20) is limited in its geographical scope to the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries, excluding North Africa. The first time the Commission linked 
the issues of migration and development dates back to 2002, although the focus at that point 
was on migration control and addressing the ‘root causes of migration flows’; interestingly, 
no distinction was made between irregular migrants, migrant workers and refugees 
(Council of the European Union 2002: 4). A more substantial engagement with development 
                                                        
 
50  Frontex is an EU agency based in Warsaw, which was created as a body tasked with the 
coordination of border control between member states. Andersson (2014) provides an insightful 
ethnographic account of various players in the Euro-African ‘business of bordering’. 
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issues followed in 2005 with the publication of the Green Paper On an EU Approach to 
Managing Economic Migration (CEC 2005a) that also addressed remittances, brain 
circulation and return migration. In the same year the communication Migration and 
Development: Some Concrete Orientations (CEC 2005b) suggested to mainstream migration 
into aid policy and development cooperation with third countries. Recently the paper 
Maximising the Development Impact of Migration (EC 2013) advocated a rights-based 
approach concerning internal migration in developing countries, the impact of climate 
change and migration management. The last three communications thus highlighted the 
potential positive effects of migration on development, which could be summarised as a 
‘migration for development’ approach, even though in practice development funding was 
extensively used to realise projects that restricted migration.  
Since the refugee ‘crisis’, EU funding on migration and development has undergone 
a fundamental shift. Tackling the ‘root causes’ of migration has re-surfaced as a central 
policy objective. This is immediately evident from the title of the Africa Trust Fund, which 
aims to ‘address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ (EC 
2015). This is despite the fact that previous academic analyses have pointed out that 
boosting socio-economic development in origin countries will not stop migration to Europe 
in the short-term. In fact, improved economic and social conditions result in higher 
emigration rates – a phenomenon that is variously known as the ‘migration transition’ or 
the ‘migration hump’ (Castles et al. 2014). Only at a more advanced stage of development, 
when people have reached sufficient levels of wellbeing, and hence transited over the 
‘hump’, are emigration rates likely to decrease again. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether limiting migration through development is in the interest of origin countries and 
whether it in fact complies with the primary objective of EU development cooperation, 
which is poverty eradication.51 
More generally, there has been some critique as to whether the rhetorics of 
‘partnership’ and ‘participation’ used in development cooperation with Africa are deployed 
to hide self-interested interventions by actors outside of the continent (Mercer et al. 2003).  
The more recent trend of ‘migration conditionality’ in relation to migration and 
development aid, undoubtedly gives the EU even more undue ‘leverage’ in its relations with 
third countries. The Partnership Framework thereby encroaches upon the co-management 
and ownership principles outlined in the Cotonou Agreement. Besides, den Hertog (2016: 
50) argues that, due to the incoherent funding landscape in this area, ‘conditioning funding 
                                                        
 
51 See: Article 208(1), second paragraph, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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on cooperation on migration may actually backfire’ because migrant origin countries might 
threaten ‘to trigger migration flows to obtain more funding’. 
In addition, the EU has started concluding bilateral cooperation frameworks with 
several migrant origin countries, which either take the form of a ‘Mobility Partnerships’ that 
include readmission agreements in an exchange for visa facilitation (EC 2007) or a ‘Common 
Agenda on Migration and Mobility’ (CAMM) for countries that cannot commit themselves to 
readmission agreements (see EC 2011b). Nigeria signed a CAMM with the EU 2015, which 
is based on Nigeria’s ‘National Migration Policy’ that was adopted in 2015.52 The European 
partners have committed themselves to explore ways through which they can facilitate legal 
channels for migration. Nevertheless, the majority of the projects implemented as part of 
the mobility partnerships in reality are focused on: providing information about legal 
migration; projects that inform migrants about voluntary return programmes; pre-
departure training for migrants who want to migrate; and bilateral agreements concerning 
social security provisions. Labour migration remains a competence of member states and 
most of them are reluctant to open more legal migration channels. 
Finally, several other actors and initiatives are also involved in the migration 
governance in Africa and Europe. The African Union and ECOWAS have been key players in 
migration management on the African continent. Since 1995 nationals of ECOWAS member 
states should be able to freely enter, reside and establish a business within the ECOWAS 
region, but in practice such mobility rights are not always accepted, or indeed tolerated 
(Black et al. 2004). This is reflected in the high visa restrictions that African states impose 
on other African nationals and the lack of enforcement of migrants’ rights (Adepoju 2001). 
In 2016, the African Union e-passport was introduced and it is planned to become available 
to all African citizens by 2018. It is hoped that this will enhance mobility and migration in 
the region. 
5.2 Migration within Europe and beyond: facts and figures 
As I have shown in the previous section, the EU has developed several policy measures to 
‘manage’ the migration of third-country nationals towards its territory, as well as ‘combat’ 
the presence of irregular migrants within the EU. However, the onward migration of third-
country nationals and ‘new’ European citizens within the EEA has received hardly any 
attention, despite the fact that this has been a long-established migration pattern and that 
                                                        
 
52 The drafting of Nigeria’s national migration policy started in 2006 (Binaisa 2013) 
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third-country nationals show a similar propensity to engage in intra-European mobility as 
native-born EU citizens. In this section, I will therefore provide some relevant facts and 
figures about the general scale and patterns of intra-European onward migration. But first, 
for the sake of clarity, I re-state what I mean by onward migration. There is no agreed, nor 
universally accepted, term for migration trajectories that span multiple states. 
Furthermore, the exact definitions of the numerous terms vary across different contexts and 
migrant groups (see discussion in section 2.1). A general broad definition is that onward 
migration is a migration trajectory that involves stays in at least two, if not more, 
destination countries. In addition, onward migration, in my view, also comprises several 
other dichotomous migration categories: regular and irregular; temporary and permanent; 
forced and voluntary; as well as linear, circular and return moves.  
It is important to stress that the statistics presented throughout this thesis only 
provide information about one, very specific type of ‘onward migrant’, i.e. non-EU born 
migrants who acquired an EU passport through naturalisation and subsequently relocated 
to another EEA member state. These statistics therefore do not capture onward migrants 
who lived in multiple countries before coming to Europe; relocated with short-term 
residence papers but without an EU passport; engaged in irregular moves; or completed 
shorter non-migratory stays or circular moves. However, I did interview these other types 
of onward migrant as part of my fieldwork research. Therefore, in the three core chapters 
of the thesis, I will provide insights about the much broader group of onward migrants that 
currently cannot be captured via immigration statistics.  
The new geographies of migration in Europe are facilitated by two inter-linked but 
distinct policy regimes. The ‘migration’ regime deals with the movement of people crossing 
the external borders of the EU and is seen a matter of freedom, security and justice (EC 
2010). By contrast, the internal ‘mobility’ regime or ‘free movement’ is one of the four 
fundamental freedoms of the European Union. The preference for using ‘mobility’ to refer 
to intra-European migration, however, throws up several issues. In following, I briefly 
problematise these narrow conceptualisations with particular reference to onward 
migration and the 2011 Census data. 
First, the use of the term ‘mobility’ reinforces the policy objective of distinguishing 
between the ‘desirable’ free movement of EU citizens, and the ‘undesirable’ ‘migration’ of 
third-country nationals. In practice, this supposed clear-cut distinction between EU citizens 
and third-country nationals is being blurred in several ways. Table 5.2 illustrates that in 
2011 there were 15,852,371 third-country nationals who attained EU citizenship and could 
potentially make use of their ‘freedom of movement’ rights (equivalent to 3.1 per cent of the 
resident population). Furthermore, the group of second-generation migrants, who were 
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born in Europe is also growing. In total, at least 41,715,955 EU citizens either had a 
‘migration background’, i.e. they were second-generation migrants, or had ‘migration 
experience’ themselves, which encompassed 8.4 per cent of EU citizens. 53  Usually, the 
‘mobility’ of third-country nationals who possess an EU passport is rendered statistically 
shows invisible, because it is subsumed within the data relating to EU citizens. However, 
Table 5.2 that there were 849,182 ‘new’ EU citizens who onward migrated and they 
accounted for 0.2 per cent of the population. Furthermore, the new EU long-term residence 
paper gives third-country nationals ‘free movement’ rights similar to those of EU citizens 
and they can seek employment in another member state, but their mobility is currently not 
captured in the statistics. Although EU long-term residents have the right to seek 
employment in other member states, they need to overcome substantial hurdles to be 
issued with a work permit.54 This is one of the factors that can create a semi-legal situation 
for third-country nationals and put them into a precarious situation, but the experiences of 
this migrant group have remained under-studied (Ahrens 2013; EMN 2013). 
Second, the term ‘mobility’ implies that people will not settle permanently and 
continue to be mobile by either returning home or moving elsewhere. The renewed focus 
on seasonal and temporary migration programmes undoubtedly is part of a wider trend in 
policy-making; several international organisations have promoted ‘mobility’ in their recent 
reports (IOM 2010; UNDP 2009). It is therefore appropriate to question the underlying 
logics of these new policy imperatives and if they include due consideration for migrants’ 
                                                        
 
53 It is likely that this figure is higher, seeing that some EU citizens, who were born and hold the 
citizenship of the reporting country, could have also migrated in the past and then returned to their 
origin country before the census enumeration date. 
54 For an overview of further discretionary member state requirements and indirect limitations see 
the European Migration Network report (EMN 2013: 22–24 and 34–44). 
Table 5.2  Residents in the EEA and Switzerland by region of birth and citizenship    
Country of 
birth 
Citizenship of 
reporting country 
Citizenship of 
other EU 
Member State 
Citizenship of     
non-EU 
country 
Other 
citizenshipb 
Subtotal 
  ‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % ‘000 % 
Reporting 
country   452 403 88.0   2 110 0.4   2 771 0.5    247 0.0   457 532 89.0 
Other EU    8 852 1.7   11 086 2.2    143 0.0    29 0.0   20 110 3.9 
Non-EU    15 852 3.1    849 0.2   16 019 3.1    159 0.0   32 879 6.4 
Othera   2 764 0.5    202 0.0    466 0.1    388 0.1   3 819 0.7 
Total   479 872 93.3   14 247 2.8   19 399 3.8    823 0.2   514 340 100.0 
                      
Source: 2011 Census, European Statistical System       
Notes:  a Not classifiable according to current borders and other b Stateless and other not stated 
   
 
 
101 
 
rights. Although some intra-European mobility certainly takes the form of circular 
migration, seasonal mobility or daily cross-border commuting, other EU citizens in fact 
reside in another member state for extended periods of time or even relocate permanently. 
According to the 2011 Census, over 550,000 EU citizens were residing in another member 
state for over 30 years. This is also true for onward migrants, who often spend many years 
in one member state before moving on. Therefore, onward migrants are not necessarily 
constantly ‘on the move’, nor should we assume that they want to be. The moves of onward 
migrants have been compared to those of footloose ‘cosmopolitans’ or ‘nomads’ (Ossman 
2013), but that is not to say they have no claims to place or rights. Thus, it is important to 
not only study the mobility of onward migrants, but also their emplacements. 
Finally, there is an assumption that the short-distance internal ‘mobility’ across 
member states is easier and more fluid than the long-distance ‘migration’ to and from 
Europe. In fact, mobility within the frontier-free ‘Schengenland’ is oftentimes likened to 
internal migration. But, paradoxically, the overall intra-European mobility intensities 
remain much lower than internal migration intensities in other parts of the world. Table 5.2 
indicated that intra-European migrants account for 2.8 per cent of the resident population,55 
whereas in India, for example, internal migrants make up 30 per cent of the country’s 
population.56 It is possible that EU citizens are less inclined to relocate to another member 
state, because mobility within the EU usually involves the crossing of linguistic, cultural and 
institutional boundaries. In order to assess the migration propensity of the non-EU born 
population (32,879,261), we consider that there were 849,182 non-EU born migrants who 
onward migrated after acquiring EU citizenship, which is a mobility rate of 2.6 per cent – 
and thus is slightly lower than the mobility intensity of the EU-born population. It is likely, 
however, that the EU-born and non-EU-born population have distinct motivations for their 
migration and ‘mobility’. 
In the following, I will focus more closely on the migration patterns of non-EU 
migrants. Several studies have confirmed that there are two established migration patterns 
that shape the moves of non-EU migrants towards Europe. The first of them can be 
summarised as colonial linkages and the other is a diversification of destinations beyond 
colonial patterns (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). These two patterns can also be identified in 
the data I analysed. Several former colonising nations engendered substantial post-colonial 
                                                        
 
55 The mobility intensity is higher for the EEA as a whole than for the EU-28, because Norway and 
Switzerland receive a disproportionately high number of mobile EU citizens. 
56 The 2001 Indian census recorded 309 million internal migrants, which is equivalent to 30 per cent 
of the country’s population. The vast majority of internal migrants were intra-district migrants, 
meaning that they migrated relatively short distances. Data for the 2011 census have not been 
released at the time of writing. 
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migrations in direction of their former metropole. Considering two destinations in more 
detail, we can assess the importance of colonial links in shaping African migration towards 
Europe. In the UK, for example, around 70 per cent of the 1,364,940 African-born migrants 
originated from former British colonies. In the case of France over 95 per cent of the 
3,598,119 African migrants were born in African countries colonised by the French. The 
second pattern is that of migrants opting for a wider range of destination countries. Since 
the 1980s greater numbers of African migrants, for instance, have chosen to move to the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. This is part of a wider diversification of 
African migration patterns to other non-European destinations, such as Australia, India, 
USA, Canada and the Gulf countries (Flahaux and de Haas 2016; Schoumaker et al. 2015). 
In addition, I argue that my limited statistical data regarding intra-EU onward migrants 
indicates that two further trends emerge from the mobility patterns of the non-EU-born 
population. The first is that of converging migration patterns, whereby migrants follow 
diverse migratory routes towards different European destinations but later converge on 
their respective former imperial metropole. Third-country nationals may have a preference 
for relocating in the direction of their ‘colonial motherland’ where there often is no linguistic 
barrier to cross and which in turn lowers the relative ‘cost’ of onward migration. This was 
the case for Argentinians, Venezuelans and Uruguayans, many of whom were eligible to 
apply for an Italian passport abroad due their family roots and the generous provisions in 
the Italian ancestral descent principle (Mateos 2015). They later onward migrated to Spain, 
possibly also because of their greater linguistic affinity with Spain. The 2011 Census shows 
that Argentinian-born onward migrants were the largest group (49,155) of onward 
migrants residing in Spain, followed by Uruguayans (13,315) and Venezuelans (8,255). 
Another example of converging onward migration is the re-grouping of Nigerians in the UK, 
which appears to have gathered pace recently. There were 5,790 Nigerian-born onward 
migrants residing in the UK in 2011. Considering the total population of Nigerian-born 
migrants of 201,185, therefore at the time 3 per cent of the resident Nigerians had entered 
the UK after acquiring EU citizenship in another member state. Interestingly, the 2015 data 
from the APS survey show that the overall number of Nigerian onward migrants in the UK 
has more than doubled, now standing at an estimated 12,000 individuals aged 15-64 years 
(see Table 3.1). Thus, in recent years onward migration via various different member states 
has become a more important migration channel for Nigerians to enter the UK.  
 A second trend in the onward migration patterns of the non-EU-born population, 
that I argue merits further investigation, are emerging patterns, which can contribute to the 
formation of new diasporic nodes or the growth of diasporic hubs (Teerling and King 2012; 
Voigt-Graf 2004). The top five destinations for intra-European onward migrants in Table  
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Table 5.3  Top-20 destination countries of intra-EEA onward migrants  
  
Country of 
Residence 
Mobile Europeans  
(all residents with 
citizenship of another  
EU member state)            
Onward Migrants            
(non-EU born with EU 
citizenship of another 
member state)  
% of Onward 
Migrants  
(as part of Mobile 
Europeans) 
 
 
Germany  2 275 763   245 220 11 %  
United Kingdom  2 887 955   210 090 7 %  
Spain  1 951 145   126 275 6 %  
France  1 346 167   50 611 4 %  
Belgium   748 884   42 159 6 %  
Switzerland   955 793   36 676 4 %  
Italy  1 108 797   21 942 2 %  
Netherlands   334 534   21 869 7 %  
Sweden   276 043   13 336 5 %  
Cyprus   106 270   12 921 12 %  
Austria   372 459   12 348 3 %  
Norway   244 970   11 363 5 %  
Luxembourg   191 694   8 978 5 %  
Denmark   124 997   5 779 5 %  
Portugal   94 498   4 256 5 %  
Czech Republic   150 571   3 807 3 %  
Greece   199 121   3 525 2 %  
Finland   61 216   1 561 3 %  
Hungary   84 569   1 003  1 %  
Poland   23 624 823  3 %  
     
Source: 2011 Census, European Statistical System.    
 
5.3 are Germany, the UK, Spain, France and Belgium, in descending order. What these top 
five destinations for onward migrants share in common is that they all used to be colonising 
nations. But when looking at the disaggregated data of the onward migrants, it is not in all 
cases a colonial link or language affinity that appears to attract onward migrants. In the UK, 
for instance, the overall size of migrant communities originating from Lusophone African 
countries was relatively small, but a large share had arrived in the country through the 
channel of onward migration. For example, 37 per cent of Angolan-born residents (a total 
of 5,465 individuals), 62 per cent of Mozambican-born (3,685) and 79 per cent of migrants 
from Guinea-Bissau (1,890) came to the UK as onward migrants. These emerging onward 
migration flows may in turn contribute to the formation of the UK as a more important 
Lusophone diasporic node, as well as its further growth as a hub for the African diasporas 
and Black diasporas. In 2011 the Black population in the UK numbered 1,904,684, 
comprising those residents in the UK who identified as either ‘Black British’, ‘Black African’ 
or ‘Black Other’.  
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Germany and Cyprus are two cases that stand out in Table 5.3. When looking at the 
disaggregated data, however, their onward migration patterns do not neatly fit within the 
aforementioned discussion. In Germany the ratio of resident onward migrants is notably 
high at 11 per cent. The disaggregated data show that the single largest group of onward 
migrants in Germany were born in Turkey. Germany is home to the largest community of 
Turkish-born migrants in Europe and therefore may be drawing in Turkish-born migrants 
from other parts of the EEA because of the opportunities to enjoy a vibrant diasporic 
culture. The other noteworthy case is that of Cyprus. At 12 per cent, Cyprus attracts a 
disproportionately high number of onward migrants. It is difficult to say for sure what is 
stimulating the onward migration to Cyprus, the two largest groups of onward migrants in 
Cyprus were born in Georgia and Russia. Yet, Teerling and King (2012) have pointed out 
that this ‘divided island’ represents an important ‘hub’ and ‘hinterland’ of several other 
overlapping diasporas. 
Of course, there is a risk of over-stating the importance of onward migration and 
depicting this migration trajectory as something entirely novel, simply because it has not 
received much scholarly attention to date. In fact, there is evidence that quite the opposite 
is true. Onward migration appears to have been part of the fabric of intra-European 
mobilities for several decades. Table 5.4 demonstrates that over 12,051 onward migrants 
entered their current country of residence before 1979. Besides, the overall intensity of  
  
Table 5.4  Intra-EEA onward migrants by year of arrival in the reporting country 
 
    
Year of arrival in  
reporting the country 
Mobile Europeans  
(all residents with 
citizenship of another  
EU member state) 
Onward Migrants            
(non-EU born with EU 
citizenship of another 
member state) 
 % of Onward 
Migrants  
(as part of 
Mobile 
Europeans) 
2010 to 2011  1 269 074   78 702 6.20% 
2005 to 2009  3 911 621   241 962 6.19% 
2000 to 2004  2 210 042   192 863 8.73% 
1995 to 1999   851 829   82 565 9.69% 
1990 to 1994   617 098   60 748 9.84% 
1985 to 1989   445 072   31 146 7.00% 
1980 to 1984   295 896   19 423 6.56% 
Arrival before 1979   554 209   12 051 2.17% 
Never resided abroad   921 940   5 053 0.55% 
Not stated   583 591   23 555 4.04% 
Total a  14 238 948   848 991 5.96% 
    
Source: 2011 Census, European Statistical System  
Notes: a Disaggregated data missing for Bulgaria, Sweden and Iceland, the total should be higher 
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onward migration appears to have been relatively stable over the past decades. It is, 
however, necessary to highlight that the data presented in Table 5.4 refer to population 
stocks; in other words, those who may have engaged in intra-European mobilities in the 
past could have already left their destination of onward migration or deceased, and as a 
result are not included. 
Regarding African intra-European onward mobilities, there are several 
observations to be made. The disaggregated data show that there is considerable variability 
in the onward migration patterns depending on the region of origin of the onward migrants. 
The intra-European onward mobility of African-born migrants appears to have only been 
gathering pace since 1995 and therefore is a more recent phenomenon. Unfortunately, there 
are too many missing values in the disaggregated 2011 Census data to present a detailed 
analysis of African intra-European onward mobilities here. Yet, for the top five destinations 
of onward migrants, there are more comprehensive data available. It is possible to confirm 
that out of all onward migrants originating from different parts of the world, African-born 
onward migrants accounted for 2 per cent in Germany, 13 per cent in the UK, 4 per cent in 
Spain, 15 per cent in France and 19 per cent in Belgium.  
As pointed out by other scholars, the term ‘transit migration’ conjures up a 
politically charged image of a potential ‘large-scale influx’ of migrants and asylum-seekers 
into Europe (Collyer and de Haas 2012; Oelgemöller 2011). Furthermore, the term implies 
that all migrants want to stay in Europe, because it is assumed to be their desired final 
destination, which is reflective of a Euro-centric imagining of migration patterns. Yet, there 
is evidence that many African migrants leave Europe again, either returning back to Africa 
or moving onward (Artuç and Özden 2016; Konadu-Agyemang 1999; Takenaka 2007). 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 present an analysis by Artuç and Özden (2016) based on data from 
the American Community Survey data. The authors estimate that around 9 per cent of 
migrants who arrived in the USA during the period from 2001 to 2012 had lived in a country 
other than their country of birth prior to their arrival. Amongst those migrants who had 
university-level education the ratio of onward migration was 14 per cent. Figure 5.2 
highlights that most onward migrants used high-income countries like Canada, Australia 
and the UK (but also Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria) as ‘stepping stones’ to reach 
the USA. Furthermore, the disaggregated data indicate that around 18 per cent of migrants 
who were born in West Africa arrived in the USA as onward migrants. Amongst highly-
skilled West African migrants in the USA the ratio of onward migrants was even higher (26 
per cent). 
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5.3 Summary 
A multitude of policies and regulations structure migration flows between Nigeria and 
Europe. Taking a scalar approach, I analysed how migration governance is shaped by 
numerous institutions and actors at the supra-national, national, regional level and even the 
Figure 5.1 Ratio of onward migrants in the USA by country of birth 
 
Figure 5.2 Ratio of onward migrants in the USA by last country of residence 
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consular representations in Europe. I argued that migrants from Africa are subject to 
policies and regulations that aim to ‘manage’ migration at different stages of the migration 
process, within Europe, at the external borders of the EU, and increasingly also in the 
neighbouring regions and origin countries. Migration governance is determined by 
conflicting priorities as regards labour market demands and socio-political discourses. 
Migrants try to identify ‘openings’ through which they hope to realise their migration 
aspiration. Nigerian migrants have also contested ‘closures’, for example, by challenging 
deportation procedures and demanding more rights for third-country nationals. Further 
strategies employed by Nigerians in relation to student mobility and family reunion will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.   
Research concerning intra-European mobilities typically focuses on the EU citizens 
born in the older member states or the newly-acceded member states (for example 
Engbersen and Snel 2013; Favell 2008). In the latter half of this chapter, I analysed 
statistical data which provided evidence that non-EU born migrants are also mobile within 
Europe. Other studies on African mobilities have demonstrated that extra-continental 
migration patterns used to follow colonial links and that more recently they are diversifying 
to new destinations (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). However, I argue that two complimentary 
trends that have been largely overlooked are multiple migrations which either converge 
following colonial links or emerge in new directions, with the latter potentially forming new 
diasporic nodes and hubs. Importantly, my data show that in recent years onward migration 
is becoming a more common migration trajectory for those migrants entering the UK. In 
addition, other studies indicate that onward migrants are also seeking out destinations 
beyond Europe, particularly in North America. The next chapter now turns to the analysis 
of the drivers of onward mobility, by considering the aspirations and capabilities of Nigerian 
migrants. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Interactions between Aspirations and Capabilities  
 
Research about migration aspirations has provided useful insights into the drivers of 
international migration in origin countries. Previous studies have mainly provided insights 
about young adults’ aspirations and intentions for emigration, which tend to be 
predominantly influenced by the social context of the origin country and the characteristics 
of younger migrants (Carling 2002). Research on return migration in the meantime has 
challenged conceptions that portray migration trajectories as simple one-stop and one-
directional moves, as well as drawing attention to migration motivations of older migrants 
and the second generation who relocate to their origin country (Christou and King 2014; 
King 2000). As migration trajectories are becoming more complex and fragmented, migrant 
decision-making is increasingly taking place across space, time and generations.  
Until now there is only limited research that deals with the motivations of onward 
migrants who migrate and settle in a number of different countries. Individuals who engage 
in onward migration are typically older than first-time migrants and their aspirations are 
oftentimes transformed through the act of migration and exposure to various new social 
contexts. Therefore, the analysis of the determinants and motivations of onward migration 
broadens our understanding of how migration decision-making can evolve over the life-
course and migration trajectory. 
By focusing on aspirations and capabilities, this chapter aims to emphasise the 
multi-faceted and interlinked nature of migration decisions (Boyle and Halfacree 1993). 
The motivations for onward migration are conceptualised as the result of continuous 
frictions and negotiations between migrants’ aspirations and the restrictions placed on 
their capabilities by different social contexts. Given that this analysis is based on multi-sited 
and multi-temporal research, it also opens up possibilities of exploring how migrants’ 
aspirations and capabilities are reconfigured over space and time. The analysis of the 
research participants’ narratives highlights several transnational strategies that individuals 
employ in order to fulfil their aspirations. 
The previous chapters have provided an overview about the socio-historical and 
policy contexts which influence how migration aspirations are formed amongst young 
people in Nigeria. This chapter now analyses the narratives of the informants through the 
lenses of aspirations and capabilities, while they pass through various stages of (actual) 
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mobility and motility (potential for mobility) in Europe (Anthias 2012). This enables us to 
see how migrants’ aspirations and capabilities shape and are re-shaped by their onward 
migration – involving both changes to their personal situations and wider structural 
changes in various destination contexts. 
6.1 The formation of migration aspirations and capabilities 
Only a few studies have been conducted about the pre-departure motivations and 
occupational status of Nigerians who migrated to Europe. As part of the wider Africa 
Migration Project of the World Bank, a household survey was carried out in Nigeria in 2009. 
Prior to their departure to Europe most Nigerian migrants were students (52 per cent), 
while the other Nigerian migrants had been either unemployed (15 per cent), self-employed 
(16 per cent) or full-time wage earners (12 per cent).57 Household members were also 
asked to report the primary reason due to which migrants were living outside of the 
household. For the migrants residing in Europe the main reasons for migration included 
work (53 per cent), education (34 per cent), and marriage arrangement (9 per cent). 
Certain emblematic phrases, such as ‘looking for better opportunities' or 'searching 
for greener pastures', recurred frequently in my respondents’ description of their migration 
motivations. Even though there oftentimes is an assumption that African migrations are 
somehow ‘exceptional’, my informants most usually mentioned that they were moving in 
search of work, to study or to join family members. Women, who came to Europe as self-
initiated migrants, however, more often mentioned that they needed to 'provide for the 
family' due to poverty.58 My interviewees generally had explored other options to satisfy 
                                                        
 
57  These figures are based on my own calculations of the publicly available data for the African 
Migration Project. The questionnaire design of this household survey provides limited information 
about the migration trajectory of individual migrants (Plaza et al. 2011). Only the migrants’ current 
place of residence at the time of the survey was recorded. It is therefore not possible to know, if 
migrants engaged in any internal or intra-African migration before departing on an inter-continental 
migration. This means that no data about possible transit or onward migration was recorded. 
58 There was some variation in the pre-departure migration aspirations amongst the interviewees 
depending on ethnic group in Nigeria. Women from the Edo ethnic group often mentioned the wish 
to build a house. Benin City, capital of Edo state, has the largest concentration of property 
development financed by remittances originating from Italy (Hernández-Cross and Bun 2007: 43). 
The preference for this type of investment is likely to be related to the deportability of the Bini 
women working as prostitutes in Italy. Another reason is that Bini women are more disadvantaged 
than women from other Nigerian ethno-regional groups in terms of customary inheritance law 
(Ewelukwa 2002). Attempts to introduce a Gender Equality Bill at federal level, which amongst other 
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their needs and aspirations, and some even had relocated within Nigeria or the wider 
region.59  But when other avenues were exhausted, informants often came to see inter-
continental migration as a way forward. For some of my interviewees their decision to leave 
Nigeria was spurred on by other life events such as the birth of a child, divorce or the death 
of a parent. 
Only a few of my informants were able to access the privileged migration routes for 
highly-skilled migrants to Europe. First, only relatively few young people have the 
opportunity to attain a university degree in Nigeria, considering that the gross enrolment 
ratio for the tertiary–education level was only 10 per cent in 200560 and actual completion 
rates are likely to be lower (Unesco 2016). Second, not everyone can raise the socio-
economic resources needed for long-distance travel, afford the high tuition fees for 
international students, or has the contacts to quickly secure suitable employment in 
destination countries (Reynolds 2013; Van Hear 2014). The EU Bluecard is a dedicated 
scheme for highly-skilled migrant workers and provides third-country nationals with a 
stable residence permit to live and work across Europe, as well as a concrete path to 
citizenship. But when compared to highly-skilled visa streams offered by individual 
member states, the EU Bluecard has thus far not been very successful.61 Even though the 
largest component of the demand for labour force in Europe relates to low-skilled workers, 
there are no equivalent legal frameworks that facilitate this mobility on a large scale.  
Therefore Nigerians who cannot meet the requirements to migrate as highly-skilled 
migrants, often opt to travel on a valid tourist visa and then overstay, which is a migration 
strategy that is also common amongst other nationalities (Black et al. 2005; Bigo 2016). 
Formal tourist visa guidelines issued by the consular offices require applicants to supply 
evidence of substantial ties to Nigeria through a stable job and disposal of sufficient funds 
in order to finance the trip. The consular visa issuing practices are very arduous and the 
visa rejection rates tend to be high (see Table 5.1). The lack of sufficient short-stay visas and 
the unpredictable nature of the visa application process pose a considerable mobility 
                                                        
 
things would have created uniform inheritance laws across all Nigerian ethnic groups, were rejected 
for the fourth time in 2016. 
59  Internal migration is very common in Nigeria. For graduates internal migration is even 
compulsory, seeing that they have to serve in the National Youth Service Corps before being allowed 
to look for employment, which means that for 12 months they are posted to another part of Nigeria. 
60 These are the most recent data available in the Unesco (2016) UIS database in September 2016. 
61 Between 2012 and 2015 only 129 Nigerian citizens were granted an EU Bluecard, some of which 
were issued in Germany to individuals already residing in the country. Uptake amongst other 
nationalities also remains low (Eurostat 2016). 
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barrier.62 Several informants entered Europe via less common routes, for instance three 
individuals travelled as part of Nigerian football supporters’ associations, one came with a 
group of religious pilgrims and two others had met a European partner online via a dating 
website. In addition, I repeatedly heard rumours concerning informal or ‘unwritten’ visa 
rules. Some informants indicated that previous mobility could make the approval of a 
tourist visa for Europe or North America more likely. This was because informants believed 
that consular officials in Nigeria deemed young Nigerians who wanted to travel on a 'virgin 
passport' as more likely to overstay their visas – thus resulting in a visa rejection. 63 
Consequently, many Nigerians invested in other migration experiences to Dubai or Ghana 
or simply paid for fake stamps in their passport to fulfil what they assumed to be an informal 
visa requirement to 'disvirgin' their passport. Like migrants from other parts of the world, 
Nigerians mainly moved to Europe for work,  study or family reasons (Plaza et al. 2011).  
Aspirant migrants who cannot access a legal mode of migration often use irregular 
means of migration, which in turn has diverted migration trajectories to new destinations. 
These individuals also need to mobilise economic resources and their social networks in 
order to migrate successfully. For example, many of my informants came to Europe by using 
fake passports or other irregular means of entry, while others were brought to Europe by 
migration brokers, smugglers or trafficking networks (Alpes 2012; Plambech 2016). Some 
of my informants underwent several migration attempts before reaching Europe. Nearly all 
my interviewees travelled to Europe by plane, even though the politicised media coverage 
of African migrants crossing the Mediterranean in small boats (pateras or cayucos) has 
generated widely held misconceptions that most Africans arrive in Europe via the sea route. 
Within my sample only twelve individuals reported that they had traversed several African 
countries and crossed the Mediterranean. A minority of interviewed women did not include 
information about the exact route they travelled in their narratives. 
                                                        
 
62 There is no single official statistical source for the number of short-stay visa applications and 
approvals in Europe; these statistics instead are published separately by individual countries in a 
variety of ways. The European Visa Database by Hobolth (2012) is an online resource where this data 
is compiled in a comparable way. According to the database, the visa refusal rates for Nigerians 
between 2001 and 2012 varied greatly between member states and also from one year to another. 
Hobolth also analysed various mobility barriers in terms of access to consular services, visa 
requirements and visa issuing practices and for the period 2005-2012. Nigerians on average faced 
the lowest mobility barriers in Switzerland, Latvia, Slovenia, Italy, Malta, Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
France, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Germany (listed in ascending order). 
63  Although in the period between 1999 and 2003 consular officials working in German 
representations abroad received instructions from the Foreign Ministry 'to be less bureaucratic' 
when issuing visas and 'mere doubts concerning the willingness of visa applicants to return' to their 
origin country were ‘not an acceptable reason to refuse a visa'. The instruction concluded with 'in 
dubio pro libertate – in doubt for freedom (of travel)'. In 2005 an enquiry was carried out into this 
‘visa-scandal’. Also see Finotelli (2009). 
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6.2 Evolving migration aspirations in Europe  
International migration is often talked about as a simple move, but in reality migrants 
experience a much more ‘bumpy’ migration process. The following sections focus on the 
interplay of aspirations and capabilities in the informants’ narratives as a means of 
analysing migration decision-making. Aspiring migrants encounter barriers that impede 
their movement or settlement and in response they find ways to overcome these obstacles, 
or re-adjust their plans. This section emphasises the agency involved in how migrants 
negotiate various states of mobility and motility throughout their migration project. By 
considering migration as an open-ended process, reaching the first destination is not 
necessarily presumed to be the end of the migration cycle. Aspirations and capabilities also 
shape migration projects within Europe. 
6.2.1 Standing your ground in Europe 
On arrival nearly all informants became disillusioned with the realities they encountered in 
Europe. At first glance the media images they had seen about Europe appeared true and 
many Nigerians expressed how much they appreciated the availability of basic amenities 
such as regular electricity and running water, the supply of which over the years has become 
more erratic and costly in Nigeria. Interviewees also commented on the aesthetic qualities 
of some European cities, in terms of cleanliness, design and public transport. But they 
thought that the more difficult issues only revealed themselves on closer inspection. They 
felt deceived by other migrants who, during their return trips to Nigeria, had failed to warn 
them about these issues.  
My interviewees were not always fully informed about the difficulties of acquiring a 
stable legal status in Europe. Out of those who arrived on tourist visas, there was a 
substantial number who said they were unaware they would not be able to work if they 
overstayed, while others idiomatically referred to this as a deliberate strategy of 'crash-
landing'. Those who travel with tourist visas only have 90 days before losing their legal right 
to stay in Europe. In Northern Europe other Nigerians often advised the new arrivals to 
claim political asylum in order to buy themselves more time while they tried to find a 
solution to their predicament. Many West Africans refer to asylum-seekers as aduro 
(Fleischer 2011: 253), which is a Yoruba word for 'someone who stands or retains his 
ground'. Nigerian international students were other temporary migrants who encountered 
difficulties to meet the requirements to extend their residence permit in Europe. Therefore, 
interviewees who engaged in onward mobilities in the early stages of their stay in Europe 
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often were motivated by prospects of being able to regularise their legal status in another 
member state. Most of these undocumented onward mobilities in my sample occurred in 
the direction of Spain or Italy, but I also spoke to a two individuals who relocated to the UK.  
Irregular onward migration in some cases was a response to expulsion orders, that 
require individuals to leave the national territory. These moves thus occurred with hardly 
any preparation. Isaac, one of my interviewees whom I met in Manchester, was taken by 
surprise when he was issued with a deportation order within only a week of claiming 
asylum in Austria. Isaac then took a train to Italy where one of his cousins lived, but because 
he had not informed her about his travel plans, he did not receive any support from his 
cousin: 'She refused to pick me. I didn’t tell her I was coming, so she didn’t pick me'. At Milan 
train station Isaac approached some Nigerians who helped him find a place to stay. 
Other informants emphasised the importance of social networks for the journey and 
the beginning of the stay. Maxwell stressed that not everyone in Nigeria has the required 
financial resources and social networks to migrate to Europe.   
It costs money to come to Europe, it costs connections to come to Europe… The poor 
man from the street from Africa cannot dream of Europe. If you don’t have the money 
you cannot come and if you don’t have the connections, which is psychological money, 
you don’t come… Without the local help, the system will exhaust your money within 
weeks and make you stranded.  
(Maxwell, 32, m, Czech-Nigerian in Amsterdam) 
Another painful realisation for Nigerians was that they overestimated the amount 
of money they could earn in Europe (Carling 2006). At a street junction in Sevilla I met 
Goodluck selling tissues to car drivers when they stopped at the red traffic lights. We 
arranged to meet the next day at a Nigerian shop and walked to the apartment that he 
shared with several other Nigerians. Goodluck said he was still 'living like a student'. Hereby 
he was not only referring to his accommodation, but also to his condition of ‘waithood’ 
(Honwana 2012) due to his irregular legal status, which made it difficult for him to provide 
for his wife and children back in Nigeria in the way he anticipated. Goodluck felt foolish 
recalling how migrants used to be received with a grand welcome on their return visits back 
in his village: 
We never knew that to ship one bus… At the time we thought… this guy has come from 
Europe and he has made it. You don’t know how many years he has spent before he can 
afford that one bus. A bus of 400-500 Euros [laughs]! It takes 12 years to gather 500 
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Euros to buy bus. Then you load it with clothes from basura [rubbish bins].64 When he 
get to Africa the people would be hailing him: 'He has come from Europe. Amen!' 
(Goodluck, 39, m, without residence papers in Sevilla) 
Now that he was in Europe himself, the second-hand vehicles and goods, which 
returnees used to bring back, appeared in a different light. Goodluck had learnt that the 
items were worth a lot less, yet at the same time he realised how many years migrants had 
to work to attain them. These insights made Goodluck re-evaluate the success stories of 
previous migrants and also wonder whether it had been worth him setting off on his 
migration project at all. Illustration 6.1 depicts the daily informal second-hand market in 
the deprived neighbourhood of Palma-Palmilla in Málaga, that my informants who lived 
there described as a 'ghetto'. On the market Nigerians would barter with Romanian and 
Moroccan migrants selling clothes and electronic goods, which I saw being retrieved from 
rubbish bins and charity clothes containers at night time. The second image shows one of 
the Nigerian shipping yards I spent time at during my fieldwork, helping to sort items and 
having informal conversations with traders (Omobowale 2013). 
Nevertheless, many Nigerians I spoke to also admitted that they themselves 
contribute to the perpetuations of the myth of Europe as the Eldorado.  
No, I was thinking that when I come to Europe, I will start picking the money on the 
streets. It’s true… [laughs]. I thought that there is money on the streets in Europe. I 
thought that by coming to Europe, in under one month, I will build a house for my family 
                                                        
 
64 In order to offset the costs for shipping to and clearing in ports in and around Nigeria, it is a 
common practice amongst traders to fill the vehicles and containers with other second-hand items 
they can sell. For further discussion about the second-hand Nigerian import-export trade, see 
Jedlowski (2016), Şaul (2014) and Omobowale (2013) 
Illustrations 6.1  La Palmilla informal market and Nigerian shipping yard in Málaga 
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and give the Madam [the migration sponsor, often linked to sexwork] the money she is 
asking me to pay… and I will have this, I will have that. I didn’t know there are still a lot 
of people that are suffering here, I thought it was only in Africa […] But I cannot tell my 
family that. I will tell them that Europe is sweet. 
(Iziegbe, 41, f, permanent Spanish residence paper in Málaga) 
Having invested considerable resources and incurred debts with visa brokers, 
smugglers or traffickers to pay their journey, meant it was difficult to return to Nigeria 
empty-handed. The majority of interviewees had set off from Nigeria in order to earn money 
thinking they would return to Nigeria fairly quickly – this was the case for both the men and 
women I interviewed. In contrast, my informants who had come to Europe to join other 
family members generally envisaged an indefinite stay. At the point of the interview, only 
four informants mentioned that they had concrete plans to return to Nigeria. Out of the 
informants I remained in touch with, several returned to Nigeria temporarily and I became 
aware that one of my informants was deported. The low rate of return intentions amongst 
my research participants appears striking. But seeing that my fieldwork was focused on 
destination countries, my research does not provide any insights about the actual rate of 
return migration. Nonetheless, a representative household survey also shows that the 
incidence of return migration is particularly low in Nigeria. There were only 3 per cent 
returnees (as a share of all migrants) recorded in the migrant households surveyed (Plaza 
et al. 2011).65  
Thus, virtually all of my interviewees had put their plans to return to Nigeria on hold 
and it was unclear when they would go back. But staying put in the destination country was 
not always due to hopes that aspirations could be realised at a later point. When faced with 
barriers – real or perceived – another coping strategy for Nigerians was to adjust their 
aspirations. One of my informants in Berlin, called Joe, told me that he believed that ‘In 
America you can rise very high, but you can also fall very low. That is why I prefer to stay in 
Germany. Here my life is more stable’. Thus, Joe thought that he could possibly have excelled 
more in his profession if he had moved to the USA. But this would have come at the 
considerable cost of giving up the sense of security that the unemployment insurance and 
other welfare benefits in Germany afforded him should he ever need them. That is why he 
ultimately decided to stay put. 
                                                        
 
65 The return migration rate was considerably lower in Nigeria than in the other countries where 
household surveys were conducted as part of the Africa Migration Project (Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda). But it is possible that Nigerian return migrants did not 
return to their former household and instead decided to live in another part of Nigeria, thus being 
recorded as internal migrants. 
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6.2.2 Gaining an (un)stable foothold  
Legislation concerning immigration draws clear distinctions between legal and irregular 
forms of migration. Even though migrants generally try to migrate legally, restrictive 
immigration policies mean that they also seek out other means of travel, entry and stay. 
Moreover, legal status also structures migrants’ aspirations and capabilities for onward 
mobility. Taking into account the amount and variation of immigration policies across EU 
member states, it is difficult to summarise the various ‘regimes of mobility’ that migrants 
can negotiate as students, workers, spouses, dependent children, etc. According to Morris’ 
definition, civic stratification describes 'a system of inequality based on the relationship 
between different categories of individuals and the state, and the rights thereby granted and 
denied' (Morris 2002: 79). Thus, formal access to rights not only differs horizontally across 
member states, but also vertically between different migrant types. Migrants’ capability to 
access these rights, however, is often linked with their embodied characteristics like gender, 
‘race’ and age. 
In order to realise their aspirations of better-paid work, education and healthcare, 
my informants were keen to acquire a European passport, as this provided the greatest 
stability and protected them from deportation. Even those interviewees who aspired to lead 
transnationally mobile lives between Europe and Nigeria or migrate elsewhere, pass 
through extended periods of ‘fixity’ and ‘mooring’ in order to acquire a residence permit or 
a European passport (Hannam et al. 2006). Differentiated capacity and access to mobility 
has been analysed through the concept of ‘motility’, which is defined as the ‘the manner in 
which an individual or group appropriates the field of possibilities relative to movement 
and uses them’ (Kaufmann and Montulet, 2008: 45). This resonates with the research that 
Dahinden conducted with nightclub dancers who opted to reside in Switzerland with the 
objective of acquiring ‘mobility capital’ for future life plans (Dahinden 2010). Despite 
encountering difficulties in one place, migrants were often unwilling to onward migrate 
until they had managed to obtain a European passport, because they felt that leaving would 
mean they had to ‘start from zero’ elsewhere. Many spoke about the time they spent 
building contacts and getting to know 'the system' would be 'wasted' if they onward 
migrated prematurely.  
In the meantime, migrants have to live with inferior residence statuses and fewer 
rights. Short-term and permanent residence papers do not allow migrants to vote in 
destination countries, restrict their mobility rights and maintain them in a state of 
‘deportability’ (De Genova 2002). Furthermore, these residence papers offer considerably 
less stability, because various conditions have to be met in order for them to be renewed.  
 
 
117 
 
 
 
The conditions can include requirements concerning work contracts, good conduct 
in the country of residence 66  and a clean police record from the country of origin. 67 
Depending on their capacity to meet these conditions, migrants can gain and also lose their 
legal status. Figure 6.1 provides data about the first residence permits issued to Nigerian 
citizens by reason between 2009 and 2015.68 In the EU, overall, two thirds of first residence 
                                                        
 
66  Interviewees and key informants in Spain repeatedly pointed out that several Nigerians had 
difficulty renewing their residence papers, because of simple ‘offences’ such as a noise complaint that 
was issued when neighbours had called the police regarding a private gathering. 
67 In Spain the requirement for a clean police record from the country of origin is particularly hard 
to fulfil for Nigerians. While other origin countries facilitate the provision of this document through 
a centralised database and an online application process, there was no such process put in place by 
Nigerian authorities. As a result, several hundred Nigerians in Spain falsified their police records 
(interview with key informant in Madrid). Therefore, Nigerians are now the only immigrant group in 
Spain that cannot present police records, which were requested remotely. Seeing that it is impossible 
for irregular migrants to return to Nigeria for this document, the Nigerian police now organises 
regular visits to Spain to issue police records. Also see Ahrens (2013). 
68 The Eurostat database on Asylum and Managed Migration only contains data from 2008 onwards. 
Although the OECD’s annual publication International Migration Outlook (formerly referred to as the 
 
 
Figure 6.1 First residence permits issued to Nigerian nationals by reason 2009-2015 
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permits were issued to Nigerians for either family or education reasons. However, this 
picture varies considerably across member states. In the UK, for instance, around half of all 
first residence permits were issued for education reasons. In contrast, Germany and Spain 
granted on average 73 per cent and 67 per cent respectively of residence permits to 
Nigerians based on family reasons. 69  For the period in question, a relatively small 
percentage of Nigerians received residence permits due to humanitarian reasons. Work 
reasons only in Spain accounted for a considerable number of first residence permits that 
were issued. 
In her study Schuster (2005) illustrates how migrants in Italy fitted into and moved 
through various migrant categories during their stay in Europe. Some Nigerians were able 
to legalise their stay, while others later found themselves undocumented again (Ahrens 
2013). This shifting between categories is what Schuster terms ‘status mobility’. The 
economic recession of 2008-2009 led to a higher number of Nigerians in Spain losing their 
legal status and being unable to regularise, given that mass unemployment made it very 
difficult to obtain the required work contracts. Usually the presence of irregular migrants 
was tolerated in Spain, but the police target visible minorities for identity checks (Amnesty 
International 2011). As a result, the migrants’ everyday mobility could become restricted, 
which usually had negative impacts on their livelihood and wellbeing. Goodluck continued 
to live as an irregular migrant and when he messaged me three years after our interview he 
said his situation had become very challenging: 
To pay for my house rent now is a problem. For over two months now I have been at 
home because the police is asking me for documentation in the street. I was arrested by 
the police and sent to court. It was the judge that set me free because my lawyer wrote 
appeal. 
(Goodluck, 39, m, without residence papers in Málaga) 
Restricted mobility and access to services are common effects of immigration 
policies that intend to make destination countries less attractive through internal bordering 
practices (Bigo 2016). In Germany, for instance, following the 1993 asylum reform several 
                                                        
 
SOPEMI reports) provides a longer time range for these types of data, they are only available at 
national level and not disaggregated by citizenship of migrants. 
69 Even though the rate of family reunification is relatively high amongst Nigerians in Spain and 
Germany (Figure 6.1), it might still be an underestimate. Research shows that due to the backlogs for 
family reunification visas in Spain, especially non-EU couples often travel before all the legal 
formalities are completed – on average experiencing only 2.3 years of separation before arriving in 
Spain (González-Ferrer 2011: 206).  
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measures were introduced to deter asylum-seekers. The German government was one of 
the key member states pushing for the introduction of the Dublin Regulation. New German 
regulations for asylum-seekers meant that, individuals were dispersed to collective asylum 
residences in remote areas of Germany; they had to comply with the mandatory residence 
rule (Residenzpflicht) and were not allowed to seek employment. 70  Nigerians who first 
arrived in Germany spoke of these experiences of seeking asylum and the difficult living 
conditions they faced at the time. 
You have to seek for political asylum. When I stay in Germany, it was never my dream 
to stay in Germany. But after I seek for political asylum, I should not leave my Landkreis. 
If I stay… stationed in… for example… you know Berlin very well? If they station you in 
Neukölln, you can’t go to Potsdam or Zoologischer Garten. Why? Am I a criminal? 
(Peter, m, 47, German-Nigerian in South East England) 
In other instances, ‘spatial entrapment’ was an unintended consequence of 
immigration policies. In Spain, Nigerians often opted to move away from cities with large 
immigrant communities in order to speed up their regularisation process. Especially in 
Madrid I encountered many Nigerians who lived in localities that were still within 
commutable distance to Madrid, but in fact situated in adjacent regions, such as Castile-La 
Mancha. My informants argued that the high influx of migrants in Spain had created 
enormous backlogs for the municipal population register (the padrón), which was the first 
step in the regularisation process after the implementation of the continuous settlement 
programme in 2006. For the interview I conducted with Nnenna, for instance, I took a 
Madrid suburban train to the final station and then waited for one of the two busses that 
passed on a Saturday to take me to her small village – the already limited summer bus 
schedule had been even further reduced due to austerity measures. Both these intended 
and unintended immigration policy consequences have an isolating effect on migrants and 
hinder their social integration in destination countries. 
A considerable number of my interviewees inhabited statuses that neither fitted the 
definition of a legal, nor that of an irregular status. Several scholars have highlighted how 
migrants, for instance, can be legally resident in a country but working in violation of the 
terms specified in their tourist or student visa. In other cases administrative delays can 
cause migrants to temporarily lose their proof of legal residence. These ‘in-between’ 
                                                        
 
70 Since the so-called refugee ‘crisis’ in 2015 some of these measures have been lifted. Yet German 
asylum policies are characterised by their overarching aim of deterring asylum-seekers. For a more 
detailed discussion see Hinger (2016). 
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categories have attracted different labels, such as: semi-compliant (Ruhs and Anderson 
2010); liminal migrants (Menjívar 2006); quasi-legal (Düvell 2008) and semi-legal (Kubal 
2013). During my fieldwork I encountered several Nigerians who found themselves in a 
semi-legal status. Many informants who held a short-term residence permit in Spain or Italy 
were travelling to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway or Switzerland often for 
periods of under a year. According to the EU acquis they are allowed to stay as tourists in 
other Schengen countries for a period up to three months in any half-year. As Kubal (2013) 
points out, it is difficult for authorities to know exactly when these three months of tourist 
visit have elapsed, because with the absence of border controls there are no entry stamps 
in their passport. One of the key informants I interviewed also mentioned that the police 
frequently encountered semi-legal Nigerians from other EU member states in Germany and 
the officials were not always fully informed about their rights: 
Most cases of our girls who come from Italy or Spain and then they are arrested at work. 
Not because they are not supposed to be here in Schengen... they can... but because they 
are working [...] This girl came from Spain, they caught her at work with a Nigerian 
passport with Spanish residence. In fact she has stopped with prostitution in Spain, she 
now went into catering and hotel. But then in the winter there is no work, so she decided 
to come here. Then [the police] took her and said: ‘We are going to deport her to Nigeria’.  
And I said: ‘Why to Nigeria?’ They thought the passport was not good, the passport was 
fake... I explained that the only thing that could be wrong with it, is that she was not 
there to take the passport personally, maybe they sent it from Nigeria. This passport 
was ok. They were going to deport this girl to Nigeria who had fought so hard for her 
residence permit. [...] The girl said: ‘Please give me my passport and let me go back to 
Spain.’ [...] She was eventually deported to Spain. When they come here, of course, they 
always say the day they were arrested is the day they came. Some have been arrested 
three or four times.  
(Sarah, key informant, Berlin) 
After member states eventually transposed the Long-Term Residence Directive with 
several years delay (2003/109/EC), third-country nationals were able to apply for a new 
European-wide residence paper that grants them rights and obligations similar to those of 
EU citizens. The holder of an EU long-term residence permit enjoys ‘freedom of movement’ 
rights between Schengen countries.71 Third-country nationals can apply for the EU long-
term residence paper after 5 years of residence, otherwise Nigerians have to reside in Spain 
for 10 years before becoming eligible to naturalise as a Spanish citizen and enjoy freedom 
                                                        
 
71 The 2014 annual German migration report (BAMF 2016) shows an increase in the number of EU 
long-term residence permit holders that are using this right to relocate to another member state. In 
2014 there were 4,412 EU long-term residence permit holders residing in Germany. This number is 
up from 2,995 in 2013; 1,578 in 2012; 734 in 2011 and 305 in 2010. In 2014 there were 78 Nigerian 
citizens with an EU long-term residence permit registered in Germany.  
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of movement. Yet, despite its apparent attractiveness, the uptake amongst third-country 
nationals still has been very low. This is partly because it was not publicised widely enough 
and its introduction often occurred alongside the existing national permanent residence 
permit. But even third-country nationals who manage to apply for the EU long-term 
residence paper still are subject to discretionary labour market restrictions (Directive 
2003/109/EC) and can be denied a work permit after onward migrating to another member 
state. It therefore is not surprising that during my fieldwork I only met two Nigerians who 
had used the EU long-term residence paper to engage in onward migration. Bright had come 
to Germany in 2010 and quickly was issued with a work permit because of the qualifications 
he obtained as a truck driver in Spain: 
I am part of the fortunate ones because I come here [to Germany] with my [Spanish] 
document […] I was gathering information, not about me leaving per se, because things 
were still fine in Spain back then. When things started crumbling and there’s no job, I 
listened to the news and checked which of the EU members is strongest... in terms of the 
economy... and the prospect of getting my kind of job. 
 (Bright, 38, m, with EU directive long-term residence permit in Düsseldorf) 
The proportion of Nigerian migrants who managed to become naturalised European 
citizens varied in each member state. This is due to the fact that every member state sets its 
own residence requirements for third-country nationals to be eligible for naturalisation. 
From a state-centred perspective those who become naturalised citizens express a desire 
to become permanent members of their 'host' nation. But from a migrant-centred 
perspective holding a European passport also opens up new mobility opportunities and 
access to more rights. Due to provisions in the Nigerian constitution, citizens of Nigeria by 
birth may not renounce their citizenship. Thus, Nigerians can have citizenship rights in two 
countries and become dual citizens.72 My informants often mentioned that they had onward 
migrated shortly after receiving their European passport.  
However, not everyone jumped at the opportunity to become a European citizen. 
Research participants were keen to stress that, as Nigerians, there were important 
differences between European passports from different destination societies. Chima had 
previously lived in Helsinki and decided not to apply for naturalisation in Finland, because 
                                                        
 
72 Although between 1999 and 2009 Nigerian consular staff in Berlin required those wanting to 
naturalise as German, to first renounce their Nigerian passport. A letter posted on the embassy 
website in 2011 acknowledged that this practice did not conform with the Nigerian constitution. But 
Nigerians were not refunded the €400 they paid for renunciation letters, nor were their Nigerian 
passports re-issued.  www.africanheritagemagazine.de/embassy-news/ 
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he believed that as a Black Finnish citizen at European airports he would still face the same 
extensive questioning which he had come to expect with his green Nigerian passport. He 
onward migrated to the South East of England together with his Finnish wife and said that 
he prefers to apply for British citizenship once he becomes eligible. In Chima’s view it will 
be easier for him to claim Britishness. Another interviewee, Rachael, explained that these 
racialised and racist conceptions of who can be a citizen, and thereby ‘belong to the nation’, 
also continue to pose problems for second-generation Nigerians: 
For example, even my children who are born here, the Germans ask them: 'Where do 
you come from?' Whereas in the UK, they ask you: 'Where do you come from originally?'. 
People assume that you could be a British citizen, although you have an accent […] My 
children they were born here [in Germany] but they are all in the UK. Because I think 
the UK is easier for integration for the Black people.  
(Rachael, 64, f, German-Nigerian in Berlin) 
Rachael’s children were made to feel excluded by German society despite the fact that they 
were born in the country and therefore she encouraged them to study and live in the UK. 
6.2.3 Working conditions, recognition and discrimination  
My research participants’ desire to live in a place where they believed that the society is 
accepting of diversity – where they could feel free, respected and welcome – represented a 
wider context that impacted on their migration aspirations. Some of my informants had not 
engaged in onward migration, even though they felt it was hard to meet their wellbeing 
needs in their current place of residence. Informants were especially frustrated with their 
employment situation, because they had set out from Nigeria thinking that it would be 
easier to find a job which matched their skills in Europe. They decided not to onward 
migrate when they saw some prospects that their employment situation could eventually 
improve. Studies that compare migrants’ occupational status in the origin and destination 
countries are rare. In their analysis of biographical survey data, Castagnone et al. (2014) 
illustrate that medium-high skilled workers from Ghana, Senegal and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo experienced considerable downgrading after migration to Europe, and 
that it took some migrants over 10 years to recover their occupational status. Many of my 
informants invested time learning the local language, familiarising themselves with the 
system and building their social networks. Even though their capabilities were negatively 
affected in the first years after arrival in Europe, eventually some migrants were able to 
improve their situation. 
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Destination societies also changed through the presence of migrants. Especially 
informants who had been living in Europe for a long time period, felt that since their arrival 
they had witnessed general improvements to the situation of migrants. Although they 
initially might have considered relocating elsewhere, they had grown accustomed to their 
country of residence and developed coping mechanisms to deal with some of the difficult 
situations they encountered. 
Things are changing otherwise I would go. I could have easily packed my things and gone 
to the UK. But I have been here [in Germany] for quite a while, I am used to the system 
here and I know what to expect. I learnt the skills, fighting for things. But that is not the 
situation with most of our young people. 
 (Rachael, 64, f, German-Nigerian in Berlin) 
But there was a consensus that there was a limit to the adverse conditions that could 
be endured in the hope of long-term improvements. Informants in Spain often expressed 
concerns that even Latin American migrants, who had been living in the country for 
considerably longer and spoke Spanish fluently, on the whole were still largely relegated to 
low-paid jobs. While Nigerians were prepared to endure bad working conditions and low 
salaries at the beginning of their stay, they also believed there needed to be some prospect 
of future improvement of their situation, demonstrated either through the success of fellow 
diasporans or other migrant communities. When social mobility was unlikely in their 
country of residence, my informants envisaged their futures to lie in another destination. 
When the situation in their destination countries was unexpectedly altered, 
interviewees who did not necessarily have plans to relocate, were compelled to reconsider 
their options. For instance, informants often mentioned how alienated and threatened they 
felt by racist public discourses and hate crimes in their previous EU country of residence. 
Over recent years, populist right-wing parties have been gaining support in many EU 
countries, which has reconfigured politics more widely in that other centre-ground political 
parties now also are calling for more restrictive immigration policies. Interviewees often 
stressed that discrimination existed in all European countries and recent reports also found 
that People of Colour frequently experience xenophobia and racism, even though racist hate 
crimes in general remain under-reported and miscategorised (Nwabuzo 2015; UNHRC 
2017). Nevertheless, at the time of my fieldwork in England during 2012, many Nigerians 
believed that in the UK racism was not as overt as elsewhere in Europe and anti-
discrimination laws were enforced more vigorously. But their experiences might be 
considerably different after the ‘hostile environment’ policies and Brexit referendum, which 
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have emboldened some individuals in their expression of anti-immigrant sentiments and 
led to an increase in racially-motivated hate crimes in Britain. 
Another sudden change was the global economic crisis and subsequent austerity 
measures, which were felt particularly severely in Spain. Unemployment amongst the 
Spanish nationals peaked at 24.3 per cent at the end of 2013. For the non-citizen resident 
population, unemployment stood at 36.6 per cent and reached 52.5 per cent amongst third-
country nationals of African origin (Colectivo Ioé 2013; INE 2014: 5). The lack of 
employment was compounded by the fact that all of my informants had exhausted their 
maximum two-year entitlement to national unemployment insurance, at which point no 
other universal welfare was available and other austerity measures started to take effect. 
This created especially strong aspirations for onward mobility, although most informants I 
spoke to in Spain only had the national short-term or permanent residence papers, and not 
the EU long-term residence paper or Spanish passport, which would have enabled them to 
seek work elsewhere in Europe (Ahrens 2013). Meanwhile Latin American migrants, who 
had preferential access to Spanish citizenship after 2 years of legal residence, were able to 
use onward migration as a ‘coping mechanism’ to escape the recession in Spain (Mas Giralt 
2016). Another survey, about the Latin American community in London, found that 30 per 
cent of the respondents were onward migrants, nearly all of whom had previously lived in 
Spain (McIlwaine 2012). 
Furthermore, migrants have also experienced increasing precarity due to the 
fundamental restructuring of labour markets in Europe and other high-income countries 
since the 1990s. New employment practices, such as subcontracting, temporary 
employment, casual employment, and the ‘gig economy’ have caused a decline in 
employment conditions. For instance, since 2003 several German labour market sectors, 
like hospitality, catering and retail, have replaced their formerly contracted workers with 
mini-jobbers. 73  These ‘precarious’ and ‘flexible’ employment conditions have 
disproportionately affected the livelihoods of many migrant workers (Schierup et al. 2015), 
seeing that they are over-represented in these sectors:  
I worked as an Elektrotechniker [electro technician]… when the company started 
moving down and collapsing in 2004 we had to change our job. They sent everyone 
away. That is when I started working with Randstad [a private sector employment 
                                                        
 
73 Mini-jobs are classified as marginal employment and were introduced in 2003 to legalise informal 
employment and second jobs. Until 2012 neither employers nor workers had to pay income tax, 
social security or pension contribution for these ‘zero-hour contracts’. Entire sectors of the German 
economy started to exclusively contract workers on mini-jobs. See: Blankenburg, S. (2012) 'Mini-jobs' 
don't work in Germany, and they won't work in Britain. The Guardian, 21 August, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/21/mini-jobs-germany-britain 
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agency], there was no other hope then… that is when Germany had started going 
somehow with the Zeitarbeit [temping work via employment agencies], you can’t get 
direct job you have to go through the Zeitarbeit… everything started changing. You were 
paid with a low, low sum of money. 
(Collins, 46, m, German-Nigerian in Málaga) 
Although underemployment was the main reason for Collins to onward migrate, he 
also moved to Spain because his wife had been unable to obtain a residence permit in 
Germany. Like many other Nigerians I met, Collins’ wife moved Spain in the hope of 
benefiting from one of the regularisation programmes for irregular migrants. Through the 
redundancy payment from his previous job and savings from Germany, Collins became self-
employed in Spain. His business was going well for several years, but when we spoke in 
2012 he had hardly any customers and he was considering moving elsewhere.  
Table 6.1 indicates the employment rates for different nationalities and regions of birth 
based on data from the 2011 Census. These employment data are likely to be influenced by 
the economic crisis, but they reflect the situation at the time when fieldwork was conducted. 
Some subsamples are very small, therefore the findings should be interpreted with caution. 
Employment rates for third-country nationals and Nigerians without EU citizenship tend to 
be low, as these migrant groups are also characterised by their shorter residence periods in 
Europe. Third-country nationals and Nigerians who had become naturalised EU citizens 
show higher rates of employment, reflecting better local language skills and greater 
familiarity with their residence country. For the UK, at least male Nigerian onward migrants 
who relocated to the UK show the same levels of employment as British-Nigerians (73 per 
cent), while the employment rate of female Nigerian onward migrants is lower than that of 
British-Nigerians (Table 6.1). What is not apparent from this table is the extent of informal 
employment and ‘side hustles’ that Nigerians engaged in to supplement their living 
expenses and fulfil other aspirations. Activities included braiding hair for other African 
women, preparing cakes for celebrations, cleaning in private homes, sewing traditional 
dresses or loading shipments for Nigeria. Through targeted recruitment, several Nigerians 
I met also became involved in direct sales companies, e.g. Mary Kay, Herbalife, etc., where 
they lost considerable amounts of money because they were unable to sell all the products 
they were required to stock. 
My informants also reconsidered their migration projects after receiving more 
information about the opportunities in other destinations. They thought that the 
destination context was important in determining to what extent they could make use of 
their capabilities and realise their aspirations. Multi-sited research studies have highlighted 
that even migrant groups from the same origin country show significant variations in 
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integration outcomes depending on national context, which has been partly attributed to 
differences in educational systems, labour markets and integration policies (Crul and 
Vermeulen 2003). Especially in Germany and Spain my informants expressed that they felt 
limited to do 'migrant jobs' or 'Black people's jobs' which they perceived as low-paid and 
demeaning. In the quote below Efem explains how she observed a segmentation of the 
labour market in her previous two countries of residence, which made it difficult for People 
of Colour to enter certain jobs. 
Table 6.1 Employment characteristics by nationality and region of birth  
          
  
Nationality/Region of birth All 
  Employment rate 
    total men women 
UK        
 
 native-born British nationals 54,513,365  73%  77%  69% 
 
 EU  EU-born EU nationals 2,090,320  77%  82%  73% 
 
 non-EU born EU-nationals 210,090  67%  75%  59% 
 
 non-EU born non-EU nationals 2,074,285  58%  65%  51% 
 
 Nigerian-born British nationals 82,245  75%  78%  73% 
 
 Nigerian-born EU nationals 5,790  73%  78%  65% 
 
 Nigerian-born non-EU nationals 113,145  59%  62%  54% 
 
Germany        
 
 native-born German nationals 64,423,790  78%  82%  74% 
 
 EU-born EU nationals 1,543,680  73%  82%  65% 
 
 non-EU born EU-nationals 245,220  60%  72%  49% 
 
 non-EU born non-EU nationals 2,428,100  56%  69%  45% 
 
 Nigerian-born German nationals 6,980  70%  88%  43% 
 
 Nigerian-born EU nationals 390 u 72% u 84% u 60% u 
 Nigerian-born non-EU nationals 9,960  54%  66%  31% 
 
Spain        
 
 native-born Spanish nationals 40,647,160  57%  62%  52% 
 
 EU-born EU nationals 1,627,400  48%  53%  44% 
 
 non-EU born EU-nationals 126,275  51%  56%  46% 
 
 non-EU born non-EU nationals 2,968,640  44%  45%  42% 
 
 Nigerian-born Spanish nationals 610 u 43% u 43% u 43% u 
 Nigerian-born EU nationals 140 u 100% u 104% u 100% u  
  Nigerian-born non-EU nationals 22,720   29%   34%   23%   
         
 
Source: European Statistical System, 2011 Census; Note: u - low reliability of results.  Especially for 
small subsamples results may be unreliable when variables are cross-tabulated given that these are 
aggregated data (and not microdata) structured according to the hypercubes.  
  
 
 
127 
 
They want to choose for them what they should be. As a coloured person you cannot go 
further than that. There are places in Holland and Germany they are all the same, that a 
Black person can never work there. Like security, a common thing everybody works 
here, you cannot do it there. Being a policeman is a no-go-area. They keep you at a level… 
Even if you want to do it. They will suppress you. 
 (Efem, 43, f, Nigerian-Dutch in Manchester)  
 
It is also likely that in the UK, more Nigerians were in full-time education and 
therefore not counted as part of the active labour force. A study about African migrants in 
Italy and Spain shows that those who furthered their education in the destination countries 
stood a better chance of experiencing social mobility (Fokkema and de Haas 2015). But 
amongst my informants who lived in continental Europe hardly any first-generation 
migrants had been able to enter higher education, instead they recounted their unsuccessful 
attempts to get the academic qualifications and professional skills they gained in Nigeria 
recognised. They had heard, however, that this validation process was much easier in the 
UK.  
 
6.2.4 In pursuit of (more) education   
By contrast, it was more common for first-generation Nigerians to study at tertiary level in 
the UK; most had already pursued or were planning to enter higher education there in the 
future. The high population growth rate in Nigeria means that demand for higher education 
has not been met. Although more universities have been established in recent years (see 
Table 6.2), the instruction quality has declined and Nigerian Higher Education Institutes 
(HEIs) suffer from one of the worst student to lecturer ratios in the world. The lack of places 
at public universities has created extreme demand for academic credentials, so that young 
Nigerians are paying high sums to enrol at private Nigerian HEIs. In addition, every year 
thousands of students enrol at dubious unregistered institutions 74  in search of the 
proverbial ‘golden fleece’. Migration to Europe provides an alternative means of acquiring 
skills and qualifications. In the case of my interviewees, many had furthered their education 
during their time in Europe or planned to do so in future. The number of international 
                                                        
 
74 In 2015 the National Universities Commission (NUC) released a list of 65 illegal institutions facing 
prosecution or investigation due to missing licences http://guardian.ng/news/nuc-names-65-
illegal-varsities-prosecutes-eight-others/ 
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students from Nigeria enrolled at universities throughout the world has nearly tripled 
between 2004 and 2014, rising from 23,476 to 75,539 (Table 6.2).  Currently Nigeria is 
amongst the top-ten origin countries of internationally mobile students (Unesco 2016). 
The UK is the most popular location for the pursuit of higher education: in 2013 
there were 17,973 international students from Nigeria enrolled at British universities – 
constituting the third largest group of international students after 86,204 Chinese and 
19,604 Indian students. Some UK institutions have been given new names by the Nigerian 
students: Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen is called ‘University of Ibadan UK branch’, 
while London Metropolitan University is referred to as ‘Lagos State University, UK branch’ 
(Adepoju and van der Wiel 2010: 318). But the disadvantages of British universities 
nowadays are the high tuition fees and an unfavourable currency exchange rate for  
 
Table 6.2  Nigerian HEI applications, admissions and international student mobility  
Year  
No. of 
universities in 
Nigeria 
Applications to 
Nigerian HEIs 
Admissions to 
Nigerian HEIs 
Admission 
rate for HEIs 
Nigerians 
studying 
abroad  
2004/05 56 841,878 122,492 15% 23,476 
2005/06 74 916,371 76,984 8% 26,906 
2006/07 79 803,472 88,524 11% 27,969 
2007/08 90 911,653 107,370 12% 30,185 
2008/09 92 1,054,060 118,691 11% 34,105 
2009/10 101 1,182,381 211,991 18% 42,535 
2010/11 103 1,375,671 346,605 25% 45,062 
2011/12 117 1,493,609 360,170 24% 49,492 
2012/13 124 1,503,933 410,157 27% 49,568 
2013/14 129 1,735,810 400,269 23% 52,066 
2014/15 129 1,632,172 379,793 23% 75,539 
2015/16 140 1,428,379 281,993 20% n.a. 
 
Sources: Number of universities in Nigeria from National Universities Commission (NUC) 
www.nuc.edu.ng; Applicants and admissions data from Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board 
(JAMB) statistics www.jamb.gov.ng; Data on internationally mobile students from Unesco UIS 
database http://data.uis.unesco.org     
 
Note: From 2010 onwards the centralised University Tertiary Matriculation Examination (UTME) has 
been used for both university and polytechnic entry. Before 2010 the exam was used for university 
admission only.  
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Nigerians.75 Those who apply directly from Nigeria to further their education are classified 
as international students and have to pay hefty tuition fees of on average nearly £12,000 
per year, but this varies depending on the course and the university. While it used to be 
common for international students to work alongside their studies to supplement their 
living costs (Adi 1998; Harris 2006), tougher immigration regulations have made this a less 
viable option in recent years. 
George spent just under a year in the UK on a student visa, before realising that his 
family was not in a position to pay the high international tuition fees. He then moved to 
Germany, where it is easier for international students to comply with financial conditions. 
International students without a local sponsor are required to deposit €8,000 in a blocked 
banked account to show evidence of their ability to finance their living costs during the 
academic year. But German universities do not charge any tuition fees,76 and only a low 
administration fee, of around €400 per year has to be paid: 
I came from a middle-class family. OK, they are not millionaires. They just want to help 
their son to get a better education somewhere. But my family could not meet up to the 
British enrolment requirements. Some money you had to pay in deposit because you are 
foreign, plus tuition fees for a year in advance… everything was too much. And I had an 
uncle over here [in Germany] and he said: 'Why don’t you come over here? Maybe you 
can make it.' So initially I had no intentions to come to Germany. I was like… maybe I 
                                                        
 
75 The ‘been-to’ generation of Nigerians who pursued tertiary education in the UK between the 1950s 
and 1970s found it easier to pay for their studies abroad. This was due to several reasons: the 
Nigerian government and private enterprises used to sponsor more international scholarships; 
Commonwealth citizens still benefited from visa-free entry to the UK; and tuition fees for 
international students remained relatively low until the 1980s. Another important factor was that 
living costs in the UK were more affordable, seeing that the exchange rate of the Nigerian Naira was 
adjusted in a one-to-one relationship with British Pound between 1960 and 1967. Yet, the 
institutional racism African migrants faced at the time was extreme. Adi (1998: 155) reminds us that 
African students petitioned the British Council to create more hostels in London, because the colour 
bar made it difficult for African students to arrange their own accommodation. 
76 Historically German universities have not charged tuition fees, but there was a period from 2005-
2013 when some German regions (Bundesländer) decided to introduce tuition fees. Since then all 
regions abolished tuition fees for enrolment at public universities; exceptions apply to the 109 
private German universities.  
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will go to the States, which is even more expensive! [Laughs]. I just wanted to be in an 
English-speaking country, but later that wasn’t the case. 
(George, 33, Nigerian on a postgraduate student visa in Cologne) 
Another option to study in Europe without having to pay excessive international 
tuition fees, is for Nigerians to qualify as ‘home students’ in the UK. Students who hold a 
European passport or have a permanent residence permit in another EU member state, pay 
the same tuition fees as ‘home’ and EU students. Other factors that made the UK an attractive 
destination for university studies were the easier recognition of Nigerian secondary school 
qualifications, English language instruction, the possibility to study part-time while working 
and the high regard for British qualifications in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world. 
Amongst my research participants the pursuit of educational opportunities, especially at 
the tertiary level, therefore featured as an important motivation for onward migration 
towards the UK. Several informants only stayed in the UK for the duration of their higher 
education degree and later returned to their previous European country of residence. Three 
informants onward migrated ‘virtually’ and enrolled for online distance learning degrees 
with the British Open University; they only came to the UK for exams. 
In the next quote, Uchenna compares his experiences in Bonn and London, where at 
the time of the interview he had lived for 9 years each. In London Uchenna pursued 
undergraduate and post-graduate studies, while also working part-time in a skilled manual 
job in logistics. 
I contrasted the facilities, the amenities, the behaviour of the people, and the cleanliness 
and for these areas Germany comes out tops, in my opinion. But when it comes to 
opportunities to improve yourself, Britain was and it still is easier for me and some other 
Africans, who wanted to improve themselves. After working here for one year, I applied 
to study and I got so much encouragement. I was being begged to improve myself… any 
office I went to, like UCAS [Universities and Colleges Admissions Service] or the Citizens 
Advice Bureau. Also if you want to open a business or go to the bank the emphasis is on 
you per se, not on your skin colour. In Germany I would love to say… well it’s my country, 
I love the way it is. But at the same time the institutions and the way things work there, 
will make you feel excluded. 
(Uchenna, 44, m, German-Nigerian in London) 
For Uchenna the UK represented a place where he was able to further his education 
and earn a stable livelihood. At the same time Uchenna continued to have strong feelings of 
belonging towards Germany after residing in the UK for nearly a decade, and despite 
recalling many instances where he felt excluded in Germany. 
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Especially Nigerian women with nursing qualifications who had lived in other parts 
Europe preferred to relocate to the UK in order to further their professional qualifications 
and to find a job at their skill level. After living in Italy for 8 years, Joy was now training for 
additional certifications in nursing: 
In Italy there are few opportunities… due to racism foreigners are doing the menial jobs. 
My first expectation was to be reunited with my husband and to raise a family… the gap 
[of a long-distance relationship] was so much, you cannot raise a proper home like that. 
I was also hoping to get a proper job and settle in Italy and then go back to Nigeria one 
day. But in the aspect of my career it was cut off… because of the language barrier and 
the curriculum. I ended up nearly losing everything in my career. In Nigeria I was a nurse 
[…] When I tried to exchange my licence to see where I can fit in, they gave me a care job 
[…] I worked in Italy for many years. But I wanted something more. New knowledge and 
new technologies and go back to my profession.  
(Joy, 38, f, Nigerian-Italian in London) 
Of course, there are ethical questions surrounding the recruitment of healthcare 
workers from low-income countries, given that it can contribute to ‘brain drain’ (Raghuram 
2009). The British National Health Service (NHS) has adopted a formal ‘code of practice’ 
that forbids its employees to actively recruit healthcare workers from a specified list of low-
income countries that experience severe shortages of medical staff.77 Nigeria features on 
this list, and even though there might not be any active recruitment in the country, 
individuals wanting to migrate to the UK on their own initiative are not deterred by this 
NHS policy. Thus the number of doctors and nurses from Nigeria has been steadily 
increasing in the UK. There has been a high demand for medical staff abroad, and Nigerian 
doctors are attracted by better salaries and working conditions (Hagopian et al. 2005). In 
2007 the emigration rates for Nigerian doctors and nurses were estimated at 13.6 per cent 
and 11.7 per cent, respectively (Healy and Oikelome 2007).   
It is likely that the most recent hike of tuition fees in 2012, which enables English 
universities to charge home students up to £9,000 annually for undergraduate studies, will 
make this intra-European migration study trajectory less attractive. Free training for nurses 
in the UK has also been scrapped. Nigerians already have started enrolling for degrees at 
other study destinations where the programmes are taught in English, tuition fees are lower 
and living costs are more affordable. In 2013 there were 11,933 Nigerian students enrolled 
in Ghana, 3,578 in Ukraine, 2,669 in Malaysia, 2,243 in South Africa, 1,297 in the United Arab 
Emirates and 820 in Finland (Unesco 2016). Five interviewees I spoke to had graduated 
                                                        
 
77 This NHS code of practice, however, does not apply to the private healthcare sector in the UK. 
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from universities in Turkey, Malta, Northern Cyprus, Romania and Poland respectively, and 
then onward migrated to EU member states.  
In Nigeria, Joseph completed a Higher National Diploma (HND), but had not been 
allocated his desired choice for furthering his education with a Bachelor of Science, despite 
successfully passing the Nigerian centralised university admissions exam (UTME). That is 
why he started looking online for options to study abroad: 
The higher you reach, the better you get in life. To get a more solid position in society, 
in terms of income and respect, everybody just wants to be a graduate, Master’s or PhD, 
whatever… We believe that’s the only way we think we can make money in life. All my 
folks are educationalists, my two parents and my older brothers. If you study abroad 
and come back home, you are better off than those who studied back home in Nigeria. 
That makes people have this desire… that is very important. So I went online, searching 
for where the tuition fees are not so expensive and where the visa application is not as 
tedious. I figured Cyprus is a tourist island, good food, nice… Then I applied for a 
programme called Civil Engineering for four years. I already had my HND degree from 
Nigeria and my BSc in Civil Engineering from Cyprus […] But I still wanted to taste the 
European world, the clubbing, the partying, the girls… Then I thought, where can I go to 
for my next degree… America has too much gun violence […] Then I came here for a 
MSc… Actually I don’t like the UK, it’s too expensive…  
(Joseph, 30, m, on a student visa in London) 
From what Joseph explained about seeking out a destination with less stringent visa 
policies, it could be possible to assume that Nigerians who study at the periphery of Europe, 
are following a stepwise migration pattern. Meaning that they first move to an easier-to-
reach-location before trying to enter more desirable destination countries (Konadu-
Agyemang 1999). But at least for Joseph and the other students I spoke to, they did not have 
a concrete final destination in mind at the start of their journey. Indeed, during the interview 
Joseph told me that he sits down about every two years in order to 'dream' about what he 
would like to achieve. These repeated conscious reflections about how he envisaged his life 
is also the reason that he chose the nickname ‘Joseph the Dreamer’, a figure from the bible 
he identified with. While in Northern Cyprus Joseph received financial rewards from his 
Cypriot university for recruiting more Nigerian students.78 This is a common strategy for 
universities to increase their recruitment and can set in motion a chain migration. Joseph’s 
quote also shows the changeability involved in migration trajectories due to wider 
structural changes and individual circumstances. Even though the United States used to 
                                                        
 
78 Northern Cyprus now has established 10 universities that mainly attract international students 
and, in light of the embargoes, this sector represents an important source of revenue. In his novel The 
Falconer, Chigozie Obioma tells the story of the young Nigerian student Jay who studied in Northern 
Cyprus, for which the author draws on his own experiences of completing his undergraduate degree 
at Cyprus International University. 
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rank fairly high in many Nigerian migrants’ list of most desirable destinations, my 
informants often commented on the media coverage through which they learnt about gun 
violence and the lack of affordable healthcare in the USA. Informants made clear that these 
two issues had negatively affected their view of the USA. And although Joseph did not 
necessarily enjoy living in London at first, he completed his postgraduate degree, got 
married and now is working in a management role in the British construction sector. 
6.2.5 Transposing aspirations to the next generation   
Migrants do not only evaluate their migration project in terms of the immediate benefits 
they can reap for themselves. Onward migrants are typically older than first-time migrants 
and some of my informants by that stage had established their own family or reunited with 
family members who had stayed put in Nigeria. Therefore, a considerable number of my 
research participants were also considering how best to enhance the future of the next 
generation. My informants saw their own migration projects, including potential onward 
migrations, as a means to also improve the prospects of their children.  
At the earlier stages of their migration project, Nigerian parents strived to acquire a 
permanent residence or a European passport for the second generation and 1.5 generation. 
They argued that the enhanced mobility rights their children gained from holding a secure 
legal status in Europe would afford them the best opportunities in life. All EU passports 
enable visa-free travel to far more countries than a Nigerian passport does, and in addition 
they allow settlement in any of the EU member states: 
My experience was so rough, because I was a single mother. I struggled to get my paper 
and I applied several times and they denied me. And thank god, in 2010 they gave me 
papers. Since I got my own, I have been trying to get for my son. Now he is seven years 
old and without paper, but he was born here in Málaga […] He can’t move out of Spain, 
if I want to travel who am I going to leave my son with? […] The month my son gets his 
document I will go back to my country or another country. It is very important for my 
son to have documents. So he can be able to come back here when he is grown, instead 
of running up and down for a visa. I want to do what makes him happy when he is grown. 
 (Anita, 36, f, short-term residence paper, Málaga) 
In general, Nigerians thought that providing their children with an English language 
education was important – three parents had sent their children to British international 
schools while still living in Spain and Germany. Many other parents also enrolled the 
children they left behind in international schools in Nigeria, with the intention of bringing 
them to Europe once they were older. Parents believed that by cultivating the English 
language skills of their children, in the long-term, the next generation would be able to make 
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the most of opportunities and transnational ties in various countries. But when local 
alternatives in Europe were perceived to be inadequate, parents considered to relocate to 
another place or arranged for their children to move elsewhere. Research conducted with 
Indian engineers found that some gave up a comfortable lifestyle and high salaries in the 
Middle East in order to provide their children with a better education in Canada (Das Gupta 
2005). Due to their extended stay in Europe, the parents I interviewed were more familiar 
with advantages and disadvantages of particular countries. In their view, certain places 
provided better or more accessible opportunities in both higher education and the labour 
market for their children: 
And we have two kids. They are both in… they studying in the States […] they are living 
in the Internat [boarding school]. I mean the education is free here… and that means no 
school fees for them. But being in the States it saves them unnecessary harassment. The 
impression I have here [in Germany] – if you try too hard to make it… it’s not even 
appreciated. It’s like, you are too ambitious. And that puts them off… Kids don’t even 
want to try, you know. 
(Charles, 67, m, Nigerian-German in Cologne) 
Aside from the onward migration that parents engaged in or arranged for the benefit 
of their children, there were also a number of 1.5 and second-generation Nigerians who 
onward migrated by themselves. Previous studies have highlighted how some second-
generation migrants ‘actualise’ their parents’ unfulfilled desire to return to their homeland 
(Christou and King 2014). In these cases, the ancestral homeland has become an idealised 
place within the families’ discursive practices and the children often have fond memories of 
the places they visited throughout their childhood on family holidays. In migration 
scholarship the way that migrants envisage their migration project ending in their origin 
country is referred to as the ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979; Safran 1991), but it might also 
be possible to speak of a ‘myth of onward migration’. 79  Within families the unreached 
destinations of the parents’ generation can attain a mythical status, similar to that of the 
ancestral homeland Nigeria. At times family holidays to these other destinations reinforce 
the positive associations some second-generation migrants have with these places. The UK 
in particular held an unrivalled appeal within the Nigerian ‘diaspora space’, alongside other 
destinations such as the US and Canada: 
                                                        
 
79 Melissa Kelly gave a paper on this generational perspective in relation to onward migration and 
we discussed this topic at length at the workshop on ‘Global Onward Migration’, which was organised 
at COMPAS, Oxford by Ayumi Takenaka in September 2014. Also see Kelly (2017) 
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London was always highly regarded, I’m not sure why my father didn’t make it here. […] 
Recently my mother told me, his dream was always to do a PhD in London… I’m not sure 
if he ever told me that. A couple of years ago I would have never dreamt of doing a PhD, 
but now I’m doing exactly that. 
(Damilola, 36, f, German-Nigerian in London) 
The Nigerian 1.5 and second generation in Europe grew up with mobility 
experiences and connections to various places. Many became onward migrants at earlier 
stages of their life course, because they generally acquired a European passport at a young 
age via their parents. The 1.5 and second generation moved on to places where they felt 
they could belong, as well as achieve their life aspirations. Like many other first-generation 
migrants, their parents’ generation usually had fewer expectations to develop feelings of 
belonging in their destination countries. Discrimination and racism were something that 
the older generations frequently experienced in Europe and had grown to expect, but it was 
also something they hoped to shield their children from by either onward migrating with 
them or facilitating their children’s move to another country. 
6.3 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the drivers of Nigerian onward migration. To 
this end I analysed the interactions of aspirations and capabilities in structuring the onward 
mobilities of Nigerian migrants in Europe. The findings presented in this chapter suggest 
that the informants interviewed as part of this study migrated to Europe due to their 
aspirations to build a stable livelihood, further their education or escape poverty. Some 
attempted to realise their ambitions within Nigeria or the wider region, by relocating to 
another city or another country in West Africa, but ultimately they decided that emigration 
to Europe was the better option. Europe was perceived to be easier to reach than other 
destinations like the USA or Canada; nonetheless, visa and immigration policies still posed 
significant barriers to my informants’ emigration. This means that the Nigerians who came 
to Europe constitute a highly selected group of migrants, who usually had sufficient 
capabilities to leave Nigeria. Those who came to Europe to join family members usually 
benefited from more stable residence permits. However, Nigerians who came to Europe on 
student visas and tourist visas, entered irregularly or were trafficked often struggled for 
several years to regularise their legal status and find work that was commensurate with 
their skills. 
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This research extends our knowledge of how both temporal and spatial dimensions 
influence migration trajectories. This study highlights that the factors that drive migration 
can differ considerably along the migration project and the life cycle. At the beginning of 
their stays in Europe, most Nigerians were concerned with gaining a stable legal status in 
Europe; whilst later they were also focused on enhancing their capabilities by accumulating 
economic and cultural resources. Many onward migrated in the hope of finding a better-
paid job and improved working conditions. Furthermore, this study found that, for 
Nigerians who were residing in different EU countries, one common motivation for onward 
migration in the direction of the UK was the pursuit of higher education. The evidence from 
this study also suggests that, once Nigerians started their own families or were able to bring 
their families to Europe, the enhancement of the lives of their children also became a 
motivation for onward migration.  
Although this chapter has presented various drivers for international migration and 
onward migration amongst Nigerians, it is important to stress that the informants I spoke 
to often had complex and inter-related motivations for migrating. Furthermore, when my 
informants considered relocating, they often weighed up the opportunity of return 
migration, against the other options of staying put in the current country of residence and 
onward migrating elsewhere. The reason that many Nigerians considered onward 
migration rather than a return to Nigeria, is that those individuals believed that there had 
not been a meaningful improvement of conditions in their origin country since they left. 
These findings expand our understanding of the determinants of African migrations that 
typically focus on the motivations of individuals at earlier stages in their life cycle when they 
still reside in their country of origin. By analysing how migrant decision-making evolves 
throughout the migration project and life course, this chapter contributes new insights to 
research about the drivers of international migration and onward migration.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Patterns of Onward Migration and  
Multi-Sited Transnationalism 
 
Transnationalism is concerned with understanding migrants' and non-migrants’ 
connections and practices that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. Although there 
is considerable ambiguity about the defining features of transnationalism, most empirical 
studies in the field have focused on transnational mobility and ties that connect individuals, 
communities and institutions in a particular origin country, region or place with migrants 
in destinations abroad. In other words, previous multi-sited research has focused on 
transnational connections between the ‘homeland’ and a particular diasporic destination. 
However, this conceptualisation of transnationalism does not capture the experience of 
onward migrants who have lived in several countries and thus formed transnational ties 
laterally across multiple locations and also remain engaged with their origin country. The 
lives of onward migrants are characterised by complex, multi-directional and dynamic 
movements, alongside further 'enfolded mobilities' that are local and international, 
embodied and virtual, and real and imagined (Hannam et al. 2006, Williams et al. 2011).  
In order to visualise the onward migration patterns of my informants, I did a 
‘sequence analysis’ of their migration histories (Castagnone 2011). For the 45 informants I 
remained in touch with, it was also possible to add a further 6 international moves that took 
place after the interview date and August 2016. For the purpose of the sequence analysis all 
international migrations of at least one-year duration were visualised chronologically. I 
separately analysed moves of shorter duration and internal migrations, which also inform 
the interpretation of the findings. By comparing and contrasting the patterns that emerged 
in the sequence analysis with the themes I identified in the interview data, it was possible 
to further analyse the data concerning other variables, such as age, gender, migration 
cohort, legal status and transnational family ties. 
From the sequence analysis (Figure 7.1), three main mobility patterns can be 
observed amongst my informants: a) the preference for the UK as a destination for onward 
migration, b) the emergence of new destinations for those who engage in several onward 
migrations, c) and return and circular migrations to a previous country of residence and 
Nigeria. It is worth noting again though, that the fieldwork focused on only three destination 
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countries in Europe, therefore the migration patterns I describe here are not fully 
representative of the wider intra-European migration patterns of Nigerian migrants. In 
addition, the observations are right-censored, because I was not able to stay in touch with 
all of my informants and therefore some might have returned or onward migrated to 
another country since the interviews were conducted.  
Based on my findings I develop the concept of 'multi-sited transnationalism', in 
order to more adequately account for the transnational mobilities and translocal 
connections of onward migrants. Through the analysis of the trajectories and narratives of 
my interviewees, this chapter seeks to understand the various ways in which onward 
migration and multi-sited transnationalism can affect the individual migrants and (re)shape 
transnational families. The central research question of this chapter therefore is concerned 
with the patterns of onward migration and in turn understanding the impact on families' 
evolving transnational identities, ties and practices. I will present the empirical findings 
using a relational approach that highlights how onward migration is embedded in wider 
structures and the life-cycle. The findings contribute new insights into how the repertoires 
of family life are transformed in the context of international migration. 
7.1 Diverse trajectories and changing understandings of ‘belonging’  
Individual migrants employ significant agency when pursuing their migration projects 
within the constraints placed upon them. Onward migration is the result of a series of 
choices that migrants make, which produce complex and evolving migration trajectories. 
One of the main patterns in Figure 7.1 is the gravitation towards the UK that is evident in 
the onward migrations. Out of the individuals who onward migrated after having resided in 
a first member state, 38 per cent opted to relocate to the UK for their next step. Except for 
three, all informants who onward migrated to the UK had been resident in Europe for an 
extended period of time and therefore held EU passports, which facilitated this movement. 
A large number of onward migrants in the UK had been residing in Germany before and 
previous countries of residence included Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and Ireland. 
Interviewees mentioned various reasons for relocating. The UK was seen as a better 
place to look for employment especially for those who had been unemployed before; several 
individuals wanted to further their education; and those who started a family felt that it was 
better to raise their children in the UK. Thus, particular stages in the life-course were 
important in shaping onward migration. Furthermore, the wider structural context also 
influenced onward migration patterns. Migrants who previously lived in Italy, Spain or 
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Figure 7.1 Migration trajectories of interviewees (n=120) 
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Ireland mentioned that they had been very content and had even purchased houses there. 
Their onward mobilities mainly occurred because they felt that during the financial crisis it 
was impossible for them to gain a livelihood. My findings are therefore influenced by the 
global economic crisis, which also made Nigerians feel ‘pushed’ or ‘forced’ to leave their 
previous country of residence.  
Aside from the aforementioned influences at the micro and macro-level, migrant 
communities as a whole also contribute to the active construction of transnational space. 
Concepts such as the ‘transnational social field’ (Basch et al. 1994) help us understand the 
simultaneities of diasporic life, through the ways in which intimacies and everyday 
practices are often extended across space and time. Voigt-Graf (2004) illustrates the diverse 
nature of transnational networks by developing different spatial models for the three Indian 
migrant communities which are part of her research. Similarly, amongst the Nigerians I 
spoke to it was possible to discern variations in transnational networks associated with the 
different migration histories of the various ethno-regional groups. For instance, Nigerians 
originating from Edo State tended to have several social ties with Italy, whereas the Yoruba 
had more close family members in the UK. Through onward migration the shape of these 
established and overlapping transnational networks is becoming re-configured. 
In addition, it is possible to identify distinct hierarchies of places, determined 
respectively by their popularity and the size of the diasporic population. This echoes 
Massey’s concept of power geometry (Massey 1993), whereby the power of individuals is 
dependent on their place in relation to wider flows and networks. The ranking of places is 
particularly apparent in the way that individuals and families who did not move to the UK 
but to other destinations, still aimed to progressively relocate upward within a perceived 
hierarchy of places (Ahrens et al. 2016; Paul 2011; Voigt-Graf 2004). When considering 
where to move, my participants often weighed up the wider communities’ favoured 
destinations against their personal aspirations and circumstances. Within Europe, Nigerian 
migrants tended to think of the UK, and especially London, as the most desirable location. 
Overall, however, Nigerian diasporans rated the United States and Canada more highly.  
At times the decision to onward migrate was a compromise between several 
options. My informants at times also mentioned that they briefly contemplated a return to 
Nigeria, but usually quickly discarded that option. They felt that the situation in their origin 
country had not improved, and should they return they would have to face many of the same 
issues that had compelled them to emigrate. The findings suggest that where conditions for 
a return are unfavourable or problematic, relocating to a ‘diasporic node’ with a vibrant 
ethnic community that reproduces most elements of the ‘cultural hearth’ can appear like a 
good alternative or make a return unnecessary (Voigt-Graf 2004). In Europe, one of the 
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main Nigerian diasporic nodes certainly is London. When leaving Peckham Rye station in 
South London, material representations of Nigerian and Yoruba culture are highly visible. 
The area is affectionately called ‘Little Lagos’ due to the shops stocking yams, okra and 
Nigerian herbs, the restaurants selling suya meat and other typical dishes, bustling 
hairdressers and barber shops, market stalls displaying Nollywood films, and the 
colourfully dressed attendants rushing to the African churches and mosques. 
In Adébáyò’s case, he and his partner needed to find a location that fitted in with 
both their career needs and wider family and transnational ties: 
I left [Germany] because I was getting married. We knew each other in Nigeria, we went 
to the same primary school… we bumped into each other at a party in London… […] 
Actually at that point I was contemplating moving to Nigeria because my parents were 
also returning […] My wife she is a solicitor and it would have been a lot harder for her 
to move out and come to Germany, because she doesn’t speak the language and because 
of the qualifications. Whereas I have an IT background and I already spoke English… 
There also is a bigger Nigerian concentration in and around London and that’s why it 
was a great fit. Six months ago my work transferred me to Switzerland. Well I work there 
during the week and I fly home [to London] during weekends… Now I could go back to 
Germany, but I might also move elsewhere. My wife wants to move back to the US, she’s 
a dual British-American citizen… she’s a third-generation Nigerian, born in the UK and 
who moved to the US for a while. She’s tired of the UK and she wants to move back to 
the US. 
(Adébáyò, German-Nigerian in Basel and London, 31, m) 
This extract illustrates that onward migrants who moved to London also benefited 
from the city’s status as a ‘global city’, that is part of a network through which capital and 
highly-paid migrants are said to move without much interference of states (Sassen 2001). 
After Adébáyò left an IT job in Germany and secured a highly-paid position within a week 
of his arrival in London, this city propelled him into a global talent circuit, which later 
resulted in him becoming a posted worker in Switzerland. Multi-national companies with 
head offices in London are likely to recruit onward migrants with relevant professional 
skills, because they also possess a unique set of language skills that the local British 
workforce tends to lack. 80  Yet, apart from those with professional skills, most of my 
interviewees were employed in low-paid service jobs in London, given that this is where 
most new jobs were being created over the last years (Dyer et al. 2011; McGregor 2007).   
                                                        
 
80 In the lead-up to the ‘Brexit’ negotiations, however, British politicians repeatedly have called the 
rights of EU citizens and other migrants residing in the UK into question, creating uncertainty 
whether they will be allowed to reside and work in the country in future. In October 2016 the Home 
Secretary, Amber Rudd, made a proposal that British companies should be required to draw up lists 
of foreign workers they employ, in order for them to be publicly shamed for not giving more jobs to 
British workers.  
 
 
142 
 
At the same time there are important counter-flows to be observed in the direction 
of Southern Europe, which appear to contradict the logic of the hierarchy of places amongst 
Nigerian diaspora. In general, moves from Northern Europe to Spain or Italy were related 
to lacking legal status. Only two individuals had other motivations for relocating to Spain, 
one Nigerian engaged in large-scale trading activities and another who moved there 
temporarily for a career break with her family. In Spain five special regularisation 
programmes were carried out between 1985 and 2001, and then a ‘normalisation’ 
programme in 2005. Italy also provided repeated opportunities for migrants to regularise 
their legal status. Some informants were fortunate to move to Spain just before a 
regularisation was carried out and were regularised fairly quickly. But in 2008 all member 
states signed the European Council’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which also 
includes an agreement designed to prevent Southern European countries from carrying out 
more collective regularisations (Doc. 13440/08), since it was hoped that this will lower 
their ‘calling effect’ for irregular migrants. Since then Spain and Italy have implemented 
case-by-case regularisation programmes, which require irregular migrants to find an 
employer who is willing to hire them. These more recent settlement programmes require 
more time for migrants to regularise their status and mean that some onward migrants 
became immobile in Spain for longer than they intended. 
Overall, transnational migrant networks are constantly being transformed, with 
some locations becoming more important and others losing relevance. In my informants’ 
narratives I found continuous re-evaluations of their ‘cognitive maps’. Interviewees often 
used their transnational ties to gain information and compare the circumstances in their 
previous and current place of residence, while also contemplating new destinations and the 
option of returning to their country of origin (Bang Nielsen 2004). Furthermore, Voigt-Graf 
(2004) argues that where cultural links to the cultural hearth are lost, migrant communities 
might also come to regard a place where they have lived for an extended amount of time as 
the ‘new centre’. This was the case for some Indo-Fijian twice migrants, who, after migrating 
to Australia, regarded Fiji as their ‘new centre’ because they no longer maintained strong 
kinship ties to India. Similarly, Bhachu (1985) argues that Indians, who were brought to 
East Africa as indentured labour migrants and then later resettled in the UK, showed great 
variation in the strength of kinship ties and intensity of daily transnational activities that 
linked them to either Gujarat or East Africa.  
Seeing that my research was concerned with first generation and 1.5 generation 
Nigerians, most of them still regarded Nigeria as their homeland and cultural hearth. The 
emergence of a new centre is a process that usually spans various generations. Nonetheless, 
there was evidence within the narratives of some of my interviewees that their 
 
 
143 
 
understanding of ‘home’ had changed during their migration project. The next informant, 
Ayọ, was ‘left behind’ in Nigeria by her parents and followed them as an adolescent to 
complete her secondary schooling in the UK. This migration path is common amongst the 
1.5 generation Nigerians in the UK, seeing that the similarity between the Nigerian and 
British education system allows for these relatively smooth educational transitions: 
I go back home to… well I call London home now [laughs]. I go back home to London 
quite regularly, because my parents still live in London and my brother lives in 
Switzerland… We all go to Nigeria for Christmas, of course… My mother has probably 
lived in the UK for most of her life. She goes back to Nigeria for vacations and weddings 
and stuff like that. But I think she is more attached to the UK, than Nigeria. I guess where 
you grow up, now that she has made her life in the UK. When she goes back she doesn’t 
feel… so like… She is Nigerian, she loves Nigeria and she would do anything for Nigeria, 
but she has more friends and family in the UK now. She has a job, she is working. But 
they go back home to visit.  
(Ayọ, 27, f, British-Nigerian in Düsseldorf) 
Ayọ also had ambitions to work in Asia and mentioned that she had applied for PhD 
programmes in Australia, where she hoped to move with her husband and children. 
Nonetheless, Ayọ’s story is not the norm, her experience was more common amongst the 
1.5 generation who had entered Europe with more stable residence permits due to family 
reunification and gained European educational qualifications. 
7.2 New transnational ties, ‘emplaced’ mobilities and fluid identities  
Within migration studies, transnational ties are typically perceived to be those social 
connections that migrants and their ‘left behind’ family and kin maintain between the origin 
and destination country. Yet migrants also form new social ties during their migration 
project, which can diversify their transnational connections and trajectories. I have already 
outlined the socio-historical factors which hampered the opportunities of Nigerian youth to 
achieve social adulthood and contributed to the emergence of migration as an attractive 
option. Thus age played an important role for Nigerian pioneer migrants, but another factor 
is also the family status of aspirant migrants. In general, it is easier for Nigerians to embark 
on a migration project while they are single and have no dependents. First, immigration 
channels towards Europe have become more selective since the 1990s, meaning that 
individuals who arrive as students, migrant workers, asylum seekers or irregular migrants, 
find it both difficult and costly to bring spouses and children. Second, international 
migration from Africa in many cases is a collective decision in which family members 
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contribute to the cost of those emigrating and also need to come to an agreement regarding 
the care provisions for those staying put (Øien 2006).  
With regard to the geographical location of these new relationships, recent research 
conducted with African migrants has highlighted the importance of social connections that 
are formed during the journey (Kastner 2014; Schapendonk 2012; Suter 2012). Female 
migrants migrating towards Europe via the desert and sea can be exposed to violence and 
rape. Kastner (2014) observed that Nigerian single women who migrate overland to reach 
Spain form new pragmatic (intimate) relationships in the in-between spaces that connect 
the origin and destination countries.81 Kastner argues that the resulting pregnancies can 
protect the women from sexual and other harassment while on the road through Morocco 
and to some degree also from deportation on arrival in Spain. Nigerians who travelled to 
Europe ‘on foot’ therefore may have social ties in several places – in their country of origin 
Nigeria, on the road in Africa and at their country of residence in Europe. 
At the beginning of my interview with Sonia, she identified as a single mother though 
later Sonia also mentioned her son’s father, whom she left behind in Morocco 7 years 
previously. She remained in touch with her partner via mobile phone. Due to the economic 
crisis Sonia was struggling to provide for her children who stayed in Nigeria and her son 
who was born in Spain. The transnational connections of Sonia’s nuclear family thus 
spanned three countries. Not being able to send remittances to cover the basic needs of her 
family in Nigeria caused Sonia great distress, as she felt she was not meeting West African 
expectations of her role as a mother and international migrant (Coe 2014: 27). 
Things are not easy for me and my son. Even as I am sitting here now, to pay my house 
rent is very difficult for me. Imagine someone who don’t have work, how will he pay his 
rent or feed the children or buy the clothes? I used to work in a factory, but I lost my job 
and ayuda [social welfare] has finished. […] Now I can’t even send my mother money to 
chop [eat]. I didn’t even send money for Christmas. If you are in Europe and you cannot 
send money to your family and children it is very bad […] As we are sitting here we just 
came out from the Caritas [Catholic charity] for help or food. They say there is nothing, 
nothing.   
(Sonia, 43, f, Nigerian with Spanish permanent residence permit in Málaga)  
                                                        
 
81  Other anthropological studies describe popular discourses concerning pre-marital and extra-
marital sexual relationships in Nigeria (Cornwall 2001; Maier 2012). Since the colonial period and 
also influenced by religion, moralising comments have been made about ‘wayward women’, who are 
married women that run after men with money, as well as ‘useless husbands’, who are unable to 
‘provide’ for their family. Local press also features caricatured figures of urban life such as ‘acadas’ 
(female university students who seek wealthy lovers), ‘razor blades’ (women who bleed men for 
their money) and ‘jaguas’ (women who like men with expensive cars such as Jaguars) (Cornwall 
2001; Maier 2012). 
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Despite the considerable attention this ‘new migration’ to Europe received in the 
1990s, in general only a small proportion of Africans travelled to Europe over land and sea. 
Other research suggests that the majority of African migrants entered Europe on a valid visa 
and then overstayed (Black et al. 2006). The same is true for the informants in my sample, 
where only 12 individuals arrived in Europe via this route. Yet, there is evidence that this 
migration overland and sea has become more important for Nigerians recently. During the 
so-called refugee ‘crisis’ 10,135 and 18,145 Nigerians applied for asylum in Italy in 2014 
and 2015 respectively, but due to the large backlogs so far only a few dozen Nigerians have 
been granted positive decisions (Eurostat 2016, also see Figure 4.2). During 2016 the 
asylum applications from Nigerians have remained high in Italy and also started to rise in 
Germany. It is likely that a substantial number of Nigerians was residing in Northern Africa 
for several years as migrant workers and decided to flee the unrest in Libya and Tunisia 
following the Arab Spring. Others might have come from Nigeria to seek protection in 
Europe due to the violent attacks by Islamist group Boko Haram and the increasingly 
precarious socio-economic situation in their origin country. Furthermore, it may be an 
opportune time to attempt to cross the Mediterranean seeing that Muammar Gadhafi no 
longer controls the migration route between Libya and Italy, the way he used to as part of 
the bilateral and multilateral agreements the EU signed with neighbouring regions in order 
to ‘externalise’ its borders (Carrera 2007). Therefore, on the whole these recently arrived 
Nigerians are more likely to have transnational connections to the African countries they 
transited and resided in (Crawley et al. 2016). 
 Nigerians also started new intimate relationships after arriving in Europe. Many of 
these relationships were motivated by romantic feelings, but in other relationships more 
pragmatic considerations concerning legal status also played a role. Especially my 
informants in Germany often mentioned that marriage with a European national offered 
them the best prospects of being issued a residence permit. In order to meet ‘white women’ 
several of my informants went to salsa clubs and I joined them on a few occasions (also see 
Partridge 2008). There were also many Nigerian-owned bars and clubs in Germany that 
alluded in their names to these relationships (see Figure 7.1). Fleischer (2011) highlights 
that, according to German statistics, Nigerian men in Germany are less inclined to 
intermarriage than other sub-Saharan African men, such as Cameroonians.82 Nevertheless, 
during my fieldwork I found that a high proportion of the Nigerians who lived in Western 
and Northern Europe attained EU citizenship by marrying an EU national. Several 
                                                        
 
82  Although these figures are not necessarily accurate because bi-national couples often marry 
abroad in Denmark where there are fewer bureaucratic hurdles (Fleischer 2011). 
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individuals told me that they resented the apparent need to ‘go through’ another person to 
secure their legal status. In Spain, the formation of pragmatic conjugal relationships with an 
EU national had been less common in the past, seeing that there were sufficient alternative 
means for migrants to regularise their status. But during my fieldwork in Spain during 2012, 
Nigerians also mentioned that more individuals were looking for legally resident spouses 
to arrange ‘sham marriages’ – considering that the high unemployment rates during 
economic crisis made it very difficult to regularise through a work contract.  
 
 
Overall, in my sample 29 Nigerians were married to native-born EU citizens. The 
overwhelming majority of them were keen to emphasise that they married ‘for love’ and not 
‘for papers’. Research conducted about migrant integration in Europe has typically included 
research about the inter-marriages of third-country nationals with local native-born 
residents. Such relationships are analysed, because they are regarded as both a driver and 
an outcome of successful integration. However, I would also like to highlight other conjugal 
relationships - beyond those formed with native-born EU citizens. In Spain the bi-national 
relationships were especially diverse, given that the country is a destination for both 
tourists from Northern Europe and migrant workers from Eastern Europe. As a result many 
Nigerians experienced 'emplaced mobility' (Brickell 2011: 26) through their spouses, 
meaning that interviewees formed new translocal and transnational ties via their partners 
– without necessarily leaving their place of residence. Rather than seeing intermarriage 
solely as an indicator of integration in the destination country, I argue that these new 
relationships also can transform migrants’ transnational orientations. 
In the following quote Maxwell recounts how he met his Czech spouse after arriving 
in the Canary Islands. For Maxwell life began when he became married. This step marks 
several transitions: the shift from undocumented asylum seeker to a residence permit 
holder; the passing from youth to adult with his own home; the beginning of life in the Igbo 
value system realised through marriage; and his biblical reference of enduring hardship and 
then experiencing joy. Maxwell and his wife later moved to the Netherlands with their son. 
Illustrations 7.1  Nigerian-owned bars in Berlin and Dortmund 
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Our interview took place during one of Maxwell’s business trips to Spain, on which he was 
purchasing items he could ship to Nigeria via the import-export company he had established 
in the Netherlands.  
Some people they find good wife… like me, I have good wife and a son. Then we start 
living and the life change, because you can now pay for your house. Then you… as the 
bible says: ‘The sorrow may be endured for the night, but in the morning there is joy’. 
Once you are legal then there is joy. It takes many years to settle these things… My wife 
is also a foreigner, she is not an indigene83 here. My wife is from Czech Republic […] 
When the crisis started in 2008… it was difficult to manage things and I needed to 
change the country […] Spain is my home in Europe, but Amsterdam is also good as a 
foreigner because they don’t discriminate so much.  
(Maxwell, 32, m, Czech-Nigerian in Amsterdam) 
Maxwell’s enhanced mobility rights as an EU citizen are a resource that widens his 
business opportunities across transnational space (Moret 2016). By contrast, his Nigerian 
business contact in Spain was unable to leave the country while his residence papers were 
being renewed. Thus, while ‘waiting’ for the bureaucratic wheels to turn, he offered his local 
knowledge and contacts to international traders, who were time-poor. Maxwell had to 
return to Amsterdam quickly. In the Netherlands he perceived the cost of childcare to be 
high, which made it difficult for him and his wife to work full-time. Maxwell therefore asked 
me about the cost of childcare in the UK and elsewhere, and he was keen to ask me questions 
about my own experience of growing up bilingually. His son spoke Czech and English, plus 
Maxwell also had managed to teach him some Igbo. At the nursery in Amsterdam his son 
had learnt to speak Dutch, but Maxwell was concerned that his son might not become fully 
fluent in English.  
The next informant, Ayọ, also recounts her experiences of transnational ties and 
mobilities that span various countries. Ayọ has close family members in several European 
countries, her job for a German company requires her to travel extensively, and Ayọ 
frequently takes holidays abroad with her family. At the time of our interview Ayọ’s partner 
was in Namibia with their toddlers:  
I travel for work and for vacation. Germany is close to everywhere. I have been around 
Europe quite a lot. I don’t want to brag… but I have been to Italy… to Spain, Prague… 
Turkey, Bulgaria, the Netherlands… and for work as well, I am actually going to Poland 
on Wednesday for work. Then next week I am working in Sweden. My partner is on 
                                                        
 
83 In Nigeria indigene does not refer to a national identity, but is instead understood as ethno-regional 
belonging (Kraxberger 2005). Ethnicity plays an important role in diaspora; in most cities I visited 
during my fieldwork there were migrant associations for the various Nigerian ethnic groups, but it 
was less common for me to find a ‘Nigerian Union’ or ‘Nigerian Association’. 
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vacation in Namibia with our children… he’s taking his paternity leave for 3 months with 
them. I can’t wait for them to be back. I keep saying: ‘Send me pictures on Whatsapp. I 
need to see the children, send me a picture!’ 
(Ayọ, 27, f, British-Nigerian in Düsseldorf) 
The experiences of Maxwell and Ayọ illustrate how conjugal relationships and 
onward migration can introduce new transnational connections for migrants and their 
descendants. Their children are growing up in a place which is the origin country of neither 
of their parents. Therefore, these children may relate to and identify with, to varying 
degrees, the country they grew up in, as well as the ancestral homelands of their parents.  
Onward migrants, in general, are difficult to place along simple social identity 
binaries. Bhabha (1994) developed the concept of ‘third space’, in order to challenge 
existing categorical binary structures, such as us/them and colonial/postcolonial. Bhabha 
(1994) further defines ‘third space’ as characterised by ‘hybridity’ and multiple subject-
positions, a contingent space that always is in-between and continuously becoming. Yet, I 
agree with the criticism that the concepts of transnationalism and ‘third space’ have often 
described space as immaterial, liquid and metaphorical. There have been calls to ‘ground’ 
research on transnationalism (Mitchell 2007). The following examples of the experiences of 
onward migrants and their descendants show how transnational space and identifications 
are experienced, contested and re-conceived. 
 Damilola was born in Germany and then lived in Lagos with her parents for several 
years. When she returned to Germany, she was the only mixed-race person in her school 
and wider circle of friends:  
I wanted to live my reality as a bi-cultural and bi-national person and I always felt that 
that was easier outside of Germany and Nigeria. I studied in the Netherlands, but after I 
finished the country was too small and boring […] I am interested in multiculture and 
art […] I wanted a visual normality, more people that looked like me… it was not really 
for economic reasons, more cultural reasons […] London is a virtual space where I can 
re-invent myself... it’s not restricted to that binary… or the figure of the tragic hybrid 
person stuck between one and the other. 
(Damilola, 36, f, German-Nigerian in London) 
Much like other 1.5 and second-generation migrants, Damilola believed that onward 
migration allowed her to find a place where she could express herself the way she wanted. 
London is a space where she feels less bound by essentialised understandings of what it 
means to be ‘German’ or ‘Nigerian’, and in addition she can live her queer sexual orientation.  
Nonetheless, other informants also mentioned situations after onward migration, 
where contested social realities manifested themselves. Vanessa’s children were very 
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young when she suggested to her husband that the family should relocate from the Ruhr 
region in Germany to Manchester. Vanessa had noticed that her children were being pushed 
around on the playground. Furthermore, she was also disappointed that she was unable to 
form friendships with other parents. They decided it was best for the family to onward 
migrate, before their children became aware of the instances of everyday racism in 
Germany. At their new school in Manchester other pupils repeatedly questioned the way 
Vanessa’s children explained their cultural heritage and belonging. 
Like now, to be honest, my children don’t think they are Nigerians. They believe that 
they are Europeans… No, they believe they are German. Because wherever we are going 
now with that passport, they know they are German. So you can never take away 
something that someone is holding and say: ‘You are not from here’. You are wasting 
your time for that. Fine they know that: ‘Oh, my parents are Africans and they came from 
Nigeria’. But they know that: ‘Germany, I’m born there’. So you can never take that away 
from them. My children in school they ask them: ‘Where are you from?’ And they say: ‘I 
am German’. So they ask them: ‘German? How come you have brown skin?’ That is when 
they said: ‘Yeah, I have brown skin and I am German.’ And sometimes they say: ‘But 
Mama, why did my friend ask me why I have brown skin and said I’m not German?’ And 
I say: ‘Yes, you are German. But you’re African anyway. Your origin is African.’ I said: 
‘Where your mother and father came from, that’s where you are from. But you are 
German anyway.’ 
(Vanessa, 39, f, German-Nigerian in Manchester) 
For my informants, onward migration therefore oftentimes led to the formation of 
transnational ties and social identifications that were situated not just in-between, but 
beyond the binary of origin and destination countries. The increasing diversity of 
destinations chosen by migrants who undertook several onward migrations, can be partly 
related to the new transnational connections they formed and their enhanced mobility 
rights as European citizens. The next section illustrates how migration control impinges on 
the formation of multi-local transnational families and their opportunities for family 
unification. 
7.3 Continuous reconfigurations of transnational family lives 
Instead of only considering conjugal relationships and households, it is now more common 
to regard families as constituted of complex webs of relationships that can span across 
generations and locations (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). During the interviews with my 
informants I was struck by their accounts of the geographical re-constellations of their 
transnational families throughout space and time. Research into transnationalism is replete 
with examples that analyse the cross-border activities of migrants and their apparently 
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immobile ‘left-behind’ family members. Fewer studies consider the power structures that 
contribute to the evolving opportunities for mobility and immobility amongst transnational 
families (Carling 2008; Coe 2014; Paul 2011) and mutually contingent social and 
geographical mobility of family members (Mata-Codesal 2015). The configurations of my 
informants’ transnational families responded to the processes of bordering that were 
continuously evolving – creating both ‘closures’ and ‘openings’.  
Migration and labour market policies often mirror a context of institutionalised 
discrimination, which marginalises migrants on the basis of embodied characteristics, such 
as age, gender, ‘race’, nationality or ability. Increasingly restrictive US immigration 
legislation, for instance, has caused parents and children to be separated for longer and 
more indefinite periods of time (Coe 2014; Dreby 2010). Nigerian parents generally opted 
to leave their children behind seeing that as pioneer migrants they could not rely on 
relatives and kin to share the caregiving responsibilities within the destination country 
while they themselves had to manage long working hours. Riccio (2008) demonstrates that 
the opportunities for transnational families to reunite are to a great extent determined by 
immigration legislation, but that additional factors also contribute to variation across 
migrant groups. Given that member states are heavily restricting most other modes of 
migration, family migration currently makes up a considerable proportion of total 
immigration, particularly in those member states with large and established migrant 
communities.  
 The opportunities that migrants encounter to enter and settle in destination 
countries, in turn influence the subsequent migration patterns of trailing family members. 
In a comparative study of West Africans in Italy, Riccio (2008) shows how migrants’ long-
term plans impact on their transnational activities and their desire for migration with the 
purpose of family formation in destination countries. While Ghanaian men in Italy tended 
to bring their family to Europe when possible, Senegalese men preferred to visit their family 
on extended stays during the summer, because they ultimately envisaged returning to their 
country of origin (Riccio 2008). Based on my limited sample I argue that Nigerians preferred 
to have their family members join them when possible, because they generally did not 
envision the situation in their origin country to improve in the foreseeable future. In Spain 
it was relatively easy to meet the stipulations for family reunification, as these required an 
individual to have legal residence and be allowed to stay at least one more year, and to have 
adequate housing and enough income to provide for the family. The latter varies by 
province, but usually is around €300 a month per relative (González-Ferrer 2011: 197). In 
other member states, these requirements are far more demanding. In the UK, for instance, 
migrants who want to sponsor a dependant for family reunification need to have a 
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permanent residence permit and at least an income of £1,550 per month before they are 
eligible to apply.84 In recent years, member states have begun to further stratify rights to 
family migration contingent on income thresholds, years of residence, level of integration 
and other criteria (Carling 2008). 
In some destinations family reasons nonetheless constitute the most common 
grounds for Nigerian citizens to receive authorisation to stay. Between 2009 and 2015 in 
Germany, on average 73 per cent of first residence permits issued to Nigerians were due to 
family reasons; and in Spain family reasons accounted for an average 67 per cent over the 
same period (Figure 6.1).85 In Germany and Spain the initial male dominance in Nigerian 
migration patterns meant that many Nigerian women in these destinations received family 
visas via their male Nigerian partner. In total, 7 women arrived as 'trailing wives' and 5 
migrated independently and later entered a relationship with a Nigerian partner. But in 
other destination countries Nigerian women dominated the initial migration flows of 
professionals, labour migrants, asylum seekers and victims of trafficking. For instance, Italy 
and the Republic of Ireland are the only member states with a majority of legally resident 
Nigerian women. In Italy, Nigerian women initially worked harvesting tomatoes before 
trafficking networks brought large numbers of women there for prostitution, many of 
whom were later regularised (Carling 2006; Plambech 2016; van Dijk 2001). The rapid 
influx of Nigerian women to Ireland, was purportedly due to a landmark case86 involving a 
Nigerian migrant who overstayed his visa and appealed his deportation order based on the 
principle that his Irish-born children had a right to care and parentage. Reynolds (2006) 
posits that more recently Nigerian women’s household responsibilities are also 
contributing to the rise in professional women migrating to the US, the UK and Canada and 
this may explain why the flow of trailing spouses to these particular destinations is 
relatively gender-balanced.  
The reunion with children in Europe after several years of separation represented a 
time of transformation for the transnational family. All of the interviewed 13 young people 
                                                        
 
84 It should be noted that the Directive 2003/86/EC on Family Reunification does not apply to all 
member states, i.e. the UK, Ireland and Denmark opted out of this Directive.  
85 The other recorded reasons for first residence permits to be issued include: work; education; 
refugee status or subsidiary protection; humanitarian and other reasons (Eurostat 2016). 
86 The Fajujonu and Ors v. Minister for Justice appeal was dismissed, but the Supreme Court held ‘that 
where non-nationals had resided for an appreciable time and become a family unit within the State 
with children who were Irish citizens, then such Irish citizens had a constitutional right to the 
company, care and parentage of their parents within the family unit’. However, a 2004 referendum 
changed Irish citizenship legislation. This resulted in the principle of ius soli becoming more diluted 
and after 1 January 2005 children were no longer entitled to Irish citizenship based on birth. Also see 
Iroh (2006) and Kómoláfé (2008). 
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who had come to join their parents, the so-called 1.5 generation, arrived in Europe as 
teenagers to complete their secondary school education and apply for higher education; 
although three of the parents mentioned that they brought children at a younger age. 
Fosterage is common in West Africa, where young children stay with other relatives and 
patrons who will enhance their development; therefore similar arrangements are also made 
for ‘left-behind’ children of migrants (Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Kufakurinani et al. 2014). On 
the one hand, the delayed arrival of children in Europe in their late teens is the result of the 
complicated bureaucratic process associated with family reunification and legal 
requirements according to which children usually need to be under 18 years old to still be 
considered as dependent minors (Veale and Andres 2014). On the other hand, many 
migrant parents also believe that leaving their children in the country of origin throughout 
their early childhood allows access to more affordable childcare provision and keeps 
teenagers away from the temptations in Europe that can lead young minds astray (Coe 
2014).  
Research about international migration associated with family formation of couples 
or the reunification of parents with their left-behind children is fairly common in the 
academic literature (for a review see Carling et al. 2012). Far fewer studies focus on the 
experience of siblings who grew up in two different countries and are anxious for the family 
to reunite (Coe 2014; Veale and Andres 2014). When Nigerian parents decide to leave their 
eldest children behind in Nigeria, at times more children are born in Europe. When some 
siblings remain in Nigeria and other siblings live in Europe, they thus grow up in two 
different countries and keep in touch via social media, phone calls and occasional visits 
(Veale and Andres 2014). 
Adediji is a young Nigerian whom I interviewed in Düsseldorf and his transnational 
family underwent several geographical re-constellations after we remained in touch. 
Adediji’s experience illustrates particularly well how family reunification and onward 
migration oftentimes take place by different family members in a temporally-lagged 
fashion, because certain family members are unable or unwilling to relocate together 
(Ahrens et al. 2016). 
I was schooling in Lagos and I was living there with my grandparents. My parents came 
to Nigeria every December, most especially my father came for one month from the end 
of December until January and then moved back. My mum came once in three years or 
four years. After almost 15 years they brought us down to Germany in 2001. At the same 
time my father, he moved to London in 2005... He believes that the life in London is 
better than in Germany. After two, three years he came to take my mother and my 
younger sisters. They are all living there now. My sisters they were born here. I have 
three sisters and I am the oldest. My junior sister, we both came together from Nigeria, 
but next month she is planning to move to London. She went there to visit my parents 
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and she seems to like it. Now she applied to some universities… now she has to find a 
place to live […] I stayed here because I was still in university. When I went to London, I 
didn’t like it that much. The life in Germany is easy, not that crowded. I am used to it 
somehow. […] I can still do my Masters there. But I still miss them, that’s why I visit them 
when I can. 
(Adediji, 25, m, German-Nigerian in Düsseldorf) 
I later met up with Adediji on two more occasions when he was visiting his family in East 
London. In his suitcase Adediji had brought canned Goulasch soup that his youngest sisters 
had grown fond of in Germany. Meanwhile Adediji and I were savouring the hot Nigerian 
pepper soup his mother prepared for us. The family had satellite TV and his youngest sisters 
continued watching the German channels they grew up with. The next time we met up in 
London Adediji was setting up a British bank account with another German-Nigerian friend. 
Eight years after his father’s departure to London, Adediji decided to also join his family in 
London and is currently completing his undergraduate studies there. The experience of 
Adediji and his family shows that renewed distancing and separation can occur within 
migrant families when members decide to onward migrate. Onward migration is at times 
realised by the whole migrant family at once, but more commonly it leads to the (re-
)emergence of multi-local households.  
However, children and partners were not only ‘left behind’ in Nigeria. During the 
financial crisis many Nigerians who previously resided in Spain, Italy or Greece started 
seeking a (temporary) livelihood in Northern Europe, often leaving their children behind in 
the care of other relatives and friends (Ahrens 2013). In most cases, these onward migrants 
had national short-term or permanent residence permits, which only allowed them to 
relocate within the Schengen area for a maximum of three months as tourists. They 
therefore did not have the right to seek employment in another member state. Not all of 
these ‘semi-legal’ onward mobilities are depicted in Figure 7.1, because they often involved 
stays of under a year. The reason that children had to stay put was mainly due to 
administrative delays, which meant that many children lacked residence permits and 
therefore were not allowed to move to another member state. A recent article revealed that 
close to 500,000 children under the age of 15 were residing in Spain undocumented in 2013 
(González Ferrer 2014). Given the often temporary nature of these onward mobilities, the 
parents preferred not to disrupt the schooling of their children in Spain. 87  In addition, 
                                                        
 
87 In Spain undocumented children are allowed to attend school, as long as they are below 16 years 
of age. Other member states vary in their regulations concerning the education of undocumented 
children. 
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parents usually had more close contacts in Spain, whom they trusted to take on these 
caregiving responsibilities.  
Two further trajectories of Nigerian adolescents need to be highlighted. The first is 
that of parents choosing to send their children back to their country of origin and the other 
is that of children being sent to another destination. I will take up both these occurrences in 
turn. Within studies of transnational parenthood, the practice of sending children back to 
the country of origin, or the threat of doing so, has been interpreted as a ‘deliberate strategy 
of child rearing’ (Orellana et al. 2001: 572). Parents portray the return to the country of 
origin as the ultimate punishment for children or teenagers who do not ‘behave’ or conform 
to the parents’ authority and wishes (Coe 2014; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Seeing that 
many Nigerian parents experienced corporal punishment as part of their upbringing and it 
remains legal in Nigeria at home and in the school to this date, parents are often unsure how 
to deal with their unruly children in Europe, where physical punishment is not accepted by 
society and in some countries is prohibited by law. According to my informants, relatively 
few of these threats are acted upon; but the possibility of invoking ‘transnational 
disciplining’ (Orellana et al. 2001, 583) serves as an important strategy for parents to bring 
their offspring’s behaviour in line.  
 In the following quote Peter explains how the destination countries and the 
prevailing institutional understandings of ‘good parenting’ strategies can also influence the 
children’s transnational trajectories. After living in Germany for 16 years, Peter was able to 
bring his eldest son from Nigeria, who was then aged ten. After three or four years his son 
started staying out overnight and truanting from school. A German social worker became 
involved, but did not endorse Peter’s idea to send his son back to Nigeria. In the end the son 
was placed into care against the parents’ wishes and remained there for three years. 
Some teachers teaching them in the Heim [children’s home] they told me that I should 
talk to my boy he is very intelligent this is not the right place for him. I should get him 
out of here before it is too late […] I got advice from a lawyer that the only way I can take 
him out, I have to convince my son that: ‘Look we relocate to the UK would you like to 
come out of the Heim so that we can change the environment?’ He said: yes, he accepts. 
They released him to us and we brought him here […] In the UK here the school authority 
advised me that they knew I am from Nigeria and they have seen a lot of kids 
misbehaving in this form, but when their parents send them back to Africa they changed. 
They advised me the best thing for me is to take this kid out of here. And the social 
worker came to my house here about to talk the issue […] They called many times. They 
sent a delegate to be monitoring him from school when he goes out […] About three 
years ago I discovered the best thing we need to do is to take this boy back to Nigeria. I 
invited him one day if he would like to go on holiday to Nigeria and then he accepted. 
And I take him home and I fixed him in boarding school in Nigeria. When I came back 
here the social worker asked me: ‘Where is he?’. Then I gave the paper of the school, the 
paper I used to pay for the school fees to take care of him in Nigeria. I presented it to the 
social worker here, they went to convert the money everything to pounds and they came 
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back to me and look… this is a very… they were so surprised. They can see that I am 
really looking for the future for this boy. […] I tried to get a better school, better world 
for him. Because, his situation cannot be solved here. Because the way he used to be… 
when I was young like his age, I did the same thing. I believe I am the right person who 
should know how to change him, not the government. And they accepted with me. Now… 
the boy now gets an admission to university this year in Nigeria.  
(Peter, 47, m, German-Nigerian in South East England) 
During the interview Peter received a phone call from family friends who visit his son at the 
boarding school every weekend. Peter also regularly calls his son and goes to see him twice 
a year in Nigeria.   
But of course, not all children were sent back to Nigeria as a form of punishment.  
Parents also considered taking their children to Nigeria, because they thought it was safer, 
this was especially true in London. One of the plays, Pandora’s Box (Solanke 2012), which I 
saw during my fieldwork in London, centres on a Nigerian mother who returns to Lagos on 
a family holiday and agonises about whether to leave her son behind at a boarding school. 
She fears that her son might become involved with local gangs or fall victim of crime. This 
was also a concern expressed by other informants who said they noticed a growing number 
of adolescents with Nigerian names appearing in news reports in London.88 The play also 
picks up on another concern of parents living in diaspora, namely that children might lose 
their African culture in Europe (McGregor 2008). This is why some parents send their 
teenage children to their ancestral homeland to become re-acquainted with Nigerian 
culture and languages. A growing number of second-generation Nigerians return to Nigeria 
for a ‘year abroad’ or ‘gap year’ to participate in the National Youth Service Corps.  
Another less common strategy was for Nigerian parents to send their children to 
another country while they themselves stayed behind. Similar trajectories have also been 
described in the case of South Korean parents who chose to send their ‘parachute kids’ to 
the US, while remaining behind in the country of origin. Ong (1999) argues that these 
families hope to use the knowledge their children acquire to facilitate the parents' entrance 
to the country at a later stage or formation of networks that aid future business. Yet my 
informants did not mention such business considerations, their main objective was related 
to the education of their children. 
                                                        
 
88 The November 2013 cover of the British diaspora monthly newspaper Nigerian Watch featured 
pictures of 30 young Nigerians who had died or were convicted as a result of gang violence in London 
www.nigerianwatch.com 
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7.4  ‘Returning’ and visiting friends and relatives in Europe and Nigeria   
Due to their migration trajectory, onward migrants have transnational ties in several places 
and this also shapes their subsequent multi-directional ‘mobilities’ – some of which are 
directed towards their previous place(s) of residence, entirely new destinations or the 
origin country (Williams et al. 2011). The transnational connections include family 
members, as well as acquaintances that migrants make along the way. Migrants work hard 
to maintain their transnational relations, by keeping in touch via phone, email and sending 
remittances (Tan and Yeoh 2011; Vertovec 2004). But their stories cannot always be seen 
as celebrations of ‘dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and 
making a living through continuous regular contact across borders’ (Portes et al. 1999: 
217). Furthermore, transnational family ties and onward mobilities are shaped by gendered 
roles performed in the country of origin and destination countries. Some Nigerians onward 
migrated following the break-up from a partner, but others relocated and continued in a 
long-distance relationship where frequent shuttling between European countries enabled 
them to stay in touch. Out of the informants I spoke to, the formation of multi-local families 
within Europe was especially common amongst Nigerian men who previously resided in 
Germany and relocated to England. In order to further their education and careers many 
decided to onward migrate to the UK, seeking out opportunities that were unavailable to 
them in Germany due to ‘institutional racism and racist stereotyping’ against people of 
African descent (Ahrens et al. 2016; OHCHR 2017).  
Throughout the nine years Uchenna was working and studying in London, he chose 
to rent shared accommodation strategically close to one of the London airports, which 
allowed quick door-to-door travel for his monthly trips to visit his daughter in Germany. 
Every morning Uchenna sent his daughter text messages (sms) from his mobile phone in 
which he emphasised the importance of education. During the interview he made a point of 
reading some recent text messages out loud. It appeared as though he wanted to show how 
seriously he takes his parenting responsibilities in spite of his ex-partner and in-laws 
accusing him of ‘running away’ when he first mentioned his wish to relocate to London: 
Hello my golden baby, good morning. Hope you slept well and your tummy feels better. 
And do not forget to read. I love you, Papa. 
Good morning, the school week ends today, hope that you learn something new. I wish 
you a happy weekend and have fun. But remember to read your books and to help your 
mum. I love you, Papa 
Good morning my golden baby, I hope you had a nice sleep. Today begins a new school 
week. Listen well and take notes. I love you, Papa 
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Good morning, my golden one. One school week has already passed. I hope you have 
improved your knowledge. You take your schooling very seriously. I wish you a lovely 
and happy weekend. We will see each other on Tuesday. I love you, Papa.89 
 (Uchenna, 44, m, German-Nigerian in London) 
Nine of the German-Nigerian men who onward migrated to the UK then ‘returned’ to 
Germany after a couple of years. These individuals often felt that their quality of life was 
better in Germany, seeing that living expenses were lower and working hours more regular. 
But they also came back to Germany, because their children were now teenagers and they 
felt it was better to be closer to them.    
The separation from friends and relatives can give rise to feelings of loss, sadness, 
isolation and failure. As Svasek (2008) argues, the emotions involved in transnational 
migration have been under-researched until now. Not all migrants are able to stay in touch 
as frequently as they would like to. In addition, transnational mobility is not equally 
accessible to all migrants, because legal status, economic resources, household structure 
and gender relations can all constitute impediments to international mobility (Al-Ali and 
Koser 2002). Some migrants are unable to visit friends and relatives in their origin country 
and other destinations while they are undocumented, or need to save up for long-distance 
trips. Therefore, legal status and financial resources play a role in the degree to which 
migrants can maintain familial relationships in person. 
Existing friendships and family ties are nurtured, but migrants also form new 
connections along the way. Bryceson and Vuorela propose that transnational families can 
be regarded as ‘imagined communities’ (2002: 19) because they are highly relative and do 
not constitute fixed entities. ‘Imagining a family means giving it a definition which might 
conflict with the nation states’ definition of legitimate immigrant families’, meaning that at 
times migrants’ notion of their family can include a range of relatives such as distant cousins 
or indeed fictive relations such as ‘godparents’ (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 10). The 
emergence of such new social ties at times is also due to the geographical distance between 
Europe and Nigeria, because not all migrants are able to afford the travel costs for return 
trips to their origin country. 
The following participant, Vanessa, mentioned that her children were about to finish 
primary school and had actually never visited Nigeria. However, they still visited close 
                                                        
 
89 The last text message is translated from German. Original: Guten Morgen, meine Goldene. Eine 
Schulwoche ist schon vorbei. Ich hoffe Deine Kenntnisse ist besser geworden. Du nimmst Deine Schule 
sehr ernst. Ich wünsche Dir eine sehr schöne glückliche Wochenende. Wir sehen uns am Dienstag.  I love 
you, Papa. 
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German friends during the school holidays. One of their ‘adopted relatives’ is the children’s 
German godmother, and they also visit an older German couple whom her children refer to 
with the German words for grandmother and grandfather. 
Every holiday we still go [to Germany]. Their godmother is a German woman, you 
understand, and we still also go to see Oma. My two children is born there. They take 
that place as their home. Their passport is the same, we all still have German passport… 
they say let’s go and see Oma and Opa… they are not my real father and mother... but I 
took them as my own. On Mother’s Day I will send a card for Oma and on Father’s Day 
we will send one to Opa… 
(Vanessa, 39, f, German-Nigerian in Manchester) 
Some of my informants had not managed to permanently onward migrate, but 
visiting friends and family enabled them to assess other destinations. For some individuals, 
like Ehiosu, the onward migrations of members of her social network had also diversified 
her ‘reachable’ destinations. Ehiosu had visited several European countries for shorter and 
longer periods of time, usually she stayed with family members and other acquaintances. In 
the instances when Ehiosu was able to find work or a way of furthering her studies, she 
decided to extend her visits. Her best friend in Sweden was organising a Nigerian 
Independence Day party and before Ehiosu’s trip we went shopping in Madrid for a green 
dress she could wear on the occasion: 
I don't really like Spain, but I don't really have any alternative, so I just wait until I get 
what I want and then see if I can move to any country [...] I moved to England. It is good 
for the youth because there are opportunities. I was studying my foundation year for 
nursing in the UK and I was supposed to transfer to Texas, University of Texas. But there 
was issues with the visa and the school admission was cancelled... In Spain they don't 
encourage we the immigrants at all. [...] My cousin was born here and she studied here, 
but they did not give her the job she was supposed to get and now she is in Canada [...] 
When I was in Sweden they encourage you to study, because the fee for university is 
free, they will open the door for you and you are highly welcome [...] I was staying with 
a family with a woman and her children, but when she went back to Africa I had to move 
out. After that I stayed with my good friend and I was doing the Swedish language course 
but then I had a problem [...] Germany and France they are good countries... in Frankfurt 
I worked in a hostel with drunk and homeless people doing cleaning and administer the 
drugs. I did a language course and then I was hoping I can work in a hospital... My uncle 
is in Frankfurt working for an international bank, they transferred him from London to 
work in Germany. 
(Ehiosu, 24, f, Nigerian with Spanish residence papers in Madrid) 
After the interview Ehiosu asked me to read over her online application for an au-pair 
agency in the US that she was about to send off. Ehiosu was continuously looking for ways 
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to leave Spain and her visits to friends and relatives abroad served as a way of realising her 
ambitions.  
 
Around a dozen Nigerians I spoke to ran trading businesses and therefore 
frequently travelled to Nigeria; their business trips were often combined with family visits. 
This, however, was usually a privilege of Nigerian men who operated large import-export 
businesses through which they shipped cargo to Nigeria. I also met two women who were 
suitcase traders; their frequent traveller status afforded them extra baggage allowances on 
their flights between Europe and Nigeria. Arik Air, a Nigerian airline, advertised its 64kg 
baggage allowance in London neighbourhoods with high concentrations of Nigerian 
migrants (Illustration 7.2). Many others exported goods or a vehicle on an irregular basis, 
as and when they could afford to do so. This meant that the majority travelled to Nigeria 
less frequently, seeing that they needed to save up for the trip and the gifts they were 
expected to bring for their relatives.  
The interview with Faith took place in her bedroom surrounded by suitcases that 
were stacked high under the ceiling and contained some of the items she was intending to 
take along with her on her imminent trip to Nigeria. Faith was extremely happy she was 
traveling to Nigeria at the end of the year, now that she was pregnant with her first child:  
Illustration 7.2  Ad for daily flights to Lagos and extra baggage allowance with Arik Air 
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When your father see that you are close to 30 and you are not yet married, oh god... it is 
war on phone and if you come home it is war: ‘What are you still waiting for?’ Every time 
I go to Africa it is always stress: ‘You are here, alone, again, hah! You promised the next 
time you said you come here with kids. Now you are here, alone, hah. Don't come back 
here without baby...’ If you call them on phone that is the first thing they will tell you: ‘It 
is time to get married and we want to see your children’ [...] But it is not easy in Europe 
to have kids, because you are alone. You need to work to get money for feeding. Like 
Africa you can have kids and leave it for your grandad or your grandmom... or your sister 
and you go to work. And they would take care of the kids like the way when you are 
around. But here you are alone, you can't do baby the way they want you to do it. You 
have to work first to get money and to say that you have a little now [...] My dad 
grandchildren is close to 20 now, but he still want more. Half of my brother and sisters 
live outside Nigeria and half live there. Sometimes they all will bring their children and 
my dad will just sit in the middle. Then they will eat together, playing and beating him 
around. That is what is making him happy now, he is close to 80. We travel December 
time, because that is when the Binis are doing their Igue festival. Also they are happy 
that their eyes is going to see the next year. They say: ‘Let me kill foal and goat... call all 
my children and grandchildren and pray together.’ We the Africans the most important 
time to travel to us is that December. That is New Year and Christmas celebrations with 
your family... And you also see friends, long-time friends that you didn't see since before. 
(Faith, 34, f, Italian-Nigerian in Berlin) 
December was the most popular month for return visits to Nigeria, because the dry season 
made the trips to the villages easier and countless diasporans coincided in Lagos for various 
festivities. For Faith, returning to Nigeria therefore was not just a possibility to see her close 
family members who stayed behind. Return trips at the end of the calendar year, in 
particular, were an opportunity to see friends and family who lived dispersed across many 
different countries.  
Only two individuals I interviewed had reached retirement age and they were 
uncertain whether they would return to Nigeria permanently. For the moment they 
envisaged spending their time between several locations and thus circulating as long as 
their health permitted. Although all of Rachael’s children lived in the UK, she had remained 
in Germany: 
This is my own assessment. So they all studied in the UK and are working there, although 
born here […] When they were younger we all went to Nigeria and I took up an 
appointment there, but then I came back to further my studies. The children were at 
home [in Nigeria]. We left them to finish school, although now they are all in the UK […] 
And my company is registered here as well as in the UK. I thought my daughter would 
continue it, but she is not so interested. So I pay taxes here and there. It has its 
advantages; I can have some pension here and there. 
(Rachael, 64, f, German-Nigerian in Berlin) 
The familial practices for elderly care are much less flexible and Nigerian parents still expect 
their first or last son or daughter to take care of them (Okoye 2012). The first-born child is 
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raised receiving special attention, and in return is expected to take on the responsibility of 
caring for the parents in old age. But these perceptions about caregiving-roles in relation to 
the elderly in Nigeria have also been transformed through changing demands of the labour 
market, rural-urban migration and international migration.  
The humorous message in Box 7.1 illustrates how Nigerians associate and utilise 
particular destinations for the pursuit of endeavours at certain life-stages: 
 
 
Source: Text message sent to author’s mobile phone in April 2013. 
 
This message, partly written in Nigerian Pidgin, questions the tendency of, presumably 
affluent, Nigerians to satisfy their worldly needs primarily outside of Nigeria. While at the 
same time Nigerians are portrayed as succumbing to the powerful social expectation to be 
buried ‘at home’ in their ancestral villages where elaborate funeral ceremonies are 
performed. Thereby the unknown author of this message implicitly criticises that Nigeria is 
favoured as a burial ground, but not for other endeavours throughout their lives. 
7.5  Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to determine the patterns of Nigerian onward migration 
towards and within Europe. By conducting a sequence analysis of the migration histories of 
my informants, I showed that there are three main mobility patterns. First, it was possible 
to identify a preference for relocation in the direction of the UK. Onward mobilities towards 
other destinations also indicated that interviewees tended to move upwards within the 
Nigerian migrant communities’ hierarchy of ‘diasporic nodes’ (Voigt-Graf 2004). In 
instances where informants appeared to move against this logic, it was almost exclusively 
due to the need to secure legal status. The second major finding was that onward migration 
destinations became more diverse for those informants who relocated several times. This 
can be explained with new social ties that informants formed throughout their stay in 
 
When NIGERIANS loot money, they keep it in SWISS BANKS; When they're sick-They go 
to INDIA or GERMANY; When they want to invest AMERICA; When they want to buy 
Mansions LONDON/CANADA. They go to DUBAI for shopping and PARIS or BAHAMAS for 
holidays. When educating their children, they select EUROPE. When they want to repent 
- ISREAL OR SAUDI ARABIA. But when they DIE, they all want to be BURIED in NIGERIA. 
I beg, help me ask them; NIGERIA na CEMETERY?  
  Figure 7.2 Nigerian temporal and spatial imaginaries          
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Europe and the enhanced mobility rights as EU citizens that they attained over time. 
Furthermore, it was also evident that onward migration geographically re-configured 
migrants’ transnational families, because individual household members often relocated in 
a temporally-lagged fashion, thus giving rise to multi-local households. Finally, onward 
migration occurred alongside other ‘enfolded mobilities’ (Williams et al. 2011) for the 
purpose of visiting family and relatives in Nigeria and other destinations, as well as ‘return’ 
visits to the previous European country of residence. 
This research extends our knowledge of transnationalism, because it highlights the 
complex, multi-directional and diverse transnational ties that migrants form throughout 
their migration projects. I have also showed in this chapter how immigration legislation, 
practices of bordering and migrant’s legal status impinge on the transnational trajectories 
and transnational practices of migrants. Multi-sited transnationalism, however, does not 
only encourage us to re-examine our understanding of the emplacement of transnational 
practices. Transnational identities are also constantly evolving, and cannot be presented as 
permanent constructions. Bhabha (1994) suggests that identities are ‘hybrid’ due to the 
particular set of social affinities of every individual and negotiated in a ‘third space’. 
Following an onward migration, these understandings of identity undergo further re-
negotiation and re-definition, allowing yet more pluralities of realities and identifications 
to emerge. 
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Chapter 8  
 
Constructions and Perceptions of Wellbeing 
 
Onward migrants, like other migrants, are hoping to improve their own life-chances and 
wellbeing, and those of their families, by relocating. While the previous chapters have 
analysed the motivations and patterns of Nigerian intra-European onward migration, this 
chapter now turns to the outcomes that this particular type of migration trajectory can 
produce. Within the field of migration studies, the outcomes of international migration are 
generally analysed in terms of demographic, economic and sociological effects that either 
assess the integration of migrants in the destination country or their development impact in 
the origin country. These measures tend to follow state-centric definitions of ‘success’, and 
rarely take on board the views of migrants and what they hope to achieve through 
migration.  
There is an established literature on human wellbeing that sets out to more 
holistically capture how individuals themselves define what ‘living well’ means to them (see 
Gough and McGregor 2007). The wellbeing approach overlaps to some extent with Sen’s 
vision of human development, which proposed to move beyond ‘beings’ and ‘doings’,  but 
there also are important differences (Sen 2009). According to the ‘three-dimensional 
wellbeing approach’ the different dimensions of wellbeing should not be studied separately, 
instead it proposes to focus on the ‘interactions between beings, doings and feelings’ 
(Sumner and Mallet 2011). When adapting this wellbeing approach for migrants, I suggest 
that following aspects need to be considered. First, there is ‘material wellbeing’, that is 
shaped by conditions, such as health, accommodation and working conditions, which may 
affect migrants’ standard of living. Furthermore ‘relational wellbeing’ is determined by 
intimate relationships, as well as connections with family and other (in)formal support 
networks. For migrants this might also include considerations about how safe they feel to 
interact with others. Finally, ‘perceptual wellbeing’ is reflected in the individual’s 
assessment of these social conditions, i.e. their perceptions, values and experiences of 
wellbeing. This can, for instance, include individuals’ satisfaction with their migration 
project and ability to support family members (elsewhere), as well as their assessment of 
their situation in the destination country. Through the combination of both objective and 
subjective elements, it is possible to recognise the role of social construction in wellbeing, 
which is both a state and a process. 
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My emphasis on the way in which individuals understand and experience wellbeing 
as socially constructed has particular relevance and specificities in the case of the Nigerian 
research participants. It is important to note here that nearly all of my informants were 
Christians, except for three, and that they were socialised in Nigeria during the 1990s when 
Pentecostal churches were already very popular (Mohan 2000).90 Many of the Nigerian-led 
churches I attended throughout my fieldwork propagated ‘prosperity gospel’, which also 
has had a strong influence on Nigerian society more widely (Meyer 2004). Believers can 
draw upon divine prosperity in two ways: they are expected to ‘tithe’ a proportion of their 
income to their church (‘sowing in order to receive’) and to give ‘positive confessions’ in 
church about the challenges they have overcome (speaking things into being) (Anderson 
2013). Pentecostal churches appeal to young people who aspire to progress in life and 
individuals believe that they can achieve their goals through God-given miracles. Prosperity 
gospel emphasises practices that enhance the dual spiritual and economic wellbeing of the 
congregation (Knibbe 2009). Pentecostal churches create their own transnational networks 
by ‘planting’ new churches in various places with the aim of linking their members 
spiritually and materially. 
At the same time, ethno-religious aspects also need to be considered in order to 
more comprehensively understand the lived experiences of Nigerians. Several studies have 
illustrated that there are close affinities of Yoruba and Igbo cosmology and thought evident 
within religious and everyday practices in the Nigerian diaspora. By drawing on notions 
such as ‘finite time’ (mgbe) (Onah and Leman 2005), ‘destiny’ (chi) (Reynolds 2004), ‘peace’ 
(or ‘wellbeing’, àlàáfíà) (Botticello 2009) and ‘power’ (agbára) (Harris 2006), these studies 
illustrate the strong influence of ethnic cosmology on the aspirations and trajectories of 
individuals in the migration context. The experiences of Edo diasporans have remained only 
partially researched; thus far, studies have focused on sensationalist explanations of so-
called ‘vodoo’ rituals performed to keep sexworkers compliant (van Dijk 2001).  
In this chapter I aim to contribute to the literature on migrant wellbeing by applying 
this approach to the study of onward migration. My analysis explores the role that wellbeing 
plays in migration trajectories – with regard to the selection of destinations, the experiences 
of settlement and subsequent decisions to onward migrate. To do justice to the complexity 
and subjectivity inherent in determining wellbeing, I mainly focus on the narratives of my 
interviewees that centre around their relationships with others, their ability to accumulate 
                                                        
 
90 There is no universally accepted definition of ‘Pentecostalism’ and the term has been used to 
explain very diverse sets of practices and doctrines. In this chapter, ‘Pentecostalism’ refers to forms 
of Christianity that prioritise the embodied, personal experience of God and the Holy Spirit, through 
practices such as prophecy, healing and the speaking in tongues (Anderson 2013). 
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and utilise resources, and their capacity to exercise agency over their decisions. The next 
sections present the empirical data which trace the diverse ways in which wellbeing is 
constructed and fractured by focusing on three connected themes: agency, living conditions, 
and connections with society and families. I hereby illustrate the various wellbeing 
outcomes, also paying attention to the gendered and generational status positions that arise 
from emplacements in several locations. 
8.1 Social constructions of enhanced wellbeing  
The values and actions of individuals are shaped by the social structures in which they are 
embedded – ranging from the family to communities, through to their country of residence, 
as well as other places they maintain transnational ties with. These contexts also 
incorporate migrants into contingent power relationships and influence which material, 
social and cultural resources individuals can access (Massey 1994). By taking account of 
social structures I recognise that my informants are differently enabled and constrained 
across space and over time, but that at the same times these conditions are ever-evolving, 
fluid and relational. Amongst those who onward migrated, there were a considerable 
number of participants who said they experienced an improvement in their wellbeing for 
themselves and their families. Informants did not necessarily feel they had ‘made it’ – an 
often used expression denoting material success and social upward mobility – but they 
believed their prospects had improved following their relocation. In their previous country 
of residence, some had been working in jobs where they felt they were not able to make use 
of their full potential. Onward migration allowed many interviewees to find employment 
where they could fulfil their ‘competency’ (Ryan and Deci 2001). Especially for those who 
previously had been unemployed, joining the labour force improved their subjective 
wellbeing, even in cases where they initially were working in low-paid jobs. 
Oludolapo was granted asylum in the Netherlands and had been working there for 
several years. He later got married to a Dutch national and they started a family together. 
After becoming unemployed he was applying for jobs for 3 years but was never called for 
an interview. Once Oludolapo received his Dutch passport, he decided to relocate to London, 
while his wife preferred to stay in the Netherlands. 
I actually came here because I lost my job in the Netherlands. I was doing fabriek 
[factory] work making windows and doors […] Then I came here for the first time to 
check how things are and the second time I decided to stay. I started working here as 
security… and now I started to set up my company, something I was not able to do in the 
Netherlands. Here in the UK you can easily open your company.  
(Oludolapo, m, Dutch-Nigerian in London) 
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Oludolapo had just established a cleaning business and proudly showed me the 
flyers he had been distributing in North London. His job as a security guard was not too 
demanding and allowed him to further develop his business. Oludolapo employed two 
members of staff and had great hopes that his cleaning business would thrive.  Many 
Nigerians aspired to have their own business and be their own boss. 
There are considerable differences across Europe to what extent migrants can find 
employment at a level commensurate with their skills and knowledge. In many countries 
even the second-generation migrants, who have obtained local educational qualifications, 
are doing jobs for which they are over-qualified. Table 8.1 shows the results from a Labour 
Force Survey ad-hoc module for 2014 in which individuals who were employed were asked 
to provide their own subjective impression about whether they were over-qualified in their 
current job. In Spain subjective over-qualification is very high both amongst the native-born 
population and the foreign-born population. Meanwhile, in Germany and the UK the 
perceived over-qualification is highest amongst first-generation migrants with university-
level education. 
 
Table 8.1 Subjective over-qualification of employees (15-64y) by migration status and 
educational attainment level  
      
    Educational Attainment Level (ISCED 2011) 
    
Less than 
primary to 
lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary and 
post-secondary Tertiary  
All ISCED 
2011 
levels 
UK total over-qualification 11.7 20.7 25.1 20.7 
 Native-born 10.9 19.5 23.4 19.3 
 Second generation  13.1 21.8 25.3 21.9 
 First generation  17.8 28.9 31.5 28.5 
Germany total over-qualification 6.5 10.6 11.9 10.4 
 Native-born 6.0 9.7 9.8 9.4 
 Second generation : 11.8 : 10.5 
 First generation 7.5 17.5 25.7 16.6 
Spain total over-qualification 37.1 53.5 58.2 50.3 
 Native-born 37.6 50.9 57.2 49.7 
 Second generation 51.8 49.8 58.5 54.5 
 First generation  34.7 63.0 67.7 54.1 
EEA & Switz. total over-
qualification 12.4 19.5 22.1 19.4 
 Native-born 11.0 18.6 20.8 18.4 
 Second generation 19.3 21.5 23.8 19.7 
  First generation  17.9 26.5 31.3 23.9 
      
Source: European Statistical System, LFS ad-hoc module on Migration and Labour Market, 2014 
Note: Not available = :     
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Several other informants stressed that onward migration facilitated improved 
wellbeing, such as personal growth and ‘flourishing’. Vanessa provided an example of a 
friend’s daughter, for whom onward migration was a ‘breakthrough’ that allowed her to 
reach her ‘predestined purpose’ in life. The belief in destiny is particularly strong amongst 
the Igbo. 
I met a friend here, her girl is doing well now. The family came from Germany because 
[the school] told her she should go and do Ausbildung [apprenticeship] for hairdressing. 
Her mom said: ‘Over my dead body, I know my daughter is bright enough to be whatever 
she wants to be.’ Today she is a medical doctor in London. Just imagine… Germany was 
taking her where her destiny is not.  
(Vanessa, 39, f, German-Nigerian in Manchester) 
By contrast, other informants enhanced their wellbeing in surprising ways and 
unexpected places. For Ayọ a relocation to Germany did not spell an improvement in her 
material wellbeing and she was undecided what to do. She had applied for several jobs and 
her intended destination was the USA. On the way back to the airport, after attending a job 
interview in Duisburg, she decided to take a stroll in nearby Düsseldorf and had a positive 
feeling about the place. Ayọ was struck by how much more relaxed people were, and that 
life appeared slower-paced than in London.  
I was actually tired of the UK… maybe it’s the Nigerian in me that we have to go 
everywhere in the world. Actually I wanted to go to the US, Germany was not on my top 
list. But you know how hard it is, you need a work permit to apply for a job and you need 
a job to get a work permit. I am so glad I didn’t go to the US, with all that happened with 
the redundancies and the economy I could have been back in the UK. I had a job, but I 
was looking for a job somewhere. So I pasted my CV practically everywhere [online] and 
the company found me. The company wanted someone to take over a project in Nigeria. 
[…] I came around May for my interview and it was kind of sunny and just an amazing 
atmosphere… and you could see people sitting outside having a drink. Which is 
something I did not see in the UK, because everyone is too busy making ends meet. I fell 
in love with the atmosphere and it was very clean, compared to London… Yeah it was 
just love at first sight. Then I took the job. I didn’t know anybody here and I didn’t know 
the language… I thought I will do it anyway; it was an adventure. 
(Ayọ, 27, f, British-Nigerian in Düsseldorf) 
It seems that onward migration to Germany certainly enhanced Ayọ’s perceptual wellbeing. 
At the time of our interview Ayọ had been living in Düsseldorf for four years, and despite 
not having completely mastered the German language she was very content, she had made 
friends and become very active in a Nigerian church. 
Wellbeing also is influenced by ever-changing family and wider kinship ties. By 
engaging in onward migration some of my interviewees were able to be closer to some 
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family and friends, but they equally stressed that they had social ties in a variety of 
European countries. Thus being closer to some extended family members, often meant 
being further away from others. The classical meaning of ‘diaspora’ implies the scattering 
of a population, caused by some forced or traumatic historical event. Other studies on intra-
European onward mobilities have focused on migrant communities that mostly entered 
Europe as refugees (Kelly 2013; Lindley and Van Hear 2007; van Liempt 2011). Given that 
refugees experience a migration process towards Europe that often does not allow them to 
reach their preferred destination, this can result in their families living dispersed across 
several countries. In addition, the dispersal policies for asylum-seekers within destination 
countries may reinforce feelings of isolation, because refugees from the same origin country 
might be placed in different remote regions (Robinson et al. 2003). Yet, due to the 
increasingly selective EU immigration policies, my informants who entered Europe as 
migrant workers, international students or tourists were by no means free to choose their 
destination. The need to take advantage of particular short-stay visas or scholarships, can 
have a similar effect of scattering. For other individuals, an onward move could be 
understood as facilitating a reunification with friends and relatives.  
For many informants, their contact with fellow diasporans and experiencing a 
‘Nigerian’ way of life were important, so that onward migration had a positive impact on 
their relational wellbeing. All over the world Nigerian diaspora hubs of varying sizes have 
become implanted. Although orientation towards the homeland was long seen as a defining 
feature of diasporas, it has been conceded that even for members of the ‘classic’ Jewish 
diaspora, their Jewish identity is now experienced in the diaspora and a ‘return’ to Israel is 
rarely contemplated (Cohen 2008). Here we hear again from Maxwell, who had a big smile 
on his face when he was telling me about all the Nigerian ingredients he could buy now that 
he had moved from Spain to Amsterdam.  
They have our food more, they have everything [laughs]. It’s like in Africa! And in 
Amsterdam the food is cheaper and everything is fresh... In my house I prepare Nigerian 
food, and we all eat. My wife eat and my child also eat African food. My [Czech] wife can 
also cook, she can cook this egusi soup, and jollof rice, draw soup, okra soup and she can 
make fufu for me, she can do everything. I also eat white people food, sometimes she 
prepares her food and I will eat it. But my favourite is this my African food. 
(Maxwell, 32, m, Czech-Nigerian in Amsterdam) 
For Maxwell the particular ‘translocality’ of Amsterdam is produced through the availability 
of African foods, which is linked to other transnational practices and flows related to trade, 
transport and diasporas (Brickell and Datta 2011; Mitchell 1997). Given that all my 
fieldwork focused on places with relatively large concentrations of Nigerian migrants, my 
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sample is likely to over-represent those who actively sought these (re)connections with 
their fellow diasporans and ‘home’ culture. Yet, closer analysis of the 2011 Census data 
suggest that ‘diaspora re-grouping’ appears to play a role in some of the intra-European 
onward mobilities amongst other migrant communities (Van Hear 1998; van Liempt 2011). 
In many member states non-EU born migrants who attained an EU passport have relocated 
to places with established migrant communities from their own origin country.  
 
 
Particular destinations also offer opportunities to be part of wider kinship networks 
and established Black or religious communities. This was especially important for those 
who had previously lived in places where they were faced with discrimination and racism, 
which had caused them considerable psychological stress. Adébáyò, another informant, 
emphasised that onward migration was not only particular to Nigerians. Out of Adébáyò’s 
around 30 university friends of African origin only two stayed in Germany, all the others 
had onward migrated to look for work in the UK and US, as well as Belgium and France – all 
destinations with large Black and minority ethnic communities.91  
                                                        
 
91  Interestingly, there also have been many young French nationals of African origin moving to 
London. This indicates that onward migration cannot be solely explained as a gravitation to the 
former colonial metropolis or determined by a shared language. In the 2012 BBC radio programme 
The French East End, presenter Lucy Ash comments on the increase of new pupils arriving from 
France at London’s largest sixth-form college, the New VIc in Newham. The new French pupils are 
mainly non-white students whose families originate from France’s former colonies or Overseas 
Departments, such as La Reunion, Guadeloupe and Algeria. The pupils said that they crossed the 
channel because they experienced racial discrimination in the French school system and believed 
that learning English would improve their chances of finding a job. In order to bring their English 
language skills up to scratch for the A-level exams the school was providing extra language classes. 
In his book De la Cité à la City, Hamid Senni also recounts his personal experience of growing up on 
a run-down suburban estate (cité) in Valence, the racism he experienced when searching for 
employment, and his eventual decision to move to the financial sector of London.  
Illustrations 8.1  Reachout event by Nigerian church in Piccadilly Gardens and Wizkid 
concert in Manchester 
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After onward migrating to the UK, Efem explained that she felt more accepted by 
British society than she had been in the Netherlands and Germany. She also hoped that 
onward migration to the UK would provide better life chances for her children. Efem is 
married to a Dutch national, but she felt her children were being discriminated by other 
parents in the Netherlands when they did not receive invitations for birthday parties. She 
moved to a small town in Germany for a year, but she was frustrated when police officers 
stopped her every day for an entire month while she was driving her children to school. 
Efem felt the police were racially profiling her, because she was driving an expensive car. 
Shortly after this particular experience Efem and the children moved to Manchester. Even 
though Efem felt more accepted by the wider British society, she had not been able to find 
a job that she enjoyed and living apart from her husband was taking its toll. The way Efem 
framed her onward migration was that it mainly served the enhancement of her children’s 
wellbeing and their future prospects, which as a mother she saw as her responsibility. 
Nonetheless, it also is apparent that her perceptual wellbeing has significantly improved in 
Manchester: 
We feel more at home here [in Manchester]. First of all, the language… whenever they 
are speaking we understand them. I was in Holland for 22 years and I still have problems 
understanding that language in detail. So when you are speaking and they don’t want to 
interact with you, they bring out the most difficult one. And accepting us, we are like 
second-class citizens there. But here it is not like that, we are not second-class citizens. 
Whether they like it or not, you can discriminate me and I will call a lawyer and I don’t 
have to pay… I will tell them this person has discriminated me by saying: ‘Why are you 
here, go back to your country’ [...]  
(Efem, 43, f, Dutch-Nigerian in Manchester)  
Efem mentioned that she would not discourage her children from returning to the 
Netherlands – after all they hold Dutch passports. But she believed that it was important for 
her children to grow up in a place where she could better defend them from ill-treatment 
and racism, because she had fluent command of English and more trust that anti-
discrimination legislation would be implemented.  
Other participants did not experience overt racism, but said that other interactions 
and practices in destination countries made them feel excluded. Peter recalled that, after 22 
years of residing in Germany, he had grown accustomed to being treated as an ‘outsider’ 
despite holding German citizenship. One particular incident made him realise how little 
acceptance he experienced from German society and its institutions. He had booked an 
appointment at the unemployment office in Berlin to discuss his intention to move to the 
UK and request the continued payment of his German unemployment benefits while 
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searching for a job in the UK.92 The civil servant responded that she would gladly arrange 
for the payments of Peter’s unemployment benefits to assist his job search in the UK, but 
that he ‘should come back home to Germany, if things didn’t work out there’. It was not the 
fact that the woman pointed out to him that he could come back to Germany that surprised 
Peter.93 What moved Peter to tears was the woman’s choice of words. In all the years that 
he lived in Germany, and even after becoming a German citizen, not a single German person 
had ever acknowledged that Germany was Peter’s home. 
Despite the overall enhancement to their families’ wellbeing after onward 
migration, parents continued to evaluate their new surroundings. Many interviewees said 
that their children had been safer in their previous country of residence. Especially in 
London, my informants felt that their children were not able to go out by themselves to play, 
plus juggling full-time jobs with school runs was difficult in a big city. But the informants 
also qualified their statements by adding local comparisons. Regarding their perceptions of 
danger and stress, for instance, they contrasted different London neighbourhoods and rural 
versus urban settings. In the rural area in Northern Italy were Joy and her family had lived 
previously, she said it was normal for her children to walk home from school by themselves, 
and she was also able to leave her children in the care of her Italian neighbours. It was her 
cousin that had helped them find accommodation in East London, but Joy was planning to 
move her family to a smaller town in Essex once she had finished her nursing course.94 
In Italy the relationships there is more intimate. If you live here in Plaistow… your 
children go to the school around you and that is where everybody attends… it’s not like 
you can send your children to school in Barking, it’s not like that in Italy… so if you are 
living around a school the children will stay in that community. So it’s more intimate… 
The neighbours’ children will go to the same school, they all come back at the same time. 
And you interact with the Italian mothers and others… where I lived in Italy it was 
something like the countryside, there were not many foreigners around. 
 
                                                                                               (Joy, f, 38, Italian-Nigerian in London) 
                                                        
 
92  Peter was the only research informant who mentioned that he was successful in 
‘transnationalising’ his unemployment benefits. In general, to receive social security benefits 
individuals need to stay in the country that pays their benefits. However, under certain conditions 
EU citizens can move to another member state to look for work and continue to receive their 
unemployment benefits from the country where they became unemployed. 
93 He was aware of the regulations which state that EU citizens can resume receipt of any remaining 
entitlements to unemployment benefits, if the job search abroad is unsuccessful, provided they 
return to the country where they became unemployed within three months. 
94 Joy’s intended move away from the capital is part of a wider trend, whereby more Nigerian-born 
residents now live outside London. The 2001 Census showed that 88,378 respondents resident in 
the UK were born in Nigeria, of whom 78 per cent lived in London. By the time of the 2011 Census 
only 57 per cent out of 201,185 Nigerian-born respondents were living in London. 
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Usman had been in living in Germany for five years before coming to the UK in 2001. 
He recounted how, on moving to London, he was able to find a job and that he felt at ease in 
the city, but since becoming a father he had come to view London in a different light. 
The security in Germany is one hundred per cent better than here [in the UK], this place 
is non-sense. Because you are scared of going to the park here in London… Like in 
summer now, you want to walk freely with your kids and go to the park, it’s a little bit 
dangerous here […]. In Germany you can train up a child well there… but here [in 
London] it is not like that. Peckham is a very, very rough area… Let me give you an 
example: If you have a child from Peckham and a child from Chelsea, you will see the 
difference. The aggressiveness in Germany is not there, but here everyone is aggressive. 
Here you see a little child of 14 or 15 that has a knife at home. They have a long way to 
go here… If you check the crime ratio, it is ten times higher in the UK.  
(Usman, m, 45, British-Nigerian in London) 
Following these examples that illustrate how different contexts have shaped the 
migration outcomes of onward movers, it is also appropriate to consider how onward 
movers shaped the places they moved to. There is one particular example where onward 
migrants had a visible impact on their destination communities, even though Nigerian 
onward movers mostly did not understand themselves as a distinct migrant community, nor 
held dedicated meetings. Therefore, in most respects onward movers are best described as 
a hidden and dispersed population. However, during my fieldwork in Manchester I did come 
across a concentration of shops owned and frequented by onward migrants. The particular 
areas they moved to were Harpurhey and Moston, located in North Manchester. These 
adjacent neighbourhoods had been in decline for several years with many of the shops on 
Moston Lane left boarded up, because former businesses had been repeatedly burgled. 
Some of the Nigerian shopkeepers I spoke to moved there from London and were attracted 
by the lower accommodation and living costs. But most of the onward movers came there 
directly from continental Europe, arguing that London was too congested and crowded for 
them. Key informants I interviewed at the Citizens’ Advice Bureau and the local education 
authority, confirmed that they were aware of the arrival of this particular migrant group 
and had provided advice regarding housing and schooling to individuals who had visited 
the area prior to their relocation. Moston Lane is now being dubbed the ‘Little Lagos’ of 
Manchester, due to the number of restaurants, barber shops, dressmakers, bars and corner 
shops that have opened on this high street. Even though the businesses serve the Nigerian 
and Caribbean communities living in the wider surrounding areas, the local community also 
benefits from the revival of this part of Manchester. 
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8.2 Constrained agency and other barriers to wellbeing  
Depending on the positionalities, resources and relationships within which people are 
embedded, they have access to different opportunities for agency. Even though most 
onward migrants were able to improve their situation by relocating to another place or 
country, some informants experienced a worsening of their wellbeing over time. It is 
apparent that they faced various constraints that hindered them in realising their 
aspirations for migration or settlement. Although this chapter focuses on those informants 
who onward migrated, it is important to stress that not only mobility can enhance migrants’ 
wellbeing, it is equally important for migrants to settle in order to accumulate and validate 
resources. Several studies highlight the precariousness of migration careers; despite their 
best efforts, migrants may struggle to overcome the challenges posed by immigration 
restrictions and labour market conditions (Andall 2006; van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). In her 
work, Andall (2006) draws attention to the situation of Ghanaian migrants in Europe who 
settle into a state of ‘migration mobility’, meaning that they are continuously mobile and do 
not manage to gain a stable foothold in any country. A feeling of exhaustion and 
disillusionment can set in during this turbulent migration that resembles a game of ‘snakes 
and ladders’, where some advances can be instantly undone and migrants might even be 
thrown back to their starting point against their wishes due to deportation policies. But 
even when individuals face considerable constraints they still retain some agency to decide 
about meaningful action. 
Over the last two decades Ben had undertaken numerous migration attempts to 
several destinations, but immigration restrictions and ‘deportability’ (De Genova 2002) had 
frustrated his ambitions of settlement in Europe. I spoke to him in a remote neighbourhood 
south of the Madrid metropolitan area where Ben was selling the homeless newspaper La 
Farola in front of a supermarket and assisting shoppers to load their groceries into their 
cars in return for small coins. During his first stay in Europe he wanted to ‘make fast money’, 
but spent half his time in prison and in a detention centre before being deported back to 
Nigeria in 1995. Then he set out on three separate trips to Cape Verde, Libya and Mauritius 
with the aim of establishing a trading business, though visa restrictions prevented him from 
settling in any of these places and he decided to leave. In between his stays abroad Ben spent 
7 years in Nigeria trying to run a market stall, which was eventually demolished during the 
urban renewal programmes that displaced an estimated 2 million people (Mberu and 
Pongou 2010). In 2005, Ben went to Sweden and overstayed his visa. ‘After a while’, he said 
jokingly, ‘the spirit of travelling must have entered my system’. Even though Ben frames his 
continued migration attempts as an adventurous way of life, it is also clear that his 
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determination to migrate was linked to the fact that he had already invested a considerable 
amount of his financial resources in his migration project and then lost his livelihood in 
Nigeria. When he came to Spain in 2006, he arranged for his Nigerian wife to join him in 
2008. The couple were living in a shared apartment and had enough to eat due to the 
expired food they received from the supermarkets where they were begging. But due to the 
economic crisis Ben saw no hope to find a job with which he could regularise their legal 
status. On numerous occasions the police had threatened to deport him, but he had boldly 
informed them that he was still awaiting the outcome of an appeal with the Spanish 
immigration office and they ‘should not bother paying the flight’, he would leave on his own 
accord soon after ‘finishing a few things’. Nonetheless, Ben’s condition of deportability was 
still apparent in the way he selected a suitable place for our interview and the phone call he 
made to inform his wife about his whereabouts. 
Informants who eventually managed to regularise their residence status gained a 
sense of permanence and their narratives generally reflected improved wellbeing. This is 
because having residence papers enables migrants to find better-paid jobs, better housing, 
etc. It therefore is important to analyse how different functional needs are connected. The 
fulfilment of one functional need can have a multiplying effect, enhancing the wellbeing of 
migrants in other areas of their lives. The reverse is also true. When certain functional needs 
are not met, this has ramifications in other parts of individual’s lives that can negatively 
affect their overall wellbeing. 
Some onward migrants experienced periods of extreme precarity, because they 
could only exert limited choice over the timing and destination of their relocation and were 
underprepared in terms of resources. The economic crisis, in particular, drove various 
migrant communities in Southern European into considering a return or onward migration 
(Ahrens 2013; Mas Giralt 2016). Even though these countries initially had not necessarily 
been the preferred destinations for Nigerian migrants, many decided to postpone an 
onward migration or settle for a ‘second best’ option when they encountered favourable 
conditions (Schapendonk 2013). Given that the duration and severity of the economic crisis 
were unexpected, Nigerians at first tried to weather the financial crisis hoping that the 
situation would improve. Although some could claim a limited amount of unemployment 
insurance after losing their jobs, these provisions were generally not sufficient to set aside 
savings (Mas Giralt 2016). As the crisis persisted and onward migration became a last 
resort, individuals often had very limited economic resources to finance their journeys and 
 
 
175 
 
the adjustment phase in their new country of residence.95 In addition, the mobility rights of 
third-country nationals within the EU are tied to their legal status. Those Nigerians wishing 
to relocate to the UK had to wait to become naturalised European citizens, seeing that the 
UK is not one of the Schengen countries. In any case, the majority of Nigerians in Spain only 
have short-term residence papers or national permanent residence papers, which means 
that they can only travel for a maximum of 90 days to Schengen member countries and they 
do not have the legal right to work in another member state, which resulted in many 
Nigerians relocating semi-legally (Ahrens 2013). Only individuals who held the relatively 
new EU directive long-term residence permit were allowed to relocate indefinitely to other 
Schengen member states and seek employment. But their chances of finding employment 
were severely hampered by the fact that other Schengen member states could refuse to 
issue work permits to third-country nationals with EU directive long-term residence. In 
addition, by relocating to another Schengen country they were crossing another linguistic 
barrier, seeing that none of the Schengen states, except for Malta, have English as their 
official language.96  
 Onward migration in which migrants have limited agency to decide when and where 
to relocate, and which does not meet their functional needs to be able to speak the local 
language, can have substantial negative knock-on effects. The case of Osas illustrates the 
impacts that limited agency in the onward migration can have in terms of human wellbeing. 
Osas arrived in Italy in 2000 after losing her job as a caterer in a canteen in Benin City and 
realising that her attempts to sell food on the market generated insufficient income to 
support her two children. In Italy she first did various informal cleaning jobs until one of 
her employers helped her to apply for a residence permit. Then she qualified as a caregiver 
for the elderly in 2006 and sent sufficient remittances to enable her daughter to graduate 
from university. Meanwhile her son was resentful and stopped answering Osas’ phone calls 
when it became apparent that she would be unable to enrol him at university after losing 
her job during the recession: 
                                                        
 
95 In contrast to the experience of Peter, who we heard from in the previous section, informants in 
Málaga told me that they could not draw their Spanish unemployment insurance in absentia to allow 
them to search for work abroad. For EU citizens, like Peter, it is easier to transnationalise their social 
security rights. Third-country nationals, however, can only ‘export’ certain social security rights, plus 
the regulations and practices vary across member states. In Spain the Supreme Court handed down 
a judgement on an appeal (STS 7817/2012) on 18 October 2012, stating that third-country nationals 
in receipt of unemployment benefits can travel abroad for up to 15 days in every year, but this 
requires prior authorisation. For trips abroad lasting between 15 and 90 days the unemployment 
benefits are suspended for the time of their absence and resumed on re-entry to Spain.  
96 With the exception of the Republic of Ireland, but this country was also severely affected by the 
economic crisis and therefore at the time not considered a good option to find employment. 
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There was no job in Italy for a long time, for two years I was without job. It was really 
difficult, so I decided to travel out of Italy to look for a job for another place. I went to 
Rome to apply in Britain embassy for them to give me visa, but they said no. Then I 
decided to travel to Norway and I showed them my permesso di soggiorno [EU long-term 
residence permit], but they said no I can’t work in that country. After some months I 
came to Germany and now I’m here for one year plus. When I came to Germany I did not 
know anybody, I heard it in Italy that Cologne is like Lagos in my country… it is a very 
open place, so I came here on my own […] The problem is I do not have a home. The 
Ausländerbehörde [foreigners’ office] told me that I should look for two jobs for €400 
each and they will give me permission to work. That money will be enough for me to pay 
my house and take care of myself. Then I found one job at McDonald’s and one cleaning 
and took the paper to the office. So within a few months they sent me a letter saying that 
I should come. There they told me that they don’t need people from outside… like Italy, 
Spain or Greece to come to clean here, that they have enough foreigners cleaning for 
them. If I have a professional job like an engineer, doctor, or nurse… then I told them 
that I am an assistant… I take care of old people… in Italy I did a course. And then they 
told me that I should apply and find someone that will write contract for me. The 
minimum money that I should get is from €800. But at the interviews they always say 
that I need to learn Deutsch and go for language school. Now I found a free course, but 
without a house it is difficult to concentrate on the language.  
(Osas, 44, f, Nigerian with an Italian EU long-term residence permit in Cologne) 
Care workers are in high demand in Germany and actively being recruited from abroad. 
Even though Osas holds the EU directive long-term residence card with the right to work in 
any Schengen country and had relevant Italian care qualifications, she was initially unable 
to secure employment because of her insufficient German language skills. Osas passed 
through a phase of extreme precarity and sought help from three African-led churches 
before receiving assistance from an intercultural NGO. After 2.5 years in Germany, Osas 
called me overjoyed to say that she found a job in elderly care in another German region, 
only to then become increasingly anxious when her work permit had still not been issued 
four months later. Amongst the female participants I spoke to in Spain, several also held 
nursing qualifications, but were unable to practise their profession. The UK was the most 
favoured destination amongst those who could onward migrate, as they knew their Nigerian 
qualifications would be recognised. This option was only open to those who were 
naturalised EU citizens, as short-term and permanent residence papers did not allow free 
movement to the UK as a non-Schengen country. 
 When my informants encountered difficulties in continental Europe, many believed 
that their situations would significantly improve once they relocated to the UK. The 
Nigerians I interviewed repeatedly mentioned that the ‘language barrier’ in other European 
countries and the fact they were in ‘a foreign land’ were impeding their employment 
prospects and other opportunities in life. Similar to other post-colonial migrants, my 
informants often referred to England as the ‘motherland’. Hereby they signalled their 
perceived affinity with British culture due to Nigeria’s history as a former British colony. 
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Many Nigerians assumed that their fluency in English and tacit knowledge of British social 
norms and values, would make it easier for them to find better jobs in the UK. In addition, 
they believed the relative success of Nigerian diasporans in the UK and the achievements of 
other migrant groups, such as the Indian migrant community, were an indication of better 
opportunities for people of colour. Therefore, some participants expressed disappointment 
when on arrival to the UK these opportunities did not materialise or played out differently 
than expected. 
 
 
 
 Franklin had lived in the German Ruhr region for 16 years and worked as a train 
driver, when he was tempted to relocate to Manchester based on success stories of Nigerian 
friends who had bought houses and cars. With his German passport it was easy for him to 
move to Manchester where he anticipated to ‘enjoy the general atmosphere and meet more 
Nigerians’. However, after one year he returned back to Germany because he believed that 
his friends were leading an ‘artificial lifestyle’ since they were only able to acquire their 
material resources due to the easier access to bank credit in Britain. The long working hours 
prevented him from seeing his friends and when going out for drinks on the weekends he 
found himself paying for their rounds of drinks. His British-Nigerian friends had ‘no money 
left in their pocket’ due to their high mortgage and loan repayments and he also asserted, 
that ‘we Nigerians in Germany send more money home’ to Nigeria.  
During my fieldwork I encountered many Nigerians who returned to Germany from 
the UK because they did not like the lifestyle, which involved higher living costs and longer 
working hours in at times multiple jobs, especially in London (Dyer et al. 2011). It was not 
necessarily the ‘big city life’ they struggled with, given that many were born in Lagos or 
spent considerable time there. Instead they came to realise that, since leaving Nigeria, they 
had grown accustomed to a slower, quieter and safer lifestyle elsewhere in Europe.  
Illustrations 8.2 Nigerian churches in Madrid and London 
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Here we hear again from Uchenna who relocated from Bonn to study in London. His 
material wellbeing needs were met in London and he had been able to complete two degrees 
in London while working part-time; nonetheless, he felt worse off in perceptual terms. 
Through his studies he had also become more aware of class divisions in British society. 
These new insights made him reflect critically on his long working hours and the cramped 
accommodation he shared with other British workers: 
 Since I live in UK, I applied to so many things I could have not dreamt of doing in 
Germany. But let me put it this way, my body is in the UK and my soul is in Germany. I 
don’t know… I just don’t know. I cannot say I am comfortable here, I like it here, but I am 
not comfortable here. The lifestyle or the life I have here does not suit my concept of the 
life I would like to live. I want 8 hours, I rest, I bathe… I believe those facilities are here 
but I cannot avail myself of them or enjoy them. Sometimes I have to work 14 or 15 
hours a day and then also go to school. 
(Uchenna, 44, m, German-Nigerian in London) 
At the time of the interview in 2012, Uchenna expressed a wish to return to Germany. 
Because we remained in touch, Uchenna informed me that he indeed moved back to his 
former place of residence in mid-2016. This also enabled Uchenna to be closer to his 
daughter, who had remained in Germany with his ex-wife.  
Even though onward movers were able to accomplish their educational goals in the 
UK, they did not always think it represented the preferred choice for other aspects of their 
life. The fact that onward migration often gave rise to the formation of multi-local 
households also shows that relocation had to be negotiated amongst family members, 
taking into account their respective wellbeing needs according to their life stage and 
illustrating the relevance of the ‘New Economics of Labour Migration’ theory in household 
migration decision-making. 
8.3 Multi-dimensional interconnections of wellbeing 
When considering the way wellbeing is experienced in relation to onward migration, it is 
important to stress that migrants transform their conception of wellbeing throughout the 
migration project. Wellbeing is both a state and a process, and it is multi-dimensional. This 
can result in tensions between universalising perspectives and specific social, temporal, 
generational and gendered contexts. We therefore need to understand what onward 
migrants regard as wellbeing and how wellbeing needs can be met. Furthermore, it is also 
worthwhile considering in relation to when and whom onward migrants evaluate their 
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wellbeing. Onward migrants in particular may utilise multiple and evolving frames of 
reference in order to consider the outcomes of their migration project. Therefore, the way 
in which onward migrants evaluate their situation is arguably more complex and potentially 
undergoes several shifts throughout space and time.  
In addition, the meanings and understandings of wellbeing are culturally embedded 
(Wright 2012: 10). The initial act of migration can transform migrants’ perceptions of what 
it means to live well, seeing that the new surroundings of their destination country may 
raise migrants’ aspirations. But there also is a risk that further relocations upward in their 
personal or migrant communities’ hierarchy of places can trap migrants in a ‘hedonic 
treadmill’, because they might continuously identify new aspirations and may struggle to 
fulfil these (Czaika and Vothknecht 2014). To resolve this tension between instances where 
the lived experience falls short of aspirations, onward migrants can either work harder to 
meet their wellbeing needs or readjust their expectations downward. The evolving 
assessment of wellbeing needs sometimes is also accompanied by further onward, return 
or circular mobility.  
Previous research about migrant wellbeing has mainly analysed how migrants 
perceive their wellbeing in relation to their pre-migration circumstances, as well as how the 
situation for the migrant’s left-behind family members changes over time (Wright 2012). 
Yet onward migrants tend to compare their current wellbeing experience to numerous 
places that represent both previous and anticipated states of wellbeing – in the origin 
country, in the previous country of residence and other potential destinations. Generally, 
onward migrants not only evaluate their own progress, but also compare themselves to a 
variety of other reference groups – their family and peers they left behind in Nigeria, the 
local fellow diasporans, other local migrant groups, the local native-born population, or 
communities resident in other diasporic hubs. 
In the following quote Bright expresses frustration at the fact that his non-migrant 
siblings and peers had outpaced him in enhancing their wellbeing back in Nigeria in the time 
he spent abroad. He completed his Bachelor in Electrical Engineering in Nigeria and five 
years later started his journey to Europe against the wishes of his middle-class family. After 
travelling through various African countries for three years, he then arrived in Spain and 
successfully claimed asylum in Melilla. Initially he operated machines in a bottling plant 
near Barcelona, and after several other factory jobs he then became a truck driver. While on 
the road through Europe he got to know various countries and made a point of stopping in 
Nigerian eateries, which helped him expand his social network that provided access to 
relevant information. He eventually acquired the EU directive long-term residence permit 
when the economic crisis was starting to take hold of Spain. Shortly after he chose to move 
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to Germany rather than the Netherlands, because he assumed there would be more 
employment opportunities in a larger country:  
There are some parents who encourage their children to go out. But I don’t come from 
such a family, mine is school, school, school. But you know that in every family there is 
always someone who says: ‘I can’t continue’. I just tried to deviate and I wanted to come 
out of Nigeria, but now I am stuck. I have the paper to go back, but I don’t have the money 
to go back. [...] I have brothers and sisters… since I have been in Europe, let’s say ten 
year plus because I came [to Spain] in 2001… I can say for the past ten years I have been 
in Europe a lot of things has changed. I would not advise any of my family members to 
come to Europe, because Europe is a system whereby when you get in, going back is 
difficult, because of time wasted […] So it takes you like four to five years to get your 
documents, this means that this time of your life has been wasted doing nothing only 
sleeping and eating, sleeping, eating. That means that the people in Nigeria they are 
doing something better. But here you are in a place doing nothing. So now you want to 
go back home and compete with people who have been schooling? No.  
 (Bright, 38, m, Nigerian with Spanish EU directive long-term residence permit in 
Düsseldorf) 
Comparing his situation to that of other Nigerian diasporans, whom Bright met in Spain and 
Germany, he considered himself lucky, because he was granted his Spanish residence 
papers relatively quickly. Bright was also able to improve his employment situation by 
gradually enhancing his skills and he found more well-paid employment. Ultimately his 
qualifications and experience as a truck driver were a decisive factor for the local German 
authority to issue Bright with a work permit. Nonetheless, he feels that during the years he 
‘wasted’ in Europe regularising his residence status and doing menial jobs, his siblings and 
peers back in Nigeria had continued to study, started families, bought properties and 
established businesses. Bright’s experience also challenges assumptions in the academic 
literature about the interactions between geographic and socio-economic mobility, as well 
as the passivity and dependence implied by the term ‘left behind’ (Mata-Codesal 2015). 
Those who remain in Nigeria also take care of migrants abroad by sending ‘reverse 
remittances’ and at times experience more intense social mobility (Mazzucato 2009). To 
avoid feeling embarrassed vis-à-vis others in Nigeria, Bright said he had discarded his plans 
for permanent return and even avoided temporary return visits. Nieswand (2011) argues 
that Ghanaian international migrants experienced enhanced social status during return 
visits to their origin country despite doing low-paid jobs in Germany, what he terms a ‘status 
paradox’. This was certainly the case for some of my informants, but not necessarily 
applicable in Bright’s case, given that his family valued educational qualifications. It is 
possible that Bright will reconsider his decision at a later stage and feel more at ease with 
facing his family and friends in Nigeria. But for the moment an important part of retaining 
a sense of wellbeing is to limit his interaction with his social network in Nigeria. 
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However, it was not always the migrants’ own migration experience that influences 
trajectories and wellbeing. The next quote shows that the emotional cost involved in 
migration is borne both by the migrants abroad and by the ‘left-behind’ relatives and 
children (Coe 2014). The interview excerpt also illustrates that the way in which the 
separation is experienced and remembered is very subjective – influenced by factors such 
as the child's age at separation, frequency of contact with parents abroad, satisfaction with 
the caregiver and length of separation (Haagsman and Mazzucato 2014). Kelvin's dad left 
Nigeria before his birth and his mother departed to Germany when he was six months old. 
She did not have the means to visit Nigeria and was only able to apply for family 
reunification with her two sons after their father’s death in Germany. Kelvin therefore did 
not have the opportunity to get to know his father and he also felt that the six years he lived 
in Germany before onward migrating to study in England were too short to make up for the 
time they spent living apart from his mother.  
I always got bullied in school and… So, I wish I had… I had mum or a dad to call… tell my 
dad somebody bullied me at school today. Even so… my granny, she was a trader and 
she was always busy with work, trading and stuff like that… before she gets home I was 
already sleeping, you know… It is really, really hard. As well… I think the issues were 
kind of related that parents moving out from Nigeria to Europe it kind of helped us… 
helped us financially, but emotionally is the worst thing… the worst experience you 
could have for a child. And that is not something I wish for my child… no way man. So 
emotionally it was really… And that is what today crossed my mind. I know my mum is 
really, really sorry for leaving us behind […] We did not have a house telephone… 
because it was the really… the really rich people that had first got in their houses 
telephone. So, my mum she had to record a cassette in a recorder and she had to send 
us the cassette through… she post the cassette and sent it to us [with friends who 
travelled to Nigeria] and we had to record one and sent it back. So it was… it was a weird 
experience. But after time and time we had a telephone in our house. Now it was a 
different story because we talk all the time. I never spoke to my dad on telephone 
because he died before we had a telephone in our house. I cannot remember my dad’s 
voice.  
(Kelvin, 24, m, German-Nigerian in London) 
Like migrant children in other studies (Dreby 2010), Kelvin mentioned more resentment 
towards his mother than his father. At the time of the interview Kelvin was living in the 
family home of a distant cousin of his dad and said he was avoiding visiting his family and 
friends in Germany, because he feared seeing them again would make it emotionally 
impossible to continue his studies in London. This reminds us that it is necessary to embed 
migration trajectories into the wider life course of migrants, because early childhood 
experiences can have an important influence on future migration decisions and 
transnational outlook later in life. 
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Migration can challenge or reinforce prevailing gender norms within the family and 
society. Out of all the women I interviewed, there were seven who joined their Nigerian 
partners in Europe, but I did not encounter any men who came to Europe as ‘trailing 
husbands’. Some couples had tried to maintain a long-distance relationship, but ultimately 
decided it was better to live together in Europe. Given that women have displayed a long 
history of economic independence in Nigeria (Cornwall 2002), coming to Europe via this 
mode of migration often initially resulted in unfamiliar financial dependence on their 
partner. This is partly the consequence of national variations in the implementation of the 
EU family reunification directive (Article 2, Council Directive 2003/86/EC), which also 
regulates access to the labour market for family migrants (Strasser et al. 2012). In other 
cases, this was due to the women needing more time to learn the local language and getting 
their qualifications validated before being able to search for work.  
Even though one of the defining features of normative masculinity in Nigeria are the 
decision-making powers accorded to the male household head, within customary Nigerian 
marriages, women and men pursue largely separate and individual livelihood strategies 
(Cornwall 2002). The ideas of the nuclear family and the male breadwinner were only later 
introduced through colonialism and reinforced when many Nigerians converted to 
Christianity. Today Nigerian families often blend different modes of family structures and 
livelihood strategies, which serves them well when needing to respond to different 
economic pressures and geographic contexts.  
The women I interviewed who experienced a sudden economic dependence on 
arrival in Europe perceived this as very disempowering. Nnenna came to Spain because she 
wanted to become pregnant and for several years it had been impossible for her conceive a 
child during the short return visits of her husband: 
When I left Nigeria actually I was working… I was thinking the main reason I left home, 
when my husband came back home I can’t conceive. At the time he used to come back 
home, it was just for the period of a month, because of his working conditions then 
obviously he would go back. That made my mother in-law and everybody say that ‘Ah 
ah… You have to leave your work and go and join your husband in Spain.’ What I was 
afraid about was learning the language. I am not that good at learning languages. I was 
thinking, how will I cope… staying back in the house without working. Since I was born 
I have not stayed idle like this.  
(Nnenna, 40, f, Spanish permanent residence permit, Madrid) 
Nnenna enrolled on a Spanish language course, but it was too expensive. It was not possible 
to continue paying for it from her husband’s salary, seeing that they also had a mortgage in 
Spain and other financial obligations for family members in Nigeria. Even though Nnenna 
was occasionally able to find work during her 12 years living in Madrid, she experienced 
 
 
183 
 
several miscarriages and decided together with her husband that it would be better for her 
not to work. Overall Nnenna still was satisfied with their choices seeing that she and her 
husband managed to have a daughter. In Igbo culture a high value is placed on having 
children, which exceeds the importance of material wellbeing.97 Once her husband received 
his Spanish passport in late 2014 he onward migrated to London a few months later. 
Together with her daughter, Nnenna eventually joined her husband in the UK in 2016 and 
had started applying for jobs the last time we spoke.  
Another one of my informants, Joy, followed her husband to Italy, because she 
believed it was better for them to live together. But rather than staying in Italy permanently, 
Joy engaged in several circular moves back to Nigeria with her small children, in order to 
continue working. It was only when she managed to secure a job in Italy that Joy decided to 
settle in Europe. Both Joy and Nnenna developed their migration projects in different ways 
in order to meet the wellbeing needs of their nuclear and wider families. Even though 
‘trailing wives’ are often depicted as passive, these experiences show how women actively 
negotiate their migration pathways and respond to challenges in the destination countries. 
For others the pathways of how to enhance their wellbeing were less clear and 
involved a great deal of chance encounters. Informants had to often displace their short-
term wellbeing needs, uncertain whether their struggles will be compensated by future 
wellbeing. Kizito, for instance, studied Fine Arts at postgraduate level in Nigeria and worked 
as a painter and art critic for some years. In the next quote, Kizito elaborates on how he was 
confronted with life as an irregular migrant in Hamburg for nine years, which meant having 
to do degrading jobs:  
In Germany I didn’t have a lot of opportunities that I would have loved to have. I 
went to university [in Nigeria], but… I was not able to showcase my talents in 
Germany. I had to work in the kitchen and I cleaned toilets and I washed dishes and 
carpentry… all sorts of menial jobs to keep on. While I was trying to find an 
opportunity as an artist. And I lived these past few years as an illegal immigrant [...] 
I decided to live like someone living underground. Surviving that… later I decided to 
move to Spain to see what I can do with myself. And now that I have two years in 
Spain I have an art exhibition of my creations here in Málaga … Five libraries are 
going to exhibit my work... I feel like someone who has lost time in Germany. But 
then I also feel like the experience I got in Germany was hard but it will propel me 
to have a better life. Some of the artworks there were titled ‘My other Self’. […] In 
Germany they know me as someone who is a very good dishwasher. But that is not 
who I am, because I am by profession an artist […] That is also what a lot of other 
                                                        
 
97 From Igbo: Nwakaego (Child is more precious than money). 
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Africans and Nigerians are passing through there in Germany. You are trying to live 
a life that is not yours, because you do not have the document.  
(Kizito, 43, m, Nigerian without residence papers in Málaga) 
In Spain his Spanish language teacher helped him to have his artwork exhibited in 
several public libraries. The exhibition mostly included pieces he had created in Germany, 
where, apart from going to work, he did not venture outside of his flat much due to fear of 
being apprehended without residence papers. During a radio interview at a local 
community radio station, to which I was invited, Kizito was asked to talk about the 
exhibition and provided some further details. In an effort to promote his work another 
Nigerian mentioned that the artwork would also be for sale; however, Kizito replied on air 
that he was mainly honoured to have his artwork seen by a wider public and was not too 
concerned about selling the paintings. We stayed in touch, and Kizito told me that he now is 
married and continues to paint. One of his more recent artworks is entitled The Jailer is 
Liberated 98 which he created in honour of 
the late Nelson Mandela. In an email, 
Kizito sent me an image of this artwork 
(Illustration 8.3) together with this 
explanation: ‘Thinking of the Anti-
Apartheid struggle and racism in general, 
I believe that the breakdown of any wall of 
segregation, racism, nepotism, tribalism, 
slavery etc. brings liberation not just for 
those oppressed but also freedom to the 
oppressor.’ In his work, Kizito uses 
traditional, religious, and ancient symbols 
from Nigeria and other countries like 
Egypt, China, Japan and India ‘to show that 
humans can co-exist in harmony 
irrespective of creed or race’. Kizito also 
pointed out that ‘the broken arrow sign is 
an ancient Indian symbol for peace. I hope 
that through this effort we shall have 
peace in this world.’ 
                                                        
 
98 In Igbo: Agbaputawo oche nga 
Illustration 8.3  The Jailor is Liberated by 
Kizito 
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8.4 Summary 
This chapter set out to interrogate the migration outcomes for individuals who engage in 
onward migration. These individuals have lived in a variety of countries and maintain 
transnational connections to several places. The focus on human wellbeing revealed that 
although a large proportion of informants reported an improvement to their perceptual 
wellbeing following an onward migration, others were not as satisfied with the outcome of 
their relocation. The extent to which onward migrants were able to construct wellbeing, 
develop competencies and make choices across borders, was usually linked to the degree of 
agency individuals could exert over their onward migration. Within the context of the EU, 
rights to engage in mobility and seek employment in another member state are stratified 
according to different types of residence permits. Third-country nationals, who acquired a 
European passport, generally faced the least barriers to onward migration. This in turn 
often also had ramifications for their subsequent experiences of settlement and human 
wellbeing in their new country of residence.  
Using the wellbeing approach this study has drawn attention to the material, 
relational and perceptual dimensions of how migrants define what living well means to 
them. This study has highlighted the connections that migrants themselves identify in the 
multi-dimensional evaluations of their lives. For some onward migrants, improvements in 
one dimension of their wellbeing, had positive impacts on other aspects of their wellbeing. 
But interestingly this research also demonstrated that some participants did not necessarily 
enhance their material wellbeing through onward migration, but nonetheless they felt 
richer because they were able to develop their competencies and feel more accepted in their 
new country of residence. Institutional trust and safety also played an important role for 
migrants’ perceptual wellbeing. The second major finding was that more accurate 
information about different EU countries enabled onward migrants to know which places 
were most suited for the accumulation, validation and exchange of certain resources. 
Through onward migration many individuals could validate certain resources, such as 
educational qualifications, that had not been recognised in their previous country of 
residence.  
The findings of this study suggest that the human wellbeing approach is particularly 
suited for exploring the outcomes of onward migration, because it ‘travels’ with the migrant 
(Wright 2012: 9). Given that onward migration is explicitly conceptualised as an open-
ended migration trajectory, the focus on human wellbeing offers insights about how 
migrants experience their multiple emplacements. Furthermore, human wellbeing provides 
a more inter-disciplinary and holistic analysis of migration outcomes, than a focus on either 
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integration or development. A limitation of this study is that the findings were influenced 
by impacts of the ongoing economic and financial crisis which started in 2008. Spain used 
to be a transit country that later turned into a country of settlement for Nigerian migrants; 
however, the recession induced significant onward mobilities from Southern Europe. It is 
therefore important to consider these macro-level factors in addition to the micro-level 
characteristics of the migrants, in order to understand how migration patterns and 
trajectories are shaped.  
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Chapter 9  
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
This final chapter serves several functions. I provide an overview of the main research 
findings in relation to the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. In the next section I 
share some general reflections on the overall thesis, and discuss how the findings relate to 
the broader debate around African mobilities and onward migration. Finally, I conclude 
with a discussion about the drawbacks of this study, as well as possible future research and 
policy recommendations. 
9.1 Findings obtained across the research questions 
In this thesis I have explored the process of onward migration by focusing on Nigerian 
migrants in Germany, the UK and Spain. Through a multi-sited and mixed-methods 
approach I was able to take an in-depth look at this under-studied migration trajectory and 
generate new insights. The ethnographic methods I employed and the limited statistical 
data available about onward migrants preclude any statistical representativeness. 
Nevertheless, onward migration forms part of continuously evolving Nigerian migration 
strategies and patterns and the insights I have gleaned from my in-depth analysis constitute, 
I would claim, an original and valuable research contribution. 
 
• What are the drivers of Nigerian intra-European onward migration? 
 
In order to situate the practice of onward migration, I examined the multi-faceted aspects 
of Nigerian migration patterns. I showed in Chapter 4 how Nigerian migration dynamics 
evolved over time and outlined three distinctive post-colonial migration phases. I argued 
that increasing numbers of young Nigerians have started forming migration aspirations, 
due to high unemployment rates, a deterioration in the quality of education, growing 
corruption, rising living costs and different forms of violence that have contributed to a 
rapid decline of living standards in the country. Similar to other youths in the Middle East 
and other parts of Africa, young people in Nigeria find it hard to attain markers of social 
adulthood. Unlike previous generations that reached adulthood in newly-independent 
Nigeria, the youth today struggles to secure a stable livelihood, build a home, start their own 
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family and provide for their family and kin. Therefore young Nigerians see themselves 
‘stuck’ and unable to achieve the social markers of adulthood (Honwana 2012; Singerman 
2007). Emigration is thus regarded as one possible strategy through which young Nigerians 
can hope to realise their personal ambitions and fulfil the expectations of their families. 
The Nigerians I interviewed used a range of migration routes and strategies to enter 
Europe. The vast majority of my informants arrived in Europe by plane, held valid tourist 
visas and then overstayed. But a significant proportion of Nigerians also came to Europe as 
students and family migrants. Amongst my informants only twelve individuals transited 
various countries on their way towards Europe and crossed the Mediterranean (Carling 
2006; Collyer 2007). Until now the onward mobilities of Africans within and beyond Europe 
have remained relatively under-studied. The available data suggest, however, that onward 
migration has formed part of intra-European migration patterns for several decades 
(Chapter 5).  
Based on a literature review of migration theories (Chapter 2), I proposed a 
conceptual framework to analyse the drivers of onward migration, taking into account the 
policies and regulations at the macro-level, as well as the networks and cultural 
perspectives at the meso-level. At the core of this framework is migrants’ pursuit of 
improved human wellbeing based on a function of evolving aspirations and capabilities of 
the migrants during their migration project. Individuals with sufficient capabilities – such 
as financial resources, contacts, information, etc. – are more likely to realise their 
aspirations for (onward) migration.  
Through an analysis of the policies and practices operating at various scales – from 
the supra-national, national, regional right down to the consular level – I illustrated their 
respective impacts on the various stages of the migration process. Since high-income 
countries implemented more selective visa policies in the 1990s, it has become more 
difficult and unpredictable for Nigerian nationals to realise their migration ambitions. But 
the barriers have not completely stopped immigration to Europe; they rather function as 
filters that make emigration more challenging and selective (Chapter 5). I argued that 
immigration and visa policies not only create ‘closures’, they also generate ‘openings’. 
Enhanced access to information through the internet and other means of communication 
allows migrants to learn about particular openings such as study opportunities or labour 
market conditions (Kleist and Thorsen 2017; Vertovec 2004). Furthermore, I analysed how 
socio-economic transformations and continuities in the different destination countries 
impacted on the migrant decision-making process. After extended periods of residence in 
Europe, informants opted to relocate, because socio-economic changes in the initial country 
of settlement had negatively impacted their lives. For instance, the flexibilisation and 
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precarisation of work contracts in many European countries since the 1990s, as well as the 
onset of the global financial crisis compelled migrants to relocate elsewhere to find 
employment (Chapter 6). Meanwhile, other onward migrants reported that growing anti-
immigrant rhetoric in wider public discourse had contributed to their decision to relocate.  
In addition, I assessed the relevance of networks throughout the migration 
trajectory. In Chapter 6, I highlighted how various networks not only encouraged but also 
facilitated Nigerian emigration. For instance, global media and co-ethnic social networks 
raised the aspirations of young people in Nigeria and often also created an unrealistic image 
that in Europe the ‘money grows on trees’. But once in Europe migrants did not have to rely 
solely on these networks for information, as they usually could undertake preparatory trips 
before onward migrating. Thus, new friendships and relationships that informants formed 
in Europe, so-called ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973), expanded their social networks in turn 
augmenting the number of ‘reachable’ destinations (Chapter 7). Nevertheless, policy 
changes and social networks do not fully explain the whole range of determinants of intra-
European onward mobility. 
Given that I conceptualise onward migration as an open-ended and multi-
directional migration trajectory, I found it fruitful to consider how the aspirations and 
capabilities influence onward migration. Analysing onward migration from a migrant-
centred perspective revealed how migrant decision-making evolved across space and time. 
On arrival in Europe, Nigerians on the whole experienced a segmented, racialised and 
sexualised incorporation into the labour market because their skills and knowledge were 
not fully recognised or undervalued. I demonstrated how access to formal employment for 
Nigerians varied significantly across member states (Chapter 6). Many informants therefore 
onward migrated with the ambition of furthering their education and finding better (paid) 
employment. Importantly, onward migration was also related to different life course events. 
Having established their own families, Nigerians not only relocated in order to improve 
their own lives, they were equally concerned about enhancing the life prospects of their 
children and shielding them from discrimination.  
The findings of this study thus suggest that the drivers and determinants of 
(onward) migration are multi-dimensional, dynamic and relational. Commonly, migrant 
decision-making is studied in the country of origin by taking into account the policies, 
networks and aspirations that affected emigration. I have demonstrated that throughout 
their migration project migrants continuously evaluate the possibilities of staying, 
returning and onward migrating. Therefore it is important to consider how the act of 
migration transforms migrant decision-making during the life course and the migration 
project. 
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• What are the patterns of intra-European onward migration?  
 
The trajectories of my informants suggest that Nigerian intra-European onward migration 
follows multiform migration patterns, which are accompanied by other internal and non-
migratory mobilities. Through a sequence analysis of the international migration 
trajectories of my informants, I was able to compare and contrast their spatial trajectories. 
There were several patterns that emerged. First, the trajectories of my informants indicated 
a trend of relocation in the direction of the UK. I therefore argued that the pattern of 
diversification of Nigerian emigration beyond colonial patterns, is complemented by a 
partial convergence of migration trajectories towards former imperial metropoles and 
diasporic hubs (Chapter 7). This trend of converging migration trajectories in the direction 
of the UK is normally overlooked, because in the analysis of immigration statistics the 
migrants’ country of birth is often assumed to be their former place of residence.  
Furthermore, the migration trajectories of my informants tended to follow an 
underlying logic that was influenced by the ‘meaning’ of the places produced within the 
Nigerian diaspora. As a result onward migrants typically tried to move upwards within the 
a commonly perceived hierarchy of Nigerian ‘diasporic nodes’ (Voigt-Graf 2004). Migrants 
are therefore actively involved in producing and reproducing the ‘meaning’ of places. These 
findings were supported by analysis of relevant statistical data, according to which 
Nigerians and other Africans are engaging in onward migration, not only in Europe but also 
in direction of other destinations like the USA, Canada and Australia (Chapter 5). In cases 
where onward migrants did not follow this logic and individuals moved to lower ranked 
destinations, like Spain or Italy, they generally were motivated by the need to secure a legal 
status. Such irregular moves often occurred in haste and without much preparation, as a 
reaction to expulsion orders which require individuals to leave the national territory 
(Chapter 6).  
In addition, this study has highlighted the importance of several ‘enfolded 
mobilities’ as a means through which migrants maintained their everyday transnational 
lives (Williams et al. 2011). These mobilities at times were undertaken for pleasure, as 
holidays or visits to see new places on weekend trips. Informants with EU citizenship also 
used their enhanced mobility rights to undertake trips outside of Europe, to destinations 
like the USA and Canada.  For others continued back-and-forth mobility between various 
destinations represented an important coping mechanism to secure livelihoods. Especially, 
those migrants who became unemployed or had to give up their businesses during the 
global financial crisis, engaged in shorter semi-legal mobility to North-Western Europe in 
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search of work (Chapter 8). For some, these ‘enfolded mobilities’ eventually facilitated an 
onward migration, seeing that informants could familiarise themselves with new places as 
they went through prolonged periods of preparation that involved various intensities of 
transnational mobility and livelihood. I suggested that Nigerians who stayed put in one 
country managed to fulfil their aspirations through situated practices of ‘emplaced mobility’ 
(Brickell and Datta 2011). Several informants engaged in ‘virtual’ and transnational 
mobility by enrolling in online degree courses, placing their children in international 
schools,  attending Nigerian-led churches and socialising in Nigerian diasporic spaces. 
Moreover, I suggested that onward migration geographically re-configured 
migrants’ transnational families. Individual household members often relocated in a 
temporally-lagged fashion, therefore multi-local households were common amongst 
Nigerian onward migrants (Chapter 7). Furthermore, onward migrants maintained their 
transnational family ties by shuttling between several countries on a frequent basis for 
several years. Some eventually arranged for their families to join them at the new 
destination, whereas in other cases the onward migrants ‘returned’ to their family in the 
previous European country of residence. Thus, ‘enfolded mobilites’ were not always 
directed at new destinations. For the purpose of visiting family and relatives, onward 
migrants also travelled to their previous countries of residence. The lower travel cost for 
intra-European trips, made ‘return’ visits to previous European countries of residence more 
affordable than return visits to Nigeria. Second-generation migrants had visited family 
friends and relatives in other parts of Europe more often than they returned to their 
parents’ ‘ancestral homeland’ . 
Finally, I found that there was considerable variation as to how transnational 
identities, boundaries and space were imagined, experienced and lived. Members of the 
same family expressed very different feelings of transnational identity, which further 
evolved during the migration project. Several of my informants challenged dichotomous 
understandings of identity and asserted ‘hybrid’ identities, or multiple subject-positions, 
that lay beyond the categorical binary structures. When onward migrants move to a new 
place, I found that constructions of identity underwent further negotiations – due to 
renewed contestation and distinct boundary-making practices. 
 
 
• What are the outcomes of intra-European onward migration? 
 
The outcomes of migration are typically measured either in terms of migrants’ ‘integration’ 
(or ‘assimilation’) in the destination country or the contributions migrants make to the 
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‘development’ of their origin country. This means that the frames through which migration 
outcomes are viewed distinguish between the ‘here’ and ‘there’, despite the fact that 
migrants often lead multi-local lives. Nieswand (2011) has highlighted the ‘status paradox’ 
that can lead migrants to be perceived as highly successful by their kin during their short 
return trips, while at the same time they are doing low-status jobs in Europe. In the case of 
onward migrants, understanding the outcomes of migration is even more complex. How do 
you measure the migration outcome of a ‘return’ to the previous European country of 
residence? How do you assess the migration outcome of those who remain continually 
mobile? Furthermore, both ‘integration’ and ‘development’ privilege state-centric measures 
of migration outcomes that do not necessarily take into account the aspirations that 
migrants hope to realise as part of their migration project (Chapter 2). 
For a more holistic understanding of what it means to live well, processes of 
development and integration have been assessed from a wellbeing perspective (Wright 
2012). Wellbeing also features prominently in the Igbo and Yoruba cosmologies as a value 
that is to be respected and promoted amongst individuals and kin. Furthermore, Nigerian 
Pentecostal churches commonly emphasise the combined spiritual and material wellbeing 
of its members. In my analysis, I paid close attention to how migrants define what living 
well means to them and how they see this notion circumscribed by others. For a more 
nuanced analysis, I distinguished between the material, relational and perceptual 
dimensions of wellbeing (Sumner and Mallet 2011; Wright 2012). Moreover, I illustrated 
how onward migration is characterised by various dilemmas, dreams and disappointments 
(Chapter 8).  
This thesis has highlighted the connections that migrants identify in the multi-
dimensional evaluations of their lives. For some onward migrants, improvements in one 
dimension of their wellbeing had positive impacts on other aspects of their life. But 
interestingly this research also demonstrated that some onward migrants did not 
necessarily enhance their material wellbeing through onward migration; nonetheless they 
expressed fulfilment because they were able to develop their competencies, feel safer and 
more accepted in their new country of residence. The second major finding was that more 
accurate information about different EEA member states enabled onward migrants to know 
which places were most suited for the accumulation, validation and exchange of certain 
resources. Through onward migration many individuals were able to validate certain 
resources, such as educational qualifications, that had not been recognised or had been 
under-valued in their previous country of residence.  
Importantly, the findings suggest that the extent to which onward migrants were 
able to construct wellbeing across spatial boundaries was often linked to the degree of 
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agency individuals could exert over their onward migration. Within the context of Europe, 
rights to engage in mobility and seek employment in another member state are stratified 
according to different types of residence permits (Chapter 5). Third-country nationals who 
attained a European passport generally faced the least barriers to onward migration. This 
had a positive influence on their subsequent experiences of settlement and human 
wellbeing in their new country of residence. Others who onward migrated semi-legally with 
either short-term or permanent residence papers in many cases faced significant challenges 
in the place they were attempting to settle. 
In sum, considering the outcomes of onward migration with a wellbeing approach 
was effective because it allowed me to see how migrants perceive the outcomes of their 
migration project, through a multi-dimensional and multi-local perspective. Even though 
material wellbeing was valued and promoted in Nigerian social contexts, such as the family 
and Pentecostal churches, it was not the only factor that influenced migrants’ evaluations of 
their lives. The narratives of the informants revealed the importance of perceptual and 
relational factors in shaping their understandings of a ‘good life’ – being close to family, 
feeling safe and welcomed, trust in institutions, etc. While many participants were able to 
actualise their ‘imagined futures’, some individuals struggled to realise their aspirations as 
they were forever seeking even greener pastures. 
9.2 Relevance of findings for migration studies  
This thesis on the topic of intra-European onward migration of Nigerians contributes 
several new insights to migration studies. These contributions mainly extend knowledge 
regarding the conceptualisation of migrant decision-making, transnationalism and the 
evaluation of migration outcomes.  
Migration used to be conceptualised as a one-off event based on a decision made at 
a single point in time. Yet, the ‘mobilities turn’ has had a profound impact on the social 
sciences, and increasingly mobilities and settlement are understood as interdependent and 
relational processes. More attention is now being paid to how people have differentiated 
access to mobility and migration. Nonetheless, I argue that migration drivers and migrant 
decision-making are all too often analysed as spatially and temporally ‘fixed’ in the origin 
countries. In order to understand the drivers of onward migration, I therefore proposed a 
dynamic and actor-centred approach that captures various contingent processes that 
influence migrants’ aspirations and capabilities throughout the migration process. To this 
end, I analysed how changing policies and conditions in the destination countries, evolving 
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social networks, as well as various life-stage events affect the ways in which migrants 
evaluate their migration project. Conceptualising migration as a process through which 
migrants hope to achieve wellbeing for themselves and their families, allows us to 
understand why migrants continually weigh up the possibility of return migration, against 
the other options of staying put in the current country of residence or onward migrating 
elsewhere.  
Furthermore, this research extends our understanding of transnationalism, because 
it highlights the multi-sited, multi-directional and situated nature of transnational ties and 
practices. Empirical research on transnationalism is often limited to the transnational links 
between the country of origin and one destination country. My findings highlight the 
importance of inter-destination transnational practices, in addition to the connections that 
migrants maintain with family, kin and institutions in the origin countries. Through their 
continued mobilities, Nigerian migrants are also actively involved in the production of 
transnational space. New social connections that migrants form throughout the migration 
project expand and diversify their transnational networks. Migrants’ social networks also 
undergo repeated reconfigurations through the continued migration of other members of 
the network. Importantly, migrants also contribute to the differentially situated and 
embedded meanings of places. I suggested that the ‘translocality’ of certain places allowed 
migrants to satisfy their transnational aspirations without the need of physically onward 
migrating. Some parents enrolled their children in local international schools or studied for 
online degrees at British universities, which represented a form of ‘virtual’ onward mobility. 
Interestingly, onward migrants frequently ‘return’ to their former place(s) of residence 
within Europe, seeing that travel is easy and affordable.  
Finally, I proposed human wellbeing as a suitable lens through which to analyse 
migration effects in a transnational setting. So far, the narrow economic definitions that are 
often applied to measure development and integration only capture a limited part of the 
total story of migration outcomes. The findings of this study suggest that the human 
wellbeing approach is particularly suited for exploring the outcomes of onward migration, 
because it ‘travels’ with the migrant (Wright 2012: 9). Given that onward migration is 
explicitly conceptualised as an open-ended migration trajectory, the focus on human 
wellbeing offers insights about how migrants experience their multiple, and often 
simultaneous, embodiments and emplacements. My informants typically made multi-
dimensional comparisons when evaluating their situation. They considered their wellbeing 
relative to that of fellow diasporans or that of the family members they left behind in 
Nigeria, but also compared their situation to that of other migrants or native-born 
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Europeans. Therefore, wellbeing allows us to understand the impacts of migration from the 
perspective of the migrants. 
9.3 Future research and policy recommendations 
This section focuses on some of the drawbacks of the research design of this study, including 
the questions that could not be addressed and the new questions that arose. In this way my 
study generates a range of possibilities for future research on onward migration. 
This thesis outlined three main factors have that have contributed to the emergence 
and current shape of Nigerian onward migration towards and within Europe. First, 
changing visa and immigration policies since the 1990s have contributed to a growing 
‘diversification’ of emigration flows beyond colonial patterns, which was followed by a 
partial ‘convergence’ through onward migration to more ‘traditional’ destination countries 
and other diaspora hubs. Second, a wide range of networks enabled Nigerians to overcome 
emigration barriers, and to a lesser extent continually evolving networks also played a role 
in intra-European onward mobilities. Finally, a dynamic view of aspirations and capabilities 
of migrants helped to assess their impact on emigration, and in addition showed their 
continued importance throughout the life course and migration project. 
One shortcoming of this thesis is its focus on a single migrant group. Some 
experiences of Nigerian migrants might resonate with the experiences of other migrant 
groups – especially migrants originating from countries confronted with increasing barriers 
due to the selective visa and immigration policies implemented in Europe. Meanwhile, other 
findings are not as widely applicable to other migrant groups because they are linked to the 
particularities of the Nigerian context. One issue is that the high incidence of onward 
migration amongst Nigerian migrants is likely to be related to their low intentions for 
permanent return – due to ongoing violence, failing infrastructure, rising living costs and 
growing income disparities in Nigeria. This is one important contextual factor why migrants 
perceive a relocation to a third country as more attractive and feasible than a return 
migration to Nigeria. Therefore future research could be conducted with migrant groups 
that originate from countries with varying conditions for return. This could generate new 
insights concerning the extent to which the conditions in the origin country are associated 
with migrants’ aspirations for onward migration.  
Another shortcoming of this thesis was the lack of research in Nigeria. It would have 
been valuable to include more information about the emigration conditions and the ways in 
which individuals form migration aspirations in Nigeria. I did my best to convey this 
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information through my informants’ narratives and other secondary sources, but this can 
only partly substitute for fieldwork in Nigeria. Research in Nigeria would have also enabled 
me to speak to (temporary) return migrants. Finding out about the aspirations and 
capabilities of return migrants would have enabled me to study how their experiences 
differed from those of other Nigerian migrants. It would have been particularly interesting 
to see how migrants who returned to Nigeria against their will viewed their migration 
project. Adjusting to life in Nigeria can be hard for those who voluntarily returned as well 
as those who were deported. Several of my informants re-emigrated to Europe, as they 
struggled to earn a livelihood in Nigeria. 
In terms of the findings that were generated by this study, it is important to 
recognise the impacts of the economic and financial crisis which started in 2008. Spain used 
to be a transit country that later quickly transformed into a country of settlement for 
Nigerian migrants. However, the recession induced significant onward mobilities from 
Southern Europe. The continuous semi-legal mobilities that many of my informants 
engaged in, to create a livelihood for themselves and their families across European borders, 
are likely to have been more pronounced as a result of the crisis.  Such macro-level shifts in 
addition to the micro-level motivations of the migrants need to be taken into account to 
understand how migration patterns and trajectories are shaped.  
In terms of migration policy, more accurate migration statistics are certainly likely 
to enhance our understanding of onward migration. European governments thus far have 
focused on implementing highly selective mobility regimes, stopping irregular migrants 
from arriving and removing them from their territory. However, due to the concomitant 
demand for migrant workers across the region, these policies have largely failed to fulfil the 
objectives of reducing migration and deterring more migrants from arriving. Instead, ever 
more money is being spent on migration management and more migrants are embarking 
on perilous and, in many cases, fatal journeys. Therefore, ways need to be found to provide 
more safe and legal migration channels that address the needs of destination and origin 
societies alike. 
 Third-country nationals still have to overcome considerable hurdles and wait for 
long periods to attain stable residence permits in Europe. As a result, they are often unable 
to work and reside in the places where they could be more productive and feel more 
fulfilled. European governments should aim to provide tailor-made integration 
programmes, access to language courses and recognition of qualifications, as well as clearer 
and quicker pathways to stable residence permits. This would shorten the time that 
migrants currently spend trying to regularise their stay and enter the labour market, and 
enable migrants to make fuller use of their skills and knowledge. 
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At the moment political parties in several European states are reinforcing anti-
immigrant sentiments for the purpose of short-term political gains. Currently, hardly any 
attention is being paid to the high proportion of immigrants who decide to leave their 
destinations by either returning to their origin country or moving elsewhere. Several 
studies confirm that onward migrants are positively selected on skills and a highly 
motivated migrant group. Rather than investing ever more resources in deterring migrants, 
destination countries could consider policies that would make them more attractive for 
particular migrant groups. More focus should be placed on policies that promote wellbeing 
for individuals and reduce global inequalities. 
9.4 Some final words 
On the countless flights, train journeys and bus rides I have taken during this PhD – doing 
multi-sited fieldwork, maintaining a multi-local household, visiting family members and 
friends, relocating for visiting fellowships and attending conferences in various countries – 
I always wondered how many fellow onward migrants I was sharing my journeys with. In 
the several places I have called home over the years, I had numerous fascinating 
conversations with onward migrants. And it certainly was a privilege to hear about the 
experiences of the Nigerian onward migrants I interviewed as part of this study. We do not 
share the same ‘roots’, have not travelled via the same ‘routes’ and are likely to end up in 
different destinations. But I felt there was a shared understanding of the complexity of our 
lived experiences and perspectives. We understand the effort it takes to make homes in 
several countries. We speak several languages more or less fluently. We perceive and enact 
different cultural codes. 
I started this thesis with an anecdote about my encounter with Harrison who got me 
interested in the topic of onward migration. I conclude with another vignette from the end 
of my fieldwork. Having completed my multi-sited research in three countries, I was at the 
airport in Málaga and standing in line at the gate waiting for departure. I was nervously 
tucking at my hand-luggage trying to make the books, research diaries and other precious 
items fit neatly into the bag. Another passenger was repacking her hand-luggage in the 
seating area. She raised her eyebrows and glanced in the direction of the flight attendants 
who were about to scrutinise boarding passes and our bags before entering the airplane. 
The flight was fully booked and the woman I had eye contact with at the departure gate 
eventually came to sit next to me. Her hand-luggage was bursting at the seams, but she 
managed to stow it away in the overhead lockers. Becky was nervous about the take-off and 
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wanted to know whether I lived in Düsseldorf, the destination of our flight. It turned out 
that she was from Nigeria and had lived in Spain for several years. She was now going to 
live with her boyfriend in Germany. I told her about the research I was doing and that I had 
interviewed many Nigerians. The topic did not surprise Becky in the slightest seeing that 
she knew many Nigerians who had lived in several countries. We continued chatting about 
the different places we knew in Spain, her trading business and life in Germany. After we 
landed Becky asked me whether she could use my mobile to call her boyfriend, as she could 
not see him in the arrival area. We continued talking for a little while longer until her 
boyfriend came to collect Becky a few minutes later. Then we exchanged goodbyes and I 
wished her well for life in Germany. 
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